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ABSTRACT 
In the case of LaGrand (Germany v United States), the International Court of Justice 
held that the United States (US) had violated its international obligation to Germany 
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations when it executed two German 
nationals without first informing them of their consular rights. The case came before 
the court after the United States had disregarded a preliminary ruling passed by the 
IC], which directed the US not to execute the German nationals pending the outcome 
of the IC] case. The decision raised the issue of the effect ofIC] decisions in domestic 
proceedings and the effectiveness of IC] enforcement mechanisms. This thesis 
considers the possibility of a role for national courts as active enforcers of IC] 
decisions. It is argued that whilst evidence shows that there is no legal obligation on 
courts to enforce IC] decisions, there is certainly room in international law to 
facilitate this development. In support of this argument, the thesis demonstrates how 
basic presuppositions about international law have shifted over the last few decades. 
This shift has been both the impetus and the result of globalisation. The case of 
LaGrand alongside similar cases is used to show how national courts may play an 
increased role in the enforcement of IC] decisions. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND TO THESIS 
The consensual nature! of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as 
the ICJ) has been one of the high-ranking reasons for its limited jurisdiction.2 It is 
suggested, however, that the limited number of states accepting the court's 
jurisdiction is not "the disease itself but the symptom".3 The disease is the court's 
previous inability to pass judgments that reflect changing social norms in the 
international community and the court's poor enforcement mechanisms. In the past 
the court exhibited a tendency to prefer the old Westphalian system, which hailed the 
preservation of sovereignty as supreme. This is well illustrated by some of the 
jUdgments passed by the court. South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v 
South Africat is an apt example.s The case had two phases, but it is the second phase 
1 The IC] only has jurisdiction over those states, which consent to its jurisdiction. SEE Article 36 of the 
IC] Statute where it states that the function of the court is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it. 
2 Skordas 'IC]: Guardian of Sovereignty or Catalyst for Integration' (2002) 8 International Legal 
Theory 49. 
3 Ibid. 
4 (SEE judgment of 18 July 1966) 1966 IC] Reports 6. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij .org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ilsaesasummary660718.htm on 15 November 2005). 
5 In this case the Applicants alleged that South Africa had breached the League of Nations Mandate 
over South West Africa. The alleged contraventions were of a humanitarian nature. The court however 
did not deal with the merits of the claim since it held that the Applicants had no standing to bring the 
matter. For more examples, see the Nicaragua case of 1986, (Accessed at http://www.icj-
1 
of the case that is of concern. In this case the court refused to enquire into various 
allegations brought by Liberia and Ethiopia (in their capacity as concerned members 
of the League of Nations) that South Africa was breaching its mandate over South 
West Africa. Some of the alleged contraventions were of a humanitarian nature, in 
that the Applicants were questioning whether the Respondent had promoted the moral 
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa. It was held 
that the Applicants did not have standing to bring the matter before the Court. This 
finding was based on the premise that members of the League of Nations (such as 
Liberia and Ethiopia) could not litigate on 'conduct provisions' (any provision 
pertaining to the power and obligations of a Mandatory over the inhabitants of a 
particular territory) unless the Applicants could prove a 'special interest' or legal right 
in the matter. The effect of the decision was to say that even humanitarian 
considerations are not in themselves sufficient to generate legal rights and obligations 
and there must be some other established legal right to warrant an enquiry into the 
contraventions.6 The South West Africa cases thus strengthened an authoritarian 
version of state sovereignty at the expense of the international interests in 
safeguarding human rights and promoting change in the international legal system.7 
1.1.1 Germany v United States8 
Despite this history, the court has recently adopted certain standpoints that appear to 
indicate an abandonment of this traditionalist worldview of international law. In the 
case of LaGrand (Germany v United Statesl (hereinafter referred to as LaGrand), the 
IC] took a bold decision, and ruled on a matter that implicated a nation's criminal 
justice system, something that is traditionally regarded as a municipal law matter. 10 
cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusfTame.htm on 15 November 2005) and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion of 1996 (Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanfTame.htm on 15 
November 2005). 
6 South West Africa Case (second phase). 
7 Skordas (2002) 8 International Legal Theory at 52. 
8 Germany v United States (judgment of 27 June 2001). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm on 5 November 2005). 
9 LaGrand (judgment of 27 June 2001). 
10 LaGrand (Judgment of27 June 2001) para 52. 
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Germany had filed an application in the IC] against the United States (hereinafter 
referred to as U.S.) concerning the impending execution of two German nationals 
resulting in a provisional measures order being issued by the IC].l1 The order was 
however disregarded by the U.S. and the matter brought before the court for a final 
determination. One of the court's most significant findings in the judgment is that the 
procedural default rule l2 as applied by the U.S. criminal courts prevented foreign 
nationals from exercising their rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Rights (VCCR)13. This is a U.S. rule that originates in the state laws of 
criminal procedure. The rule governs post-conviction relief in any criminal case and 
requires that if a defendant is to challenge his conviction, he must first have raised all 
claims either at the trial court level or in his first appeal. If the defendant fails to do 
so, his claim is deemed to be waived or procedurally defaulted. Thus in the U.S. if a 
foreign detainee does not raise a violation of the VCCR at the trial stage or during his 
first set of appeals, he is deemed to waive his claim. 14 The IC] thus ordered that in the 
future the U.S. courts should consider such a claim on the merits, and allow review 
and reconsideration of both the sentence and conviction regardless of the stage in the 
litigation. 
The IC] order in LaGrand is significant because the ruling effectively requires the 
U.S. courts to disregard the procedural default rule when an accused raises a violation 
of Article 36. The U.S. argued that many of Germany's submissions in the case 
required the IC] to address and correct U.S. errors of law and errors of judgment by 
U.S. judges. IS The U.S. alleged further that this would amount to the IC] playing the 
role of an ultimate court of appeal in criminal proceedings, a role it was not 
11 LaGrand (Provisional Measures Order of 3 March 1999) Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm on 6 November 2006. 
12 For an in-depth discussion of the rule see Weinman "The Clash between U.S. Criminal Procedure 
and The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: An Analysis of the International Court of Justice 
Decision in the LaGrand case" (2001-2002) 17 Am. U In! '/ L. Rev. 857 at 880. 
13 All references to "Article 36" in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, are to Article 36 of the 
VCCR. 
14 See for instance section 32 ofthe Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. 
15 LaGrand Uudgment of27 June 2001) para 50. 
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empowered to carry.16 The latter opinion IS founded on the premIse that the 
recognition of state sovereignty places a prohibition on the Ie] to intervene in matters 
that implicate domestic policyY This is the traditional understanding of sovereignty, 
which in this globalised context must now give way to a more balanced appreciation 
of sovereignty. 18 In response to the U.S. objections, the Ie] stated that its role in the 
case was merely to interpret the scope and application ofthe VeeR and in so doing; it 
was not engaging in any exercise contrary to its founding statute. 19 The Ie] in 
LaGrand therefore showed its ability to apply international legal principles to develop 
international law, even where this may implicate domestic proceedings. Yet the 
effectiveness ofthe judgment lies in its implementation. 
In analysing academic commentaries on the case, there is a general sentiment that the 
U.S. courts have failed by not implementing the Ie] decision.2o Some have openly 
stated that the U.S. has simply responded in a way that reflects U.S. aberrance of 
16 Ibid. 
17 The IC] Statute is silent on this aspect, but Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the 
United Nations from intervening in any matter that is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
State. This clause is an outworking of Article 2(1) of the Charter which recognises the sovereignty of 
all states. 
18 The traditional understanding of sovereignty is as it was defined at the Peace of Westphalia. This 
definition refers to a state's right to autonomy (self-rule) and to be left alone. Recent jurisprudence is 
critical of this view of sovereignty on the basis that it is obsolete because society has evolved from 
insular states to interaction. These ideas are encapsulated by Slaughter "Sovereignty and Power in a 
Networked World Order" (2004) 40 Stan. J.Int'l L 283-327. 
19 See LaGrand Gudgment of 27 June 2001) para 53, where the court noted implicitly that its decision 
would implicate matter of a domestic nature. In response, the court left the issue of an appropriate 
remedy to the U.S. to determine. In this way, the IC] was able to develop international law by 
interpreting the VCCR without overstepping its mandate in terms of art. 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. 
20 See the following: Drinan "Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Private 
Enforcement in American Courts after LaGrand" (2001-2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1303 in which she 
comments that the U.S. courts should implement the IC] decision because they are well equipped to do 
so having the experience to balance rights and employ prejudice analysis where the criminal justice 
process has been tainted. Ray "Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. 
Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular relations" (2003) 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1731 where 
Ray proposes that the only guarantee to the observance of the VCCR in future cases is a definitive 
decision that conforms to the IC] decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Fitzpatrick "The Unreality of 
International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case" (2002) 27 Yale. J. Int'! L. 427 shows 
that the deficiency in U.S. practices with respect to consular rights is a telling reflection of the unreality 
of international law in U.S. For a differing opinion see Weisburd "International Courts and American 
Courts" (1999-2000) 21 Mich. J. Int'l L. 877 in which he argues that neither the Statute of the IC] nor 
the U.N. Charter create a binding obligation on national courts to implement even its binding decisions. 
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internationallaw.21 This thesis advocates that theories that base their criticism of the 
U.S. court responses purely on legal grounds have failed to take cognisance of the 
international context in which international law operates.22 The thesis thus considers 
whether there is a legal obligation on national courts to implement Ie] decisions?3 
1.1.2 Significance of the LaGrand case 
LaGrand was not the only decision to raise this issue of the VeeR. The matter was 
raised pre- LaGrand in the case of Breard24 and was revisited post -LaGrand in the 
case of Avena and other Mexicans Nationals. 25 The trilogy of cases is of academic 
interest and importance because they present a rare instance where the treaty 
obligations of a state affecting individual rights became the subject of binding 
international adjudication. The cases are a clear manifestation of the tensions that can 
exist between international law and domestic law, whilst simultaneously raising the 
question of the role of Ie] decision in domestic law. Resultantly at one level, the 
21 Paulus "From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication" (2004) 15 No. 
4 EJIL 782-812, Fitzpatrick (2002) Yale. J Int'l L. 427. 
22The disciplines of international law and politics are inextricably linked, more so when dealing with 
the ICJ which has jurisdiction over inter-state cases. As such, any action taken by a national court 
which implicates international obligations necessarily touches on foreign affairs matter, which is a 
political matter. (For a further discussion on this see Reus-Smit The Politics of International Law 
(2004) 14). It thus follows that many political doctrines form a barrier to national court enforcement of 
ICJ decisions; for instance the political question doctrine and the doctrine of separation of powers. The 
former prohibits courts dealing with matters of a political nature since they are deemed to be best 
handled by the political branches of government. The latter is a common principle in many democratic 
states that requires a clear demarcation between the responsibilities of the different branches of 
government. For a further discussion of this see chapter 5 of this thesis and Weisburd (1999-2000) 
Mich. J Int'l L. 877. 
23 Weisburd «(1999-2000) Mich. J Int'l L. 890) is of the opinion that there is no obligation for 
domestic courts to implement even binding provisional decision of the ICl This is supported by Sellers 
("The Authority of the International Court of Justice" (2002) 8 International Legal Theory 41) who in 
his article on the authority of the ICJ, argues that decisions of the ICJ are not decisive evidence of 
international law and therefore the ICJ has no scope to create law international and its mandate stops at 
resolving disputes placed by parties before it. However, Skordas ("ICJ: Guardian of Sovereignty" 
(2002) 8 International Legal Theory 49) puts forward a proposition for the role of the ICJ as a catalyst 
for integration as opposed to a guardian of sovereignty. He argues for a greater role for the IC] that 
goes beyond it merely settling disputes. 
24 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States) [1998] IC] Reports 248 
(Order of 10 November 1998). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausiTame.htm on 6 November 2005. 
25 Avena And other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States) (decision of 31 March 2004). 
Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusiTame.htm on 6 November 2005. 
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cases demonstrate the ICJ's ability to develop international law by unapologetically 
adopting strong positions whilst on another level the cases raise the issue of the 
enforcement of international decisions by national courts. 
The significance of the cases is enhanced by the involvement of the death penalty 
issue. The majority of democratic nations across the world have abandoned the death 
penalty as a form of criminal sanction. It is thus not surprising that the international 
community should take a keen interest in the just administration of this form of 
punishment where it is retained. Babcock discusses the increased role that 
international law has to play in US death penalty cases.26 She notes in particular that 
many litigants who once perceived international law as "impractical and exotic" are 
now invoking international treaties in state courts to review decisions of foreign 
courts and international tribunals. There is thus a proliferation of matters involving 
treaty obligations being raised by citizens in domestic courts. Franscioni puts it as 
follows: 
"Today international law pervades areas traditionally reserved to the domestic 
jurisdiction of states ... Adjudication in these areas requires a difficult blending of 
national and international norms and the application of techniques to solve possible 
conflicts between the two legal orders, as well as the dilemma of how to reconcile 
separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary with the rule of law and 
the independence of judges. ,,27 
This calls for a clear policy to be adopted by the U.S courts to deal with Article 36 
litigation28 in response to the IC] decision and a lesson to the rest of the world on how 
globalisation could potentially change both international and national legal relations. 
26 Babcock "The Role ofInternational Law in U.S. Death Penalty Cases" (2002) 15 LJIL 367. 
27 Franscioni "International Law as a Common Language for National Courts" (2001) 36 Tex. Int'/ L. J. 
587 at 588. 
28 Schiffman "Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and Access under the Vienna 
Convention" (2000) 8 Cardozo J. Int'l & Camp L. 27 at 31. 
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1.1.3 The role of domestic courts in implementing ICJ decisions 
Apart from the need to address VCCR violations in the United States, the thesis adds 
to the body of literature by discussing the possibility of national courts implementing 
IC] decisions in a manner that sheds light on the nature of the relationship between 
the IC] and national courts. Henkin says " ... almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
time." 29 Whilst this may be acceptable, it is certain, as it will be seen later, that there 
are sufficient problems with non-complinace of IC] decsison for the idea of national 
courts as potential enforcers of international law to warrant discussion. LaGrand is 
but one example of non-compliance with international obligations, but also a perfect 
springboard for the discussion on the role of national courts in international law. 
Conforti, writing on the relationship between international law and municipal law, 
comments that international law has seen remarkable progress in terms of content but 
very little such progress in respect of procedures and application.3o He thus adds that 
for maximum efficacy in enforcement, international law must rely on domestic 
officials. Many authors will comment to the same effect: that international law 
enforcement mechanisms are inadequate and as a result must rely on domestic 
enforcement.31 Internationalists argue that national courts as comparatively 
independent institutions are better positioned to enforce international law which then 
promotes the international rule of law; and the international rule of law if effectively. 
established will curtail the abuse of political power.32 Few others are found to make a 
case for national courts being active enforcers of IC] decisions.33 LaGrand is thus a 
useful platform to discuss this matter and reflect on ways that national courts can 
relate to the IC] to improve the implementation of its decisions. Franscioni, writing on 
29 How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (1979) at 47. 
30 "Notes on the Relationship between International and National Law" (2001) 3 international Law 
Forum du droit international 18 at 18-24. 
31 See for example Ray (2003) Cal. L. Rev. 1731. 
32 Kumm "International Law in .National Courts: the International Rule of Law and the Limits of the 
Internationalist Model" (2003-2004) 44 Va. J. int'l L. 20 at 24. 
33 See Ray (2003) Cal. L. Rev. 1731, Slaughter & White "The Future of International Law is Domestic 
(or The European Way of Law)" (2006) 47 Harv. int'/ L.J. 327. 
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the application of international law by national judges, says that in the wake of a new 
globalised community, the traditional straitjacket roles of national courts should be 
stripped away.34 He argues in favour of the removal of all obstacles that hinder the 
effective enforcement of international law by national courts such as judicial 
deference to the executive. Kumm, discussing the concept of an internationalist model 
and the international rule of law, finds that there is support for the claim that national 
courts may be active enforcers of international law, although there are limits to this 
power. 35 International legal theory has thus begun to call for a shift in jurisprudence 
both at national and international levels to accommodate the changing global values36 
and reflect the role of the judiciary in an inter-connected world. 
This controversial decision in LaGrand shows a dramatic shift from the old 
conservative jurisprudence of the court and suggests that the IC] and other 
international tribunals have a greater role to play in easing the tension between 
international law and municipal law. According to Tams, the strength of the LaGrand 
decision is that the court did not confine the decision to questions of the interpretation 
of its own statute?7 Consequently, he suggests that the decision can have far-reaching 
effects that go beyond the mere facts before the COurt.38 The message this sends out to 
other courts is that an inherent function of adjudicative bodies is to order interim 
measures that prevent irreparable harm by preserving the status quO.39 The IC] is the 
United Nations' premiere judicial body which means that any principles laid out by 
34 (2001) Tex. Int'l L. J. 587. 
35 (2003-2004) Va. J. Int'l L. 20. 
36 This is manifested by the call for contemporary definitions of traditional ideologies such as 
sovereignty and nationalism. For a further discussion on this, see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
37 Tams "Recognising Guarantees and Assurances of Non-Repetition: LaGrand and the Law of State 
Responsibility" (2002) 27 Yale. J. Int 'I L. 441. 
38 Ibid. 
39 This is of importance because the IC] is the judicial body of the U.N. and the oldest international 
court. As such, other courts may look to the principles it applies to resolve its own disputes or even in 
the construction of some of their founding documents. (See Alford "The Proliferation of International 
Courts and Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance" (2000) 94 Am. Soc y Int'l L. Proc 
160, where he shows that the last decade has seen an explosion of new international courts and 
tribunals. He estimates that at the time of his writing over 50 international courts and tribunals were in 
existence.) 
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the court will be significant for smaller tribunals, which place great weight on IC] 
decisions.4o If this opinion is taken as valid, then it means other international courts 
and tribunals might in future endeavour to use national courts to enforce their 
decisions in the same way that the IC] has done.41 
These factors, combined with the impact of globalisation in the international order, 
suggest that there is a shift in the traditional roles of both international courts and the 
national courts. Thus a matter that warrants discussion is the role that these courts can 
play in this modern international community, not just to settle disputes, but to 
integrate the international community and reduce any tensions that exist between 
international law and domestic proceedings. 
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS 
The main objective of this thesis is to consider whether domestic courts can be used 
as active enforcers of IC] decisions to ensure compliance with international decisions 
and the advancement of international law. This will be done through the analysis of 
the trilogy of cases already discussed. The focus of the thesis will be on LaGrand with 
reference being made to Breard and Avena to clarify certain aspects of LaGrand. The 
research takes two angles: first it looks at the ICJ's capacity to advance international 
law within domestic borders through its decisions, and thereafter the application of 
international court decisions by national courts. The following questions will be 
addressed: 
40 Tams (2002) Yale. J.lnt'l L. 441. 
41 The practice of using national courts to enforce decision of supranational courts is already at work in 
the European Community. This is discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. For further reading see Jones 
"Opinions of the European Union in National Courts" (1995-1996) 28 NY.UJ.Int'.l L & Pol. 27 in 
which it is stated that the co-operation between courts of the EU member states and the European Court 
of Justice provide an encouraging example of judicial co-operation to bring integration to a community. 
In Maher "National Courts as European Community Courts" (1994) 14 Legal Stud. 226 it is shown that 
national courts judges have effectively become community judges as part of the natural embedding 
process of EU community law into its member states. Slaughter "Judicial Globalisation" (1999-2000) 
40 Va. J. Int'l L 1103 at 1104 where Slaughter shows that the role of national courts as enforcers ofEU 
community law was central to the construction of the EU as a community. 
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• 
• Can IC] decisions play a greater role in domestic proceedings 
without the IC] overstepping its mandate?42 
• In this regard, can a balance be struck between intervention and 
" ?43 mere supervIsIOn. 
• Can the decision in LaGrand be brought before national courts for 
enforcement? Should national courts issue injunctive relief to 
prevent digressions by defiant governments?44 
• How should U.S. national courts approach the question of whether 
to enforce international law claims made in cases before them?45 
• Do the demands of a more connected world require a more 
proactive role for national judiciaries as aggressive enforcers of 
internationallaw?46 
1.3 OUTLINE AND APPROACH 
The remainder of the thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 consists of a theoretical 
overview, in which the foundational presuppositions of the thesis are laid down 
through the analysis of specific ideologies. The chapter looks at the impact of 
42 The Statute of the IC] sets out what the court can and cannot do. Thus any argument that supports a 
more injunctive approach by the court must necessarily show that the court would be permitted to do 
so. This requires some consideration of the IC] Statute and the U.N. Charter to reflect on the 
boundaries of the ICJ's mandate. Additionally, this question is important because the court only has 
jurisdiction by consent. This means that its institutional integrity rests upon on its members being 
satisfied with its performance and could be drastically harmed by unauthorised action by the court. 
43 The court in LaGrand appeared to be tight roping between intervention and supervision. On the one 
hand, the court's decision was an intervention to prevent future abuse of consular rights in domestic 
law which is welcomed, whilst on the other it appeared as if the IC] was supervising U.S. domestic 
criminal justice policies, in which case it is not welcomed. 
44 Schabas 'The IC] Ruling against the US: Is it Really About the Death Penalty?' (2002) 27 Yale J. 
Int'l L 446. This issue seeks to address the question of whether an individual who finds himself in the 
same position as the LaGrand can demand review and reconsideration of his sentence and conviction 
on the basis of the decision by the IC] in LaGrand 
45Tams (2002) Yale. J. Int'l L 441. This warrants discussion because matters of international law are 
very often ofa political nature and therefore in the realm of foreign policy. It is thus generally accepted 
that these matters should be dealt with by the executive. Ifnational courts begin to enforce international 
decisions, they would have to tread gently in order to avoid breaching the doctrine of separation of 
powers. 
46 Franscioni (2001) Tex. Int'{ L. J. 587. 
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globalisation on international legal theory and argues for the redefining of traditional 
theories in international law in order to reflect current international legal relations. 
Attention is drawn to the notions of sovereignty, nationalism and internationalism. 
These concepts have been used to either argue for or against a greater involvement of 
international law in domestic jurisdictions.47 The chapter shows that modern 
international theorists have begun to redefine these concepts and review their place in 
international legal theory because of the increased interconnectedness that has come 
as a result of globalisation. The age old monist/dualist debate is revisited, but the 
chapter shows that the debate is of little practical use. It is then argued that it is more 
fruitful to analyse the general practice of states to understand the relationship between 
international law and domestic law. The chapter is thus a theoretical overview that 
sets out my foundational presuppositions about how international law works. 
Chapter 3 then focuses on the role of the IC] as an institution for dispute resolution. It 
seeks to show that the court operates within the specific constraints of its enabling 
statute and the U.N. Charter. This does not however fetter its ability to develop 
international law through its decisions. The chapter also shows the poor enforcements 
mechanisms of the court as a springboard to the argument in later chapters for 
increased involvement of national courts in the enforcement of IC] decisions. 
Chapter 4 is an in-depth analysis of IC] decisions in Breard, LaGrand and Avena, 
which shows the problems discussed in the thesis manifest practically. Included is an 
analysis of the ICJ's ability to ease the tension between international law and 
domestic law, its ability to adjudicate in human rights related matters and its power to 
issue binding provisional measures. The latter issue highlights the court's institutional 
authority, whilst the former issues are used to explain the court's response in 
La Grand. The chapter is thus an exposition on the court's reaction to issues that 
implicate domestic legal proceedings. 
47 Nationalism has generally been understood as a synonym for self-interest whilst internationalism is 
associated with the pursuit of the collective good. SEE Insanally "Nationalism: No Longer a Domestic 
Dispute" (1993-1994) 26 N.Y.u.J. Int'f L. & Pol. 439. Thus it has been argued that in the age of 
globalisation, nationalist ideology should be abandoned for a more internationalist position. See 
generally Burley "Toward an Age of Liberal Nations" (1992) 33 Harv. Int'l L.J. 393. 
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The thesis then shifts to the response of the United States to the IC] decision. Chapter 
5 looks at the attitudes of U.S. national courts towards the IC] and the possibility of 
national courts becoming active enforcers of IC] decisions. Also covered in this 
chapter are the hurdles to national court enforcement of IC] decisions such as the 
political question of doctrine and separation of powers in domestic government. Thus 
it centres on the response of the U.S. courts, but in so doing manifests the general 
difficulties that would be faced by the judiciary in constitutional states, were they to 
become active enforcers of IC] decisions. 
Chapter 6 describes how courts can relate to each other in the international arena to 
alleviate the tension between international law and domestic law. The chapter 
considers the notion of judicial comity48 as a justification for increased deference to 
international courts by national courts. The European Union is used as an example of 
a system that has managed to integrate the community through the medium of the 
courts. The chapter thus considers the possibility of achieving judicial co-operation 
between national courts in the U.S. with the IC] on the basis of judicial comity. 
The thesis winds up in Chapter 7 with reflections on the conclusions drawn in the 
previous chapters. Recommendations are made with the primary purpose of showing 
that national courts can advance the observance of international law through their 
decisions. 
1.4 SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
The research method to be adopted is standard desktop research, with extensive use of 
the internet. No empirical research is undertaken. International law research by its 
nature involves the consideration of various systems of law and as a result, no 
comparative studies per se are used. Rather, a hybrid method of research that involves 
multiple countries are adopted. Data is gathered from various published works: 
journal articles and textbook literature along with opinions in international 
jurisprudence. 
48 Slaughter "Court to Court" in "Agora: Breard" (1998) 92 Am.Jlnt'l L 711 in which Slaughter refers 
to the term to mean respect of other courts qua courts. Thus the term refers to judicial courtesy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Contents 
1. Introduction 
2. Globalisation 
3. Sovereignty 
4. Nationalism and Internationalism 
5. Theories on the relationship between international law and domestic law 
6. Conclusion 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the general theories of international law as a 
foundation to the research. Today's world is much smaller than yesterday's, in the 
sense that there is greater connectivity manifested through the intertwining of 
economic, political, social and legal spheres. This extraordinary enmeshment of 
activity has been classified under the rubric of globalisation. As a consequence this 
has reshaped international society, and in response to this, international legal rules 
must change to remain applicable to this globalised society. Any discussion on the 
relationship between international law and domestic law will raise theories of monism 
and dualism, sovereignty, nationalism and internationalism. This chapter thus seeks to 
show that in order to remain relevant, these theories have to be re-evaluated. With a 
plethora of theories, only those that are directly relevant to the topic have been 
selected, as they highlight the research problem and inform the research conclusion. 
It is one's fundamental presupposition about the make-up of international law that 
strongly influences the conclusion. As such, the theories are explored in a manner that 
displays my understanding of the ideologies and their practical significance. The 
problem of the interaction between international and municipal law has been the 
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subject of a long-standing debate between monists and dualists.49 These theories are 
revisited because they highlight the complexity of the relationship between courts on 
an international level and courts at the municipal level. Nationalism and 
internationalism are political and sociological ideologies that have been expressed by 
some writers in their argument for a greater involvement of international law in 
domestic procedures or vice versa. A balance of these two theories is advocated in the 
chapter, since neither extreme accurately reflects modern international law. The age-
old barrier to international law permeating the municipal realm is the notion of 
sovereignty. As the international legal plane evolves from autonomy to interaction, 
the old concept of sovereignty as a nation's right to be left alone is no longer seen as 
valid. The chapter will thus show new ideas of the concept of sovereignty that are 
seen to be more compatible with the current global ethos. 
The focal point of the discussion is thus the impact of globalisation on the traditional 
theories of international law; more specifically, those that explain the relationship 
between the international and the domestic. It is argued that some, although not all, 
old practices: must be re-examined and developed to keep in line with the times. The 
chapter thus begins by stating clearly what globalisation is. It then focuses on the 
theories referred to above and how these should be understood in our modern context. 
2.2 GLOBALISATION 
Globalisation is the new buzzword. It is touching and changing all spheres of life. It is 
both the fact that the phenomenon is unavoidable and its far-reaching effects that have 
warranted its discussion in this chapter. The purpose of this section is thus to attempt 
to define my understanding of this concept and assess the impact of globalisation on 
specific aspects of international law. 50 
49 See generally Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 3ed (2005) 47-48. 
50 Held et al "Globalization" (1999) 5 Global Governance 483 stress the importance of clarifying what 
globalisation actually is. They demonstrate that the debate that has been raging in academic circles for 
the past decade is the wrong debate to have when there is no common ground about globalisation is. 
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2.2.1 Defining Globalisation 
Globalisation can broadly be understood as the accumulation of links across the 
world's major regions and across various domains of society.51 It has had the effect of 
speeding up the world, deepening the dependence of states on each other and 
stretching social, political, and economic activities. 52 All this means that distant 
events have an deeper impact on us and the previously defined boundaries between 
the domestic and the international have become increasingly blurred. 
2.2.2 Effects of Globalisation on international law 
Globalisation is the pervading theme of this thesis because it is in response to this 
phenomenon that an increased role for the IC] in domestic law is contemplated. It is 
also the connectedness brought about by globalisation that spurs a discussion on the 
necessity to introduce national courts as active enforcers ofIC] decisions. 53 Discourse 
surrounding globalisation has often revolved around whether this phenomenon 
strengthens or weakens sovereignty.54 This debate is considered later in the chapter. 
For the purposes of this section, globalisation has brought change in three aspects. 
Firstly, it is contended that it has brought international law into the limelight and 
given it recognition where it once was looked upon as an anomaly, lacking the status 
of national law. Secondly, it has allowed for an increased role of non-state parties in > 
international law, and finally it has encouraged the assimilation of international legal 
norms into domestic law; for example, human rights norms. 
51 Held et al (1999) Global Governance 484. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Globalisation has increased access to information and a result is that matters that were traditionally 
of international concern are being raised before domestic courts. See Babcock "The Role of 
International Law in US Death I,'enalty cases" (2002) 15 LJIL 367. 
54 Fidler "Introduction: The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalisation" (1998-1999) 6 Ind. J. Global 
Legal Stud. 421. Many writers will say that one of the features of globalisation is the steady withering 
away of state sovereignty. See for example, Udombana "Globalization of Justice and the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone's War Crimes" (2003) 17 Emory. Int'! L. J. 55. 
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2.2.2.1 The renewed importance of international law 
Globalisation seems to be the new organising principle in society and international 
law is its principal beneficiary. 55 In the years immediately following World War II, 
international law was treated as an anomaly. The inter-war years led to great hopes 
that international law would be able to restore peace and order to the world but these 
hopes were dashed by World War II. The effect was that people lost confidence in 
internationa11awas a means to resolve disputes in the international field. 56 However, 
with the increase of communications technology, the world became 'smaller' and 
increased interactions gave rise to the need for international regulatory mechanisms. 
Thus it can be said that globalisation had the effect of thinning the international law 
and domestic law divide insofar as certain aspects of modern life, such as the media 
and portions of commerce and industry, have now become international. 
The baseline of the argument is that due to globalisation, international law has gained 
significance. Take for example the growing importance of international law in 
domestic legislation. In many countries, one can find constitutions that make 
reference to internationa11aw in the body of the text. South Africa is a prime example 
of this. Section 233 of the constitution57 provides that: 
"When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law." 
The place of internationa11aw in the South African republic is further entrenched by 
section 231 of the constitution which deals with international agreements and section 
232 which establishes the recognition of customary law as law within the Republic. 
South African courts are also enjoined to consider international law in their 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights by section 39(1)(b) of the constitution. The 
incorporation of treaties into national law is also an indication of the growing 
55 Schapiro "Globalisation, Internationallaw and the Academy" (1999-2000) 32 NY. U.J.L & Pol 567 
at 570. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
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importance of international law. For instance, some constitutions allow the automatic 
incorporation of treaties into domestic law once it has been duly approved by the 
legislature. 58 Such examples include South Africa,59 France6o, the Netherlands,61 and 
Austria.62 This innovation, in many cases, is a fairly recent and modern move. 
A more apt example of the power that international law has gained in national law is 
in the LaGrancP decision (the full facts of which appear in Chapter 4). U.S. disregard 
of the IC] decision aroused much criticism from international academics and 
practitioners. Underlying the various criticisms is the thought that globalisation makes 
the already poor response of the U.S. worse because of the reciprocal nature of some 
international obligations. So, some writers, in denigrating the actions ofthe U.S., have 
used as their argument the fact that so many American nationals are living under 
foreign governments. 64 Thus the argument goes that the rights of foreign nationals 
within America's borders should be respected because that allows the U.S. to promote 
good relations with other countries, thereby ensuring the comfort of their own 
nationals residing outside the U.S. This, as it will later be seen, is a good example of 
how the interconnectedness of the world and the ease of travel and communications 
brought about by globalisation has promoted the recognition of international laws. 
2.2.2.2 Subjects of international law 
Modern politics emerged with and was shaped by the development of communities 
tied to a particular piece of land; the nation state. 65 As such, the state was the main 
58 Dixon and McCorquodale Cases and Materials on international law (1991) 123. 
59 Section 231(4) of the Consitution of of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
60 Article 55 ofthe Constitution of the Republic of France of 1958. 
61 Article 91 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2002. 
62 Article 50 of the Constitution of Austria 1929. 
63 (Germany v United States) (Judgment of 27 June 2001). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij .orglicjwww/idocket/igus/igu.sfi'ame.htm on 8 November 2005. 
64 See for example Quigley "LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. judiciary" (2002) 27 Yale. J. Int'l L. 
435 at 440. 
65 Held at al (1999) Global Governance 487. 
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player in the international arena. Now, globalisation has eroded the exclusive link 
between geography and political power, leaving the state as only one of the many 
subjects of international law. According to Guillaume,66 the main result of 
globalisation is that states now playa smaller role in the traditional functions. This 
change has brought with it new architecture in international law with the recognition 
of institutions other than the state. Thus globalisation has accelerated the recognition 
of these non-state entities, thereby allowing a steady proliferation of players in the 
international field. The result has been that more supranational bodies have emerged 
in the last decade, such as courts, tribunals and other NGOs. In Europe, for instance, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) has managed to convince national governments and individuals to engage in 
often-high stake adjudication at a level above the state.67 
As such, the state is no longer the sole advocate for international obligations, nor is it 
the sole beneficiary of any international privileges. Individuals, corporations and 
international organisations now have greater presence in international matters. This is 
significant for the purpose of this thesis because only states can be party to ICJ cases. 
But LaGrand demonstrates that the decision of the ICJ will not only impact states, but 
individuals as well. This then necessitates the involvement of national courts, which 
have the machinery to implement the benefits of any ICJ decisions for an individual. 
2.2.3 Globalisation and international norms 
The globalisation of international norms means these norms have now been absorbed 
into domestic jurisdictions. The death penalty is but one example of this. Countries 
that have chosen to retain this form of punishment have come under heavy criticism 
for doing SO.68 Even domestic transgressions now expose a country to international 
censure. Rwanda is an obvious example in this respect. The International Criminal 
66 Guillaume "La Mondialisation et la Cour International de Justice'" (2000) 2 International law 
FORUM du droit international at 242. 
67 Helfer and Slaughter "Tow~d a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication" (1997-1998) 107 
Yale. L. J276. 
68 See Babcock (2002) 15 LJIL 367. 
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Tribunal for Rwanda (rCTR) was set up with the sole purpose of prosecuting 
individuals responsible for the genocide and crimes against humanity committed in 
Rwanda in 1994.69 Perhaps now, in the 21 st century, this seems an obvious necessity, 
but when one considers that a decade ago this would not be possible, the progression 
of humanitarian norms can be better appreciated. This is a process that Udombana7o 
describes as the globalisation of justice. 
Whilst globalisation has enabled the individual to become a beneficiary of 
international rights, other writers view globalisation as a threat to human rights 
realisations. For example, Balasuriya71 defines globalisation as a capitalistic venture, 
with a prime objective to profit investors of capital. This definition by its very nature 
sets globalisation up as an opposing force and irreconcilable with human rights. As 
such, the writer concludes that globalisation is materialistic whilst human rights are 
individualistic and only attainable through individualistic measures. Thus Balasuriya72 
says for human rights to be respected there should be primacy of the dignity of the 
person over the material realities. Globalisation, in its present neo-liberal capitalist 
form, not only perpetuates but aggravates inequalities. While recognising that market 
globalisation has the potential to create the situation described by Balasuriya, it would 
seem that at present, globalisation has worked to the benefit of the individual. For 
example, globalisation and its wave of interdependence have limited the exclusivity of 
statehood thereby emancipating the individual by allowing him/her to be a player in 
international law. 73 The proliferation of court systems and tribunals in the world now 
allows an individual to have standing to raise human rights violations.74 These very 
positive moves have been spurred by globalisation. 
69 See the Internet site of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (accessed at 
http://www.un.orglictr/ on 12 August 2006). 
70 (2003) Emory. Int'l L. J. 55. 
71 "Globalisation and Human Rights" (2000) 1 Sri Lanka J. Int 'I L.1 at 1-2. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Udombana (2003) Emory. Int'l L. J. 58. 
74 On this point see Alford (2000) Am Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 160 and Charney "Impact on the 
International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals" (1998-1999) 31 
NY. UJ. Int 'I L. & Pol 697 . 
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The exact starting point or the end point of globalisation is not certain. What is 
certain, however, is that something extraordinary is taking place in the world and this 
increased interconnectedness changes the global framework. In response to this, 
intemationallaw as a discipline must change. This means the foundational ideologies 
that underpin international law must be modified if international law is to remain up 
to date and effective. 75 
2.3 NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM 
Newton's third law of motion; 'for everything there is an equal and opposite reaction', 
is still true in the context of today as it ever was. As globalisation has advanced and 
strengthened, so has nationalist sentiment; what some have referred to as the last kicks 
of a dying horse.76 It can thus be expected that globalisation will be viewed as a threat 
to national independence and distinctiveness.77 Nationalism has carried negative 
connotations because it was alleged to be the driving force of the atrocities of the last 
century so that internationalism (a concept that embraces universalistic principles) has 
emerged.78 There is thus a perceived tension between nationalism, which advocates 
the cause of the local, and internationalism, which is seen as an appropriate response 
to globalisation, because it advances the common good. 
These ideologies are important because they inform conclusions on what role 
international institutions should play in domestic structures and vice versa. Any 
discussion on the possibility of national courts becoming active enforcers of Ie] 
decisions will necessarily be informed by one or the other theory, or a variant of 
75 Schapiro (1999-2000) N Y. U.J.L & Pol 572. 
76 See for example, Kaldor ("Nationalism and Globalisation" (2004) 10 (112) Nations and Nationalism 
161-177), who writes that the current wave of nationalism is not evidence of the enduring nature of the 
idea, but a consequence of globalisation. She explains (at 166) that globalisation not only favours the 
interconnectedness of the world, but it also favours the disconnectedness of the nation state, which 
weakens the potential for nationalist ideology. 
77 See for instance, Smith Nqtions and Nationalism in a Global Era (1995), who suggests that 
nationalism is attractive as an ideology because it promises a 'collective immortality' that has helped to 
sustain many nations in an era of technological uniformity and corporate efficiency. 
78 Burley (1992) Harv.lnt'/ L.J. 399. 
20 
these.79 The objective of this section is to evaluate the notion of internationalism 
(which is seen to be more in keeping with the wave of globalisation that is sweeping 
the world) as against the idea of nationalism. This view is advanced on the premise 
that the two cannot co-exist, because they are extremist notions. 
2.3.1 Defining nationalism and internationalism 
A logical starting point of the argument is to define the two notions of nationalism 
and internationalism. Nationalism can be understood as a mindset that promotes 
particularisation. Internationalism rests on three strands, one of which is the idea that 
internationa1law supersedes domestic law.8o 
Nationalism is synonymous in some circles with the selfish unilateral pursuit of self-
interest, whilst internationalism is associated with a pursuit of the collective goOd.81 
Such categorisations tend to present nationalism and internationalism as two 
worldviews at loggerheads with each other. However, from a given set of facts, both 
views can be seen in operation and there is not necessarily a victor. Take the 
following examples: the efforts of the Iraqi government in the Gulf war seemed to be 
an advancement of nationalism because they sought to incorporate Kuwait on the 
basis of ethnic connections.82 We then see efforts by international bodies to bring 
peace and settle the matter. In this case, the two notions appear to be operating 
simultaneously. Whilst the UN peacekeeping efforts are an example of 
internationalism, their efforts resulted in the preservation of a nation, thereby 
advancing nationalism. Another example is that of Haiti, a case bearing striking 
79 For example, Burley (1992) Harv. Int'l L.J 393 argues that the geopolitical framework for the 
millennium is neither internationalism nor nationalism but liberal internationalism. 
80 Bradley "Breard, Our Dualist Constitution and the Internationalist Conception" (1999) 51 Stan. 
L.Rev. 529 at 539. According to Bradley, the other two strands are the idea that international law must 
always trump domestic law when the two conflict and that the federal governments' opportunity to 
enter into international obligations must be expanded. 
81 Burley (1992) Harv.Int'/ L.J586. 
82 Insannally "Nationalism: No Longer a Domestic Dispute" (1993-1994) 26 NY. u.J. Int'/ L.& Pol. 
439 at 441-442. 
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resemblance to former Rhodesia.83 In both cases some said the UN was promoting 
nationalist interests instead of opposing them. The two cases are similar in that in both 
instances, there was no cross-border effect of the internal issues, but the UN still 
intervened on the basis of 'a threat to peace'. 84 Nonetheless, this was perceived as 
meddling with matters of domestic jurisdiction. Hence it would seem that on one level 
the UN's intervention amounted to a protection of national interests, while it is also 
true that any external intervention has an element of anti-nationalism. 
The argument for a balance between nationalism and internationalism is however 
optimistic and some may even go so far as to say it is unrealistic. Yet, it is shown 
above that international events cannot always be neatly compartmentalised. They are 
made up of a complex network of relations, which can at one time involve more than 
a single agenda. It would thus be fruitless to engage in endless debates about the evils 
of nationalism on the one hand or the victory of internationalism on the other. There is 
room for both in international law so that the advancement of internationalism should 
not be seen as the end of nationalism. Rather, it should be seen as an opportunity to 
balance out the implacable nationalism that was the driving force behind so many of 
the last century's horrors. 
2.3.2 Internationalist model and the international rule of law 
The international rule of law is as vague as the concept of the rule of law on a 
domestic level. It encapsulates the idea of a greater good of law, and all the desirable 
features of an international legal order. 85 The idea of an international rule of law has 
83 Ibid. A military operation was led into Haiti after a military coup occurred and the illegal de facto 
regime failed to comply with its obligations under a previous Security Council Resolution. There was 
evidence of system violations of civil liberties by the regime. The Security Council thus adopted a 
further Resolution (940 of 1994), permitting a multinational force to intervene and remove the illegal 
regime. For further reading see Damrosch, Glennon and Leigh "Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti" 
(1995) 89 Am. J.Int'l L 58. 
84Damrosch "Nationalism and Ipternationalism: The Wilsonian Legacy" (1993-1994) 26 N.Y.UJ. Int'l 
L.& Pol. 493 at 496. 
85 Mattius Kumm "The International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model" (2003-
2004) Va. J. Int'l L.21 who says the international rule of law locks in and destabilises liberal 
democracy at the same time. He explains that whilst the rule of law protects domestic groups by 
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been promoted by internationalists to the extent that it would justifY national courts 
being active enforcers of internationallaw.86 Such internationalists say that national 
courts should enforce international law irrespective of what national law dictates.87 
Thus national courts should rule on matters of foreign affairs even without specific 
authorisation of the national political branches. This position, however attractive, is 
unrealistic insofar as it does not consider countervailing considerations that prevent 
national courts actively enforcing international decisions. For example, there are 
certain doctrines that may operate to prevent national courts taking on such a role: the 
doctrine of separation of powers and the political question doctrine (these are more 
closely discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis). Internationalists argue however that if 
national courts have the clout to strike down legislation on the basis of international 
law, they should have the same clout to enforce international law. 88 However, this 
misses the point, which is that national courts in many democratic states are 
empowered to strike down legislation and can therefore do so without fear. On the 
issue of foreign policy, they incur greater risks since foreign affairs are often an 
executive prerogative. 
So the internationalist model is one that promotes the role of national courts in 
international law on the grounds that there is need to promote and enforce the 
international rule of law. This greater good is thus shown as a justification for 
engaging in matters even without executive authorisation. The main adversary of the 
realisation of this ideal is nationalism, which rather than embracing the international 
values is often closed to them. Nationalism and internationalism are thus once again 
presented as two opposing forces, one supporting greater activism of national courts 
in international law and the other resisting such involvement. 
limiting the executive's opportunity to claim prerogatives in matters of foreign affairs, it empowers the 
new political actors commensurately. 
86 Bradley (1999) Stan. L.Rev. 529. 
87 Kumm (2003-2004) Va. J. Int'l L. 21. 
88 Kumm (2003-2004) Va. J. Int'/ L. 24. 
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2.3.4 Situating nationalism and internationalism 
The attractiveness of nationalism lies in its promise of collective and territorial 
immortality, in an era where nations feel threatened by the social change being 
advanced by technological uniformity and corporate integration.89 And yet in the age 
of globalisation it may be difficult to imagine how nationalism in its purest form can 
have a place in such an interconnected world. Slaughter suggests that what we should 
be striving for is a judicious mixture of both nationalism and internationalism.9o Thus 
in the context of the current discussion, events should not be seen as proving the 
victory of nationalism over internationalism or vice versa, but as the interaction of 
both notions in a common field. Therefore in this section, it is contended that 
internationalism and nationalism need not always be seen as two opposing systems. 
Both ideologies can be seen to operate in international practice today. 
It would thus seem that in the face of increased connectivity in the world, nationalism 
still continues. This is desirable because nationalism promotes individuality whereas 
globalisation may have the effect of creating uniformity. The co-existence of these 
two provides a better opportunity for the balance to be found. A balanced view of 
these two ideologies is important for our purposes because internationalists tend to 
argue for the enforcement of international law by national courts without specific 
authorisation by national political branches91 , whilst nationalists tend to resist the 
advancement of international norms within their borders. History has shown that 
hardened nationalism serves little good. Nazi Germany is a clear example of this. It is 
argued that extremist internationalism can be equally as destructive, since it would 
erode an important aspect in the fabric of international law, state sovereignty. So an 
uncompromising view of internationalism is just as flawed as an uncompromising 
view of nationalism. What must be achieved is a balance of the two. According to 
Joseph Weiler92, the founding fathers of the European Union had such a vision. He 
89Kaldor (2004) Nations and Nationalism 161. 
90 Slaughter Burley 'Nationalism versus Internationalism: Another Look' (1993-1993) 26 N. Y. U. J. 
Int'/ L. & Pol 585. 
91 Kumm (2003-2004) Va. J.Int'J L 20. 
92 See Slaughter Burley (1993-1993) 26 N. Y. U. J.Int'/ L. & Pol. 586. 
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states that increasing the bonds between states that were previously war rivals was an 
effort to temper nationalist sentiment by reminding them that they all have a common 
heritage. 
2.4 SOVEREIGNTY 
The prevalent view in the West currently is that human rights provide legal and moral 
grounds for disregarding the sovereign rights of states.93 This reflects the growing 
tendency to place greater emphasis on international values and a departure from the 
previous tendency to pull out the sovereignty card whenever there is potential for a 
greater involvement of international law in the domestic plane. Thus sovereignty as an 
ideal is today regarded in a different light. The purpose of this section is to consider 
the traditional understanding of sovereignty as seen against today's international law 
ethic. This will then shed light on the modern definition of sovereignty and its place in 
modern international legal theory. 
2.4.1 The elusiveness of sovereignty 
When attempting a study of sovereignty, it becomes apparent that the word does not 
in fact have any set meaning. In this sense it is akin to the term 'rule of law;' a term 
commonly used but rarely defined. The obscurity of the concept is so evident that 
even after extensive research, one is still left without clarity. Henkin94 expresses his 
own frustration with the concept in the following words: 'I don't like the "S word." Its 
birth is illegitimate and it has not aged well. The meaning of sovereignty is confused 
and its uses are various, some of them unworthy, some of them even destructive of 
human values.' What is generally known about sovereignty is that to respect 
sovereignty is good but to intrude on a state's sovereignty is bad. This is perhaps the 
reason why Radon95 suggests that sovereignty is nothing but a political emotion. 
93 Chopra & Weiss "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention" 
(1992) 6 Ethics & Int'/ AjJ. 95. 
, 
94 "The "S Word": Sovereignty and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera" (1999-2000) 68 
Fordham. L. Rev. 1. 
95 "Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept" (2004) 40 Stan. J. Int'/.L 195. 
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The sovereignty argument is often raised in the face of a proposition for greater 
involvement of the international in the domestic. It is thus fitting that before the thesis 
considers the possibility of national courts being enforcers of international court 
decisions, the idea of sovereignty is first delineated. 
2.4.2 Sovereignty as a foundational value in international law 
State sovereignty is the foundation of international law and has been recognised from 
its birth. 96 This is clearly because at the formation of what can be recognised as an 
international framework, at the Peace of Westphalia, states were the only players in 
internationallaw.97 This is why the discipline was referred to as the Law of Nations. 
As far back as the 17th Century, Grotius98 (who is often referred to as the father of 
modern international law) presupposed a territorial order in which states were free 
from outside control. Today such ideas are strengthened in the UN Charter.99 
According to Shen,lOo it is in the exercise of their sovereignty that states created 
international law. It has also been said that "Sovereignty is, doubtless, the most 
precious [right of a nation]... which other nations ought most scrupulously to 
respect." 1 01 
The validity and effectiveness of international law depends on the continuing support 
of nation states, while the protection of national sovereignty and independence is 
contingent upon an effective international legal system founded on nation states. This 
idea has reigned from the Peace of Westphalia, where the concept of sovereignty was 
formally recognised, through the League of Nations to the United Nations, where it is 
96 Shen "National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law context" (2000-2001) 26 Brook. J. 
Int'! L. 419 at 421. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Article 2(1) which indicates that the United Nations is based on the 'principle of sovereign equality 
of all its members.' 
100 (2000-2001) Brook. J. Int'l L. 419. 
101 Shen (2000-2001) Brook. J. Int'l L. 421. 
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now one of the founding tenets of the Charter. 102 Shreuederl03 comments that 
contemporary international law presupposes a structure of co-equal sovereign states. 
So the way international law currently works is based on the presupposition that there 
are sovereign states as players in the field. Therefore it can be seen that sovereignty is 
not just something of academic interest, but is a central value in international law. As 
a result any changes to this foundational concept must not be treated lightly. 
2.4.3 The Evolution of sovereignty 
Sovereignty is a teim that appears to have had different meanings at different points in 
history. For example, the early Catholic writers understood sovereignty to mean the 
delegation of a competence from a superior legal order. 104 The eighteenth century saw 
the adoption of ideas spearheaded by Vattel and Hegel. Vattel saw sovereignty as 
something possessed by a state that gave it the freedom to determine for itself the 
obligations imposed upon it. IOS This was later developed by Hegel who said the state 
was a metaphysical entity with value and significance in and of itself, thus having the 
will to choose whether it should or should not respect law. 106 
The idea of sovereignty is thus historically seen as a claim to absolute territorial 
control. So Max Huber expresses the term sovereignty in Island of Palm as 10 7 case in 
the following way: 
102 Starke "Monism and Dualism in the theory ofInternationallaw" (1936) 17 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 66 at 
67. 
103 "The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law" (1993) 4 
European Journal of International Law at 448. 
104 Starke (1936) Brit. Y.B. Int'f L. 68. 
105 Ibid 
106 Ibid. 
107 2 RIAA 829 (1928) at 838. 
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'Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is a right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any 
other state, the function of a state' .108 
It was this foundation that allowed the European monarchs to create absolute states.109 
This notion of sovereignty as absolute control survived the French and U.S. 
revolutions. The major change that came with the revolutions was a shift in power 
from the hands of the monarchs to the people. Challenges to this traditional idea of 
sovereignty only began to surface after the Industrial Revolution and the World Wars, 
with the birth of a true international framework. 110 So there are some who define 
sovereignty according to its limits. For example, Starke1l1 says that sovereignty is 
only a competence that states enjoy within the limits of international law. 
At the same time, the United Nations emerged as the organIsmg body of the 
international legal order and many states sought membership of the body. 112 In order 
to do so, there was a need to surrender some of their internal control. This was 
however not seen as a negation of their sovereignty, but an affirmation of it. A new 
idea of sovereignty thus emerged. Instead of trying to defend their sovereignty 
through 'leave us alone' strategies, they sought UN membership to prove their 
sovereignty. The fact that this recognition placed constraints on their power to do 
whatsoever they wish did not seem to matter. This same view of sovereignty can be 
seen at work today in the European community, where the member states yield some 
of their international control to achieve unity in the community. (This is expanded 
upon in Chapter 6 of the thesis.)1l3 For the purposes of this thesis it is useful to 
!os Dugard International law: A South African Perspective 2 ed (2001) page number. Reffor case .. 
109 Jenik Radon "Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept" (2004) 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 195 at 
196. He also shows that the idea of sovereignty as complete control took root even in the imagination 
of leading philosophers. For example, Hobbes in the 17th century reasoned that anything less than 
absolute power would be insufficient to satisfy a single ruler. 
110 Ibid. 
III Ibid. 
1l2Radon (2004) Stan. J. Int'l Lpg 
113 Some of the smaller states in the European Community saw membership in the EU as not just a 
conformation of their recognition or sovereignty, but as an expansion of that sovereignty. For instance 
Estonia and other Baltic states voluntarily sought access to the EU to protect their sovereignty and 
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discuss the evolution of the concept of sovereignty from its origins in the Peace of 
Westphalia to contemporary international law, where the work of globalisation is 
clearly visible. 
2.4.3.1 The Westphalian idea of Sovereignty 
The traditional Westphalian idea of sovereignty is the right to be let alone or the right 
to be free from external interference. 114 The outworking of this understanding of 
sovereignty can be seen in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the UN 
from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. 
The Nuremburg trials had a major effect on the concept of state sovereignty. On one 
level it showed that individuals have rights that state action cannot jeopardise, and on 
another level it showed that individuals have obligations under international law, 
which may contradict state authority.ll5 As such it did away with any the view that 
sovereignty was a concept that gave the state carte blanche to do whatsoever it deems 
fit and highlighted the fact that there is a loyalty to humanity that goes beyond the 
loyalty to one's nation. 1 16 
Weeramantry1l7 writes that in the years immediately after the war, there was less fear 
of international law and over the years the barriers to advancement in the global order 
have lifted. He lists the following obstacles as examples: pessimism regarding world 
organisation, impenetrability of walls of sovereignty; and the negative views of the 
League of Nations. 
remain free form Russia (see Askel Kirch et a! 'Changes in EU-Consciousness in Estonia 1995-2002: 
Discussion and Public Opinion (IES Proceedings, Nov 2002). Accessed at 
http://www.ies.ee/iespikirch.pdfon 20 November 2005). 
114 Slaughter "Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order" (2004) Stan. J. Int'! L. 283 at 284. 
115 Henry T. King Jr. "Nuremberg and Sovereignty" (1996) 28 Case W Res. J. Int'! L. 135 at 137. 
116 Weeramantry "Emerging Dimensions of Sovereignty under International Law" (1991) 3 Sri Lanka. 
J. Int'! L. 1 at 25. 
117 (1991) 3 Sri Lanka. J. Int'! L.3. 
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This idea has been challenged by the growing interdependence of the world and a host 
of factors that are classed under the rubric of globalisation. Sovereignty in this sense 
is today seen as ineffective because a state is no longer able to provide economic 
stability and security to its citizens free of international interventionYs Thus the 
economic inter-dependence brought by globalisation has rendered the Westphalian 
idea of sovereignty obsolete. 1l9 Additionally, the human rights movement has said 
intervention is justified when it is done in the name of human rights. This has ensured 
the slow and steady death of sovereignty, in the Westphalian sense. 
2.4.3.2 Contemporary Sovereignty 
According to Chayes and Handler Chayes, the international community has become a 
"tightly woven fabric of international agreements, organizations and institutions".I20 
As such it is characterised by connection, not separation, and in such a setting 
sovereignty as autonomy does not make sense. As a result, a new idea has graced the 
international legal stage that signals the end of the Westphalian State, and it is said 
that this passing is by no means regrettable.12l It is said that the EU is an example of a 
system that goes beyond the traditional idea of sovereignty and raises challenges for 
the old Westphalian idea of sovereignty. 
Contemporary sovereignty remains uncertain, but an overview of legal theory shows 
that the running theme in all definitions is the recognition of a territory as a state in 
international affairs as opposed to a right to be 'left alone' .122 The common premise in 
all these different definitions is that sovereignty is no longer associated with internal 
domestic control and the 'leave us alone' dogma. It is now better understood as the 
118 Slaughter (2004) Stan.J. Int'/ L. 409 says that 'states can only govern effectively by actively co-
operating with other states and by collectively reserving the power to intervene in other states' affairs. 
119 Ibid. This was the view of some legal theorists even before globalisation became evident. For 
instance Richard Falk said: 'sovereignty is as morally obsolete as it is factually inaccurate' (Van der 
Vyver (1991) Emory Int'l L. Rev 321). 
120Chayes and Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (1995) at 4. 
121 McCormick 'Beyond the Sovereign State' (1993) 56 Mod. L.R. 1. 
122 See Slaughter (2004) Stan. J. Int'l L. 286. 
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characteristic that allows a state to be a player in the international field. The impetus 
for this development has been the changes in the global community that can be 
classified under the broader term of globalisation. Weeramantry123 identifies some of 
these factors: the broadening cultural base of the international world, the development 
ofNuremburg principles, the communications revolution, increasing consensus in the 
world and alternative problem solving frameworks. These factors can all the classified 
under the broader term of 'globalisation'. So once again, it can be seen that 
globalisation has led to the redefining of traditional international law values. The old 
sovereignty has not stood the test of globalisation because it is founded upon the 
autonomy of the state, which has been eroded by increased interventionist policies 
and treaty obligations. 
Koskenniemi 124 shows that there are two reigning theories on sovereignty: one moral 
and the other sociological. The moral view says that sovereign states strengthen the 
idea of national egoism that has been the root of the cataclysms of the last century. 
Their response is that there should be a move to a more global conception of justice. 
The sociological view suggests that global capitalism does not allow for factual 
independence, making actual sovereignty a tenuous fiction. 125 The logical endpoint of 
the sociological theory is to support the increased role of international institutions in 
domestic law. Thus theories have emerged that attempt to limit sovereignty; for 
instance the idea that states restrict their sovereignty to the extent that they agree to 
some bilateral norms by way of treaties. 
The U.N. Charter provides that signatories consent to the Security Council having the 
power to intervene or permit intervention where domestic or interstate human rights 
situations are found to constitute an act of aggression, or a threat to or breach of 
international peace.126 And yet the predecessor of the ICJ, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, in SS Wimbeldon 127 case declined to hold that a state, in 
123 (1991) 3 Sri Lanka. J.lnt'l L. 14-15. 
124 'The Future of Statehood' (1991) 32 Harv.lnt'l L. J. 397. 
125 Shreuder (1993) EJIL 402. 
126 Article 24(1). 
127 1923 PCIJ (Ser.A) No 1 at 25. 
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concluding a treaty by which it undertakes to perform certain obligations, abandons 
its sovereignty, since the right to enter into agreements is an attribute of state 
sovereignty. Perhaps this is indicative of the fact that the distinction remains an 
academic one with little practical application. 
Slaughter128 says that sovereignty is interactive and not insular, which means it refers 
not to the right to resist, but the right to engage. She further develops her thesis by 
adding that it if sovereignty is understood as conferring power to act then it is not just 
the state that is sovereign. She suggests that sovereignty should be devolved onto all 
state actors, including judges, legislators and ministers. These components of the state 
thus have the right to engage in matters of international law; they are thus deemed 
sovereign. 129 If this argument is accepted, a court is sovereign in the sense that it has 
power to act. It would then follow that it possesses the measure of independence that 
will allow it to be active with other courts across borders. In other words, such a view 
of sovereignty easily supports a more active role for courts in the international arena 
and vice versa. As attractive as this seems, there are some gross flaws with the 
proposition. If national courts were to act independently of the other state actors, 
establishing consistent policies could be highly problematic. In addition, foreign 
policy decisions are often seen as the prerogative of the executive, which means the 
national courts will be in violation of the separation of powers if they are to act. A 
further problem with the proposition is that on a practical level, it is unlikely that 
national courts would take any such action. The disciplines of international law and 
politics are inextricably linked. As a result many national judges feel ill-equipped to 
rule on such matters. 
A better definition of sovereignty is Kahn's definition that identifies two forms of 
sovereignty: positive and negative. 130 He says negative sovereignty defines the 
boundaries that protect one state from the intervention of the other, whilst positive 
128 (2004) Stan. J.Int/ 'L. 284. , 
129 Slaughter (2004) Stan. J. Int'! L 325. 
130 Kahn "The Question of Sovereignty" (2004) 40 Stan. J. Int'/ L. 259. 
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~ . 
sovereignty has to do with the right to form a concept of the self. 131 The former thus 
has to do with the right to be left alone, whilst the latter is an appeal for the right to 
self-govern. He states further that negative sovereignty in international law is lagging 
behind the changing reality of positive sovereignty. 132 
It is clear that the Westphalian idea of sovereignty is misplaced in today's globalised 
world. But there is an element of truth in the definition that must be retained. It is my 
opinion that every state must be allowed a measure of autonomy, otherwise there 
would be reason to fear a world government. Yet at the same time, such autonomy 
must be accompanied by a realisation that the state is not completely independent of 
other states and may have to account for its actions in certain cases to other states. 
2.4.4 Sovereignty situated 
The new idea of sovereignty therefore indicates the ability of the state to operate as an 
actor in the international realm. Any idea that goes against this new definition of 
sovereignty is criticised by the international community. For example, the United 
States foreign policy has recently come under the spotlight for this very issue. The 
United States idea of sovereignty is one that equates sovereignty with democracy133 
and thus resists outside interference. It has been said that this worldview of 
sovereignty is manifested in the American position toward international institutions. ~ 
l 
The U.S. entrance into certain international agreement was met with much criticism ~ 
on the basis that it was a surrender of U.S. sovereigntyY4 Even the trilogy of cases 
that are the subject of this thesis show the same demand for self-government when the 
U.S. national courts refused to grant a stay of execution on the strength of an order by 
the Iel. 
13l Ibid 
132 Ibid 
133 Radon (2004) Stan. J. Int'/ i 202. 
134 See for example Buchanan "A European Assault on U.S. Sovereignty" (accessed at 
http://www.buchanan.org/pa-97-0318.html on 25 November 2005). 
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Sovereignty must thus be understood against the backdrop of the current international 
culture; one in which the individual is depoliticised (meaning that the individual is 
defined by factors other than political borders) and in which the economic market 
envisages a single global market where political divisions are irrelevant. l3S It has been 
shown that the definition of sovereignty has important consequences for domestic and 
international policy. The classical era understood sovereignty as unbounded authority 
and in turn this led to a legal order organised around non-intervention and consent. l36 
Today, the meaning leans in the opposite direction: sovereignty is more likely to be 
understood as the right to partake in transnational affairs because the world has 
become more interdependent. l37 If sovereignty is understood in this way, it cannot be 
argued on the basis of sovereignty that the IC] should not play a greater role in 
domestic legal proceedings. In the same vein, sovereignty cannot be a reason not to 
use the machinery of national courts to enforce IC] decisions. 
2.5 THE THEORIES OF MONISM AND DUALISM 
Sovereignty is thus the characteristic of a state that allows it to exist and be 
recognised as a player in international law. Starkel38 shows that the history of 
sovereignty has more to do with the relationship of the state to other normative orders 
such as international law. It is thus not a mere characteristic of a state, but one that 
allows it to interact with others. This thesis thus deals with how the components of 
these sovereign states interact with each other. The question of what a national court 
can and cannot do when international matters are brought before it is usually followed 
by theories on the proper relationship between international law and national law. The 
purpose of this section is to discuss these theories. The section will not only consider 
the arguments of the protagonists, but also the general practice of states will be used 
to draw certain conclusions about the dichotomy. 
135 Kahn "Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights and the New International 
Order" (2000) 1 Chi. J. Int'/ L. 1 at 6. 
136 Kahn (2004) 40 Stan. J.Int'1 t 259. 
I37 Ibid 
138 (1936) Brit. Y.B.Int'l L. 17. 
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Any conclusion about the role of international decisions in municipal proceedings 
must logically begin with an acceptance of certain truths about the relationship 
between international law and domestic law. As such the following questions are 
asked: are international law and municipal law concomitant aspects of the same 
juridical reality or are they distinct nonnative realities,139 and which system stands 
higher in the legal hierarchy? 
2.5.1 The monist and dualist views 
There are two well recognised theories that explain the relationship between 
international law and domestic law: the monist school and the dualist school, each 
having its own presuppositions. Monists generally regard international law and 
municipal law as manifestations of a single conception of law, thereby arguing that 
municipal courts are obliged to apply rules of international law directly. 140 Dualists on 
the other hand argue that international law and municipal law are two different 
conceptions of law and if municipal law courts are to apply international law, it must 
first be adopted into local law by legislation. 141 The dualist theory is founded on the 
premise that states are sovereign and therefore boundaries are important. This class of 
theorists view the fact that international law and domestic law regulate different 
subjects as evidence of the distinction between international law and municipal law. 
States are subjects of international law, whereas individuals are the subjects of 
municipal law. 142 Based on this foundation, it can be seen that where a conflict arises 
between the two systems, the dualist would say that municipal courts cannot be 
considered to be bound by international law unless a law has first been adopted into 
domestic law. As such, where international law and municipal law conflict, the court 
must apply the latter. Some monists argue the opposite: that international law defines 
139 Ibid. 
140 Dugard International law 43~ 
141 Ibid. 
142 Starkelntroduction to international law 10th ed (1989) 72. 
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the boundaries and jurisdiction of municipal law; therefore it is evidence of 
international law being the higher law. 143 Other monists argue that it is in fact 
municipal law that is the higher of the two because state actors operate within 
municipal law, while the international regulates the external. 
The above theories form the substance of a longstanding debate that remams 
unresolved. They are thus important insofar as they shed light on the presupposition 
of any perspective of international law. So, for instance, they are useful in that they 
enable one to look at a particular instrument, like a constitution for example, and 
determine whether it is dualist or monist. This conclusion then reveals the 
fundamental presuppositions of the drafters of that instrument. Starke144 suggests that 
a strictly theoretical perspective of theories of international law is of utmost 
importance. Brownlie,145 however, whilst recognising the importance of the monist 
and dualist debate, suggests that a more informative route to take is to analyse the 
practice of states. He writes that that if one analyses the practice of international law, 
a realisation will emerge that the conflict between international law and municipal law 
is more heightened than in reality, since international practice has found in many, 
although not all situations, a means to resolve any conflicts between the two 
systems. 146 It must be pointed out that Starke was writing in 1936; before the rapid 
development of international law through the United Nations took place. It would thus 
make sense that he places a theoretical framework at the fore because the practice of 
international law was not as widespread as today. The context has shifted significantly 
since then. The recurrent theme through this chapter has been the rapid development 
of international law as a discipline mainly due to globalisation. It is thus possible to 
discuss the nature of the relationship between international law and national law by 
looking at the general practices of states. It is in this sense that Brownlie is correct in 
143 Levi Contemporary International law A Concise Introduction 2nd ed (1991) 23. 
144 (1936) Brit. Y.B. Int 'I L 66: 
145 I Brownlie Public International Law 15. 
146 Ibid 
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considering this the more fruitful route to take in discussing the international law 
municipal law dichotomy. 147 
2.5.2 Escaping the debate 
The issue of the relationship between municipal and international law is thus not 
merely a matter of theory, but also a matter of practice. Many theorists have attempted 
to escape the monist-dualist dichotomy, saying it conflicts with the way international 
and national courts behave.148 For instance, FitzmauriceI49 challenges the starting 
blocks of these theories: that there is one common field in which they both operate. 
He argues that international law and municipal law do not in fact operate in a 
common field and as such the question of which is master does not arise. I50 
According to Fitzmaurice the controversy is artificial, unreal and beside the point. He 
says the entire controversy rests on the premise that there is a common field in which 
international law and municipal law vie for supremacy. In his opinion, the two 
systems operate in different fields. I51 To try to compare them would be akin trying to 
decide which the master is: Australian law or English law, when each is master in its 
own sphere. He denies that the two systems can formally conflict as systems, since 
national law cannot be a rival to international law in the international field. I52 He 
however finds that conflict can arise between obligations, for example the inability of 
a state to act on a domestic plane in conformity with its international obligations. 
When such conflict occurs, he proposes that it will be settled as a matter of domestic 
law and not international law, because each state will have its own conflict of law 
147 Conforti "Notes on the Relationship between international Law and National Law" (2001) 3 
International Law FORUM du Droit International at 18), writing on the relationship between 
international law and national law, states that when discussing the incorporation of international legal 
rules into domestic law, it is not a question of adopting a monist or dualist approach. He goes on to 
explain that such theories should be left in the hands of philosophers since they have no practical 
implications. 
148 Brownlie Public International Law 15. 
149"The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Stand Point of the Rule of Law" 
(1957-11) 92 Hague Recueil at 70-80. 
150 Ibid 
151 Ibid 
152 Ibid 
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rules. 153 For instance, in the United Kingdom it has been settled in terms of Triquet v 
Bath I54 that customary international law is automatically regarded as part of 
municipal law, without need for a national court decision in each particular case. 
Likewise, the status of international treaties is also settled in most states. 
Thus the monist/dualist arguments can only be of significance if as a first step there is 
consensus that we are dealing with a common field. But such a field does not in fact 
exist, and this is well demonstrated by the fact that the subjects of international law 
and domestic law are different. Fitzmaurice thus presents a hybrid of the two theories 
that goes a long way to giving a practical edge to the monist/dualist debate. 
Fitzmaurice's idea is quite like the harmonization theory which seeks to achieve a 
harmony between international and national law. 155 For example, according to the 
harmonisation theory where a judge is faced with a conflict between international and 
national law, he must apply the rules of his jurisdiction. In this way, international law 
is applied directly in national law, expect where it is contrary to that state's laws. 156 
Fitzmaurice's answer to the conflict in LaGrand would be that it is not a question of 
monism or dualism. Rather, the answer lies in examining the rules that exist to deal 
with such conflicts. 
The monist/dualist arguments are thus not irrelevant. They capture elements of a 
complex reality, but in order to be useful, they must be discussed alongside the 
general practice of states in international law. 
2.5.3 State Practice regarding the International and Municipal law Dichotomy 
It is possible to determine whether a state is monist or dualist by looking at the values 
embraced by that state, for instance in a Constitution. In the same way, it is possible 
to determine if internal law or international law should prevail in any given situation 
by paying due regard to international legal principles. This section will discuss certain 
153 Starke (1936) Brit. YB. Int'! L 66. 
154 (1764) 3 Burr. 1478. Court 'ofKing's Bench. 
155 Dugard International law 48. 
156 Ibid 
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principles drawn from international case law and legal theory that are established 
rules showing how the international and domestic divide must be treated. Only those 
principles that inform the subject of this thesis will be discussed. 
2.5.3.1 The illegality argument 
Conflict arises when there is a contradiction between state law and international 
obligation; for instance, if in order to obey an international obligation, a state has to 
act contrary to its national law. There is, however, a well established principle that a 
state cannot plead the provisions of its own law in answer to a claim against it for an 
alleged breach of internationallaw.157 International jurisprudence has been consistent 
in this regard, holding the same from the 1930S158 to date. 159 This is clearly 
demonstrated in LaGrand. One of the barriers in US domestic law to the realisation of 
the rights of a detained person under Article 36 of the VCCR is the procedural default 
rule. 160 The ICJ thus ruled that the application of the procedural default rule in the 
face of a challenge on the basis of Article 36 was a violation of the VCCR. 161 The ICJ 
decision thus turned on the principle that the existence of a contradictory internal law 
does not excuse the state from performing its international obligations undertaken by 
treaty. 
The above rule can be classified as monist. It appears to suggest that international law 
is supreme since the rule appears to require that international practice be opted over 
municipal practice. However, this is misleading. This rule should be understood as a 
principle and not the absolute order of international law trumping municipal law. 
There are no sources, be it in literature or legislation that provide for a concrete duty 
to bring internal laws in conformity with international obligations. 162 Instead, a state 
157 Article 27 in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
158 Free Zones Case (1932) PCl] Ser. AlB, no 46 at 167. 
159 See LaGrand (Judgment of27 June 2001). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm on 6 November 2005. 
160 See LaGrand (Judgment 0(27 June 2001) at para 90. 
161 Ibid 
162 Starke (1936) Brit. Y.B. Int'/ L 35, Fitzmaurice (1957-11) 92 Hague Recueil89. 
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will be called to opt for international law where it has an obligation to do so. Thus, if 
a state fails to observe a particular international obligation, on a particular occasion, it 
is obliged to adhere to its international obligation, not because international law is 
supreme over municipal law, but because of the principle of pacta sunt servunda 
(promises must be kept). Such a state cannot seek to avert its obligation on the basis 
of a conflicting internal rule. This rule thus shows that it is not the supremacy of 
international law or domestic law that determines the outcome of any given case; 
rather, it is the obligations that are important. A picture is painted then, not of two 
systems, each vying for supremacy as suggested by the monism dualism debate; but 
of the supremacy of adhering to international obligations. 
2.5.3.2 Res Judicata and Stare Decisis in international law 
In addition to the above, res judicata has no effect from a decision of a municipal 
court to the Ie] or vice versa. The reason is simply because the two systems often 
deal with issues that are very different. So for instance in LaGrand it was not the 
accuracy of the conviction and sentence that were at issue. Rather, it was the violation 
of the internationally protected rights ofthe detained individuals. Suppose a system of 
res judicata did apply as between the two systems, so that once a matter had been 
settled on a municipal level it could not be revisited on an international plane. One 
could then conclude that there is a common field in which international law and 
municipal law operate. But this is not the case. This international rule creates a picture 
of two systems that exist in separate fields having dominion in separate fields. 163 
It would seem that this is the recognised order, because the Ie] statute provides that 
its decisions are binding only on the parties to the case and no further. 164 There is thus 
no doctrine of stare decisis operating between the Ie] and national courts and this 
tends to point to two separate systems that exist and not one. 
163 Fitzmaurice ibid. 
164 See Article 59 of the Ie] Statute. 
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2.5.3.3 Position of treaty obligations in U.S. domestic law 
Article IV (2) in the U.S. constitution declares that treaties will be the supreme law of 
the land alongside the constitution and the laws in the U.S. made in pursuance of the 
constitution. This section thus has the effect of incorporating international law into 
domestic law. But U.S. law distinguishes between self-executing and non-self 
executing treaties. The former is a treaty that may be enforced by courts without the 
prior legislation by congress and the latter is conversely a treaty that may not be 
enforced by a court without prior legislation. 
Through this system the U.S. has managed to reconcile their international and internal 
legal obligations, so avoiding the problem of determining which system oflaw applies 
and when. Therefore, conflict in international law rule and the internal legal rules is 
limited. So in the Head Money cases: Edye v Robertson165, when an Act of congress 
(internal law) was contested on the basis that it conflicted with an earlier treaty 
(international law), this rule aided the resolution of the issue. The court found no such 
conflict, but held that a treaty was as much the law of the land as any act of congress. 
Thus future courts will be aware not to disregard treaty obligations on the basis that 
an act of congress is in conflict with the treaty. This is important because the status of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) in the U.S. is significant to 
deciding what role the courts can play in the realisation of the IC] decision. If it is 
found that the VCCR is self-executing, then the U.S. national courts have the power 
to at least consider the implementing the decision of the IC] in LaGrand without 
legislative input. 
Many countries employ the same practice of reconciling the norms of the two 
international systems, not as overtly as the U.S. but through interpretation. In France, 
Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland, treaties are automatically 
incorporated into domestic law provided that the treaty has been duly approved by the 
legislature. 166 
165 112 U.S. 580 (1884). U.S. Supreme Court. 
166 Dixon and McCorquodale Cases and Materials 123. 
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2.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed selected theories of international law and considered the 
impact of globalisation on these areas. The chapter has shown that globalisation has 
both signalled and spurred many changes in international legal theory. In response to 
this, international legal theorists and practitioners have grown increasingly dissatisfied 
with theories that do no reflect international norms. The notion that globalisation will 
do away with nationalist sentiment is uncertain. What is certain, however, is that 
internationalism is advancing at a rapid pace, as it is seen to be better in keeping with 
globalisation. The chapter also demonstrated that the meaning of sovereignty has 
evolved from its creation at the Peace of Westphalia to the current globalised world. It 
was said that globalisation has brought increased connections between states and 
therefore sovereignty as autonomy is no longer relevant. Finally, the theories of 
monism and dualism were analysed. While recognising their significance in the 
formation of much of the current legal practice, it was said that focusing on the 
behaviours of states is a more informative way of understanding the relationship 
between international law and domestic law. 
The above theories are all significant to the current research because much of the legal 
theory that promotes greater co-operation between international courts is motivated by 
modern interpretations of traditional theories. The literature is thus often either 
internationalist in its approach, or it resists internationalist sentiment. Whatever one's 
take may be on the issue, there are two notable considerations that must be 
emphasised. Firstly, international society has changed from autonomy to interaction 
and theories must still retain their ability to explain state behaviour in this context. 
Secondly, as attractive as internationalist theories may be, caution must be exercised 
to avoid idealistic proposition that do not consider the politics of international law. A 
balanced reaction is thus required that neither disregards individuality by calling for 
complete assimilation nor resists integration by absolutising sovereignty and 
nationalism. 
It was argued that when trying to determine the relationship between international law 
and municipal law, more particularly whether a given country should apply an 
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international law rule, the monist-dualist debate need not be revisited. Rather, a more 
enlightening way to consider the relationship between international law and domestic 
law is to pay regard to the practice of states since international law practice has 
developed sufficiently to draw conclusions about the dichotomy from practice and not 
theory. It was also shown that the fundamental presupposition of sovereignty as a 
doctrine has consequences insofar as the ideas outwork themselves in a country's 
policies and behaviour. As such, the importance of correct understanding of this 
doctrine is put forward as neither absolute nor non-existing. Sovereignty should thus 
be seen in the balance: a concept that empowers a state to act and yet one that is 
subject to limitations. In a community where human rights realisations are the focal 
point, it is important that the correct view of sovereignty be entrenched to allow 
international input. It was also shown that internationalisation and nationalisation are 
still two reigning theories in international law and globalisation is not necessarily 
indicative of the waning of nationalisation. This means for the purposes of this paper, 
when making proposals, particularly for increased interaction of international 
institutions in national law, nationalism may still be considered as a barrier to this 
innovation. 
Finally, whether one considers the changes brought by globalisation to be positive or 
negative, there can be no question that something extraordinary is happening in the 
world. In consequence, this requires a shift in international legal academia. system is 
to remain relevant and up to date. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS AN 
INSTITUTION FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Contents 
1 Introduction 
2 The Structure of the Court 
3 Role of the Court in International law 
4 Enforcement procedures 
5 Evaluating the Court 
6 Conclusion 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Shaw167 begins his discussion on the Ie] by pointing out that the court can be viewed 
from numerous perspectives. It may be viewed through the eyes of an academic, a 
practitioner, a state, an international organisation or even an individual. Whatever 
perspective one chooses will detennine the manifestation of one's argument, that is to 
say the vantage point taken will determine the outcome of the analysis. For instance: 
an academic perspective may commend the court on the basis that it is a good ideal, 
whereas the practitioner may criticise the court on the same grounds arguing that it is 
just an ideal that cannot be grounded in reality and practice. This chapter will not 
present the discussion from any singular perspective. The chapter will show a 
melange of ideas, from the academic and the statesman to the practitioner, in an 
attempt to analyse the court from these various perspectives. 
167 Shaw "The International Court of Justice: A Practical Perspective" (1997) 461 c.L. Q. 831. 
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On evaluating the success or the efficacy of the IC] it would seem that the logical 
departure point is to look at the compliance rate with the Court's decisions. However, 
the evaluation goes further than that. If the aim of the IC] is to settle disputes, then 
that must be the measuring point. The chapter will show examples of cases where 
there has not necessarily been compliance with IC] decisions, but peace has 
nonetheless ensued due to a decision of the I C]. 168 
The chapter begins with a brief historical outline, as this will be useful in evaluating 
the development of the court as an institution in international law. The focus will then 
be shifted to the powers and functions of the court, drawn out from the various 
statutes applicable, including the IC]'s own enabling statute, the UN Charter and 
various obiter dicta elucidated from IC] jurisprudence. This will become important as 
a foundation for later chapters, in which an attempt will be made to consider whether 
the court can play a more significant role in domestic proceedings without 
overstepping its mandate. The chapter then shows how the court has developed and 
evolved from a last resort mechanism in international law to a useful and well-utilised 
method of dispute resolution in more recent times. It illustrates how the court 
functions on many levels to resolve disputes while showing the court's potential to 
expand its role in international dispute resolution. Finally, the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the court will be brought to the fore, as this will influence a later 
discussion on the court's ability to develop international law. 
168 For instance the cases of Na'"uru v Australia (Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) 
1992 ICJ 345,346 (June 29)) and the case of Finland v Denmark (Passage through the Great Belt 
(Finland v Denmark) 1992 ICJ 348 (Sept 10)). In both these cases the dispute was eventually settled 
out of court but it was the intervention of the court that made such a settlement possible. 
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3.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE COURT 
3.2.1 Historical background 
On 24 August 1898, an event occurred that has been tenned a golden moment in the 
history of international justice.169 Czar Nicholas II, in addressing the sovereigns of 
Europe, handed them a written statement whose content was to the effect that war as a 
means of resolving disputes was outmoded and should be superseded by more 
peaceful methods of resolving disputes. Today, this statement would not be out of 
place in a world that values peaceful dispute resolution. However, the 19th Century 
was a century of war, where the reigning worldview was that war is "a natural 
extension of diplomacy and the great resolver of international disputes: the sword and 
not the law".170 Set in context, the Czar's statement was indeed an unusual and 
groundbreaking statement, magnified by the fact that it was coming from the 
sovereign of the world's largest military power at the time. It was in response to this 
statement that the great Peace Conference of 1899 took place at The Hague. 171 
The impetus to create a world court developed as a result of the Hague conferences 
that took place in 1899 and 1907.172 Flowing from these conferences, a Pennanent 
Court of Arbitration arose, which attempted the consolidation of an international legal 
system. However, it was only in 1920, after World War I, that any significant 
development took place. A general feeling prevailed at the time that the horrors of 
war prompted greater optimism for the idea of peaceful resolution through the 
mechanism of an international court. The Pennanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) was thus created.173 This court aimed to prevent outbreaks of violence by 
facilitating easily accessible methods of peaceful dispute resolution. The court had all 
the apparel of a court: a pennanent panel of judges, continuous jurisprudence, a 
169 An address by Weeramantry "The World Court: Its Conception, Constitution and Contribution" 
(1994) 20 Monash Univ LR 181. 
170 Ibid 
171 Ibid 
172 Shaw International Law 3 ed (1991) 657. 
173 Ibid. 
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registry, and its own rules of procedure. 174 Yet its greatest weakness was that it was 
not an integral part of the League of Nations. This was a weakness because it meant 
the PCIJ was not an integral part of the international system and members of the 
League of Nations were not automatically members of the PCIJ. 
After World War II, the IC] was then created, as an integral part of the United 
Nations. This court functioned on the basis of an almost identical statute as its 
predecessor. However, a dramatic difference between the two courts is the 
environment in which they functioned. 175 Weeramantry, in his address on the 
occasion of the inaugural 'Governor's forum' in Melbourne, points out that the 
international law of the 19th century emphasised the individualist concept of state 
sovereignty, whilst the international law of the 20th century emphasised the collective 
duties of states and the interdependence of states. I76 This means that the IC] today 
functions in a very different setting. For example, the UN has adopted preventative 
diplomacy, which functions largely on public conferences, and as such the IC] is seen 
as a judicial extension of UN diplomatic policy. 177 
3.2.2 Composition of the court 
The court is composed of 15 members, elected by the General Assembly and Security 
Council from a list of qualified persons drawn up by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA).I78 The election process is designed to minimise political pressures 
and it takes place once every three years, with five judges being appointed at a time. 
This staggered process thus ensures continuity in the court. The judges are elected 
"regardless of their nationality, from among persons of high moral character, who 
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognised competence in international 
174 Werramantry 1994 Monash Univ LR 186. 
175 Ibid 
176 Werramantry 1994 Monash pniv LR 187. 
177 Ibid 
178 Art. 4 and 5 of the IeJ Statute. 
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law".179 The members of the court are elected for nine years and may be re-elected. 
No two successful candidates may be of the same nationality. The framework is thus 
set for a judicial body of independent members rather than state representatives. 180 
3.2.3 Powers and Functions 
The International Court rests upon two streams of legitimacy. Firstly, it is the UN's 
premier judicial organl81 and as such it possesses a responsibility to the United 
Nations and should function not only in accordance with its own enabling statute, but 
in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. Its second leg of legitimacy rests 
on its role in the wider international community. According to Judge Lachs, the court 
is "the guardian of legality for the international community as a whole, both within 
and without the United Nations". 182 
The jurisdiction of the IC] is founded on consent.183 This makes it a very different 
system to a domestic court, which is the root cause for a sentiment that the IC] has a 
weak structure. There are various sections that allow the court jurisdiction over a 
matter. Firstly, in terms of article 34 of the IC] Statute, the court has jurisdiction in 
disputes involving only states and not individuals. 184 In such a case the court has 
jurisdiction by consent. This is where two states, by special agreement, concede to 
abide by the court's decision. On the basis of the same article, the court has 
jurisdiction over a dispute based on a treaty, if that treaty gives the court jurisdiction. 
Secondly, Article 36(2) provides for compulsory jurisdiction. States accept the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the court by filing in advance recognition of the 
179 Art. 2 of the IC] Statute. 
180 Shaw International Law 660. 
181 Art. 92 of the UN Charter and Art. 1 of the IC] Statute. 
182 Lockerbie case I.C.J. Reports, 1992, pp.3, 26 and Shaw International Law 344. 
183 Article 35(1) of the IC] Statute states: "The Court shall be open to the states parties to the present 
Statute." 
184 Art. 36(1). Article 34 of the IC] Statute provides that only states may be parties in a case before the 
court. Thus private persons and international organisations or corporations may not submit a matter to 
the IC] for adjudication. 
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jurisdiction of the court in certain matters. 185 Finally, the court has jurisdiction with 
reference to advisory opinions, in which case the court adjudicates by request. 186 Such 
a request may emanate from the General Assembly, the Security Councilor any other 
organ specially authorised by the General Assembly. Hence with respect to advisory 
opinions, some international organisations may be party to a matter before the IC]. 
Article 93 (l) of the UN Charter provides that all members of the UN are ipso facto 
parties to the IC] Statute. A state that is not a member of the UN may, however, be 
party to a case before the IC] if granted the permission by the General Assembly. 187 
The court also has jurisdiction to hear disputes arising out of an international treaty, 
where a treaty contains a clause to such effect. Most treaties do in fact contain a 
clause allowing the IC] jurisdiction over any disputes that may arise. 188 
Article 41 of the IC] Statute allows the court power to issue interim measures and in 
such a case it need not satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of a case. 189 
However, in the case of Guinnea-Bisseau v SenegaZ190 the court noted that even 
though it need not finally satisfy itself as to jurisdiction on the merits before 
indicating provisional measures, it should at least ensure that the provisions invoked 
do prima facie afford the court jurisdiction over the matter. 19 ! The rationale behind 
this is clear, because it seems pointless for the court to indicate provisional measures 
in a case where the merits of the claim cannot be entertained for lack of jurisdiction. 
The primary purpose of the authority to issue interim measures is to protect the rights 
185 Article 36 (2) of the Statute provides for compulsory jurisdiction in disputes concerning: an 
interpretation of a treaty, a question of international law, the existence of any fact which if established 
would constitute a breach of international obligation, and finally the nature or extent of the reparation 
to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
186Shaw International Law 661. 
187 Art 93(2) of the UN Charter. 
188 See for example the 1965 Convention on Investment Disputes. 
189 See request by Guinea-Biss~u for the indication of provisional measures in the Arbitral Award of 31 
July 1989 (Guinnea-Bisseau v Senegal) IC] Reports, 1990 pp 64, 68. 
190 Supra. 
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that are the subj ect of the dispute. 192 It is thus a temporary order put in place to protect 
the interests of certain parties pending a final decision of the court on the merits. For 
example, in the trilogy of cases that are the subject of this thesis,193 the Applicants in 
each case requested an interim order directing the US not to carry out the executions 
pending a decision of the Ie] on the merits in order to protect the lives of the 
detainees. 
3.3 THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International adjudication as a means of resolving disputes is appealing for many 
reasons.
194 For one, the ultimate responsibility of the decision lies with another party. 
This greatly diminishes the political costs for a state. If one compares the outcome of 
a negotiation with that of judicial settlement, if a State were to 'lose' in the latter 
proceedings it bears less responsibility for that loss since internal political forces are 
more likely to accept a loss if it emanates from an external party. 195 Secondly, the idea 
of a court appeals to practitioners because it means they can resort to earlier decisions 
as guidelines for disputes arising later. 196 Although there is no clear system of 
precedent in international law it is certain that one decision will impact other states in 
similar situations. Thirdly, the elucidation of principles in cases by judges hearing the 
matters provides a clear opportunity to develop existing international norms. 197 
192 Shaw International Law 671. 
193 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States) (order of 10 November 
1998). Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlipaus/ipausframe.htm on 6 November 2005. 
LaGrand Gudgment of27 June 2001). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm on 6 November 2005. Avena And other Mexican Nationals 
(Mexico v United States) Gudgment of31 March 2004). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm on 6 November 2005. 
194 Shaw 1997 I c.L. Q 832. 
195 Ibid 
196 Ibid 
197 Ibid There has been much said on the existence of the common law distinction between obiter dicta 
and ratio decidendi in international law decisions. Rosenne (The Law and Practice of the International 
Court 2ed (1985) 87) argues there is no room for obiter dicta since art. 95(1) of the Rules of the Court 
states that the judgment must set out reasons in point of law. However, this issue is the subject of 
another discussion and will not be dwelt upon in these chapters. 
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Finally, what distinguishes international adjudication from other resolution methods is 
that it results in an authoritative decision based on law. 198 This decision may not be a 
global declaration of the actual content of international law, but it will be binding 
upon both parties before the court and any departure from such decision will 
constitute an international violation. 
3.3.1 The Court's Record 
Despite these positives, the historical record of the Ie] has not always been 
impressive. Article 36(2) of the Ie] statute provides for compulsory jurisdiction of the 
court, but less than a third of the parties to the Statute have accepted this clause. 199 
Sha~oo suggests that this is clear evidence of the fact that the Ie] merely plays a 
peripheral role in the international community. It is true that the Ie] register was 
relatively empty for a season and also true that many members do not accept the 
court's compulsory jurisdiction.201 This has been a prime topic of discussion in 
academic circles?02 However, Shaw, who was writing in 1991, may today hold a 
different opinion since from 1991 to date, there has been a dramatic increase in the 
court's role in international law. 
Prior to 1990, the Ie] played a minimal role in the preservation of peace and security. 
There are various reasons advanced for this. First and foremost, the nature of the legal 
system itself: in a legal system founded upon 150 member countries that all jealously 
guard their sovereignty; the Ie]'s ability to have jurisdiction over certain matters has 
been significantly hampered.203 As it stands, less than one third of the parties to the 
198 Shaw 1997 I c.L. Q 842. 
199 Shaw International Law 679. 
200 Ibid. 
201 See Highet "The Peace Palace Heats Up again: The World Court in Business Again?" (1991) 85 
Am. J. Int'! L. 646, Tiefenbrun "The Role of the World Court in Settling International Disputes: A 
Recent Assessment" (1997-1998) 20 Loy. L.A. Int'[ & Camp. L.J 1. 
202 See Kelly "The Changing Process ofInternational Law and the Role of the World Court" (1989-
1999) 11 Mich. J. Int'! L. 129 at 130 fn 7 & 8. 
203 Shaw International Law 679. 
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IC] statute have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction.204 In addition to this, a state 
might not submit to the court's contentious jurisdiction for fear that they might lose a 
case and erode their independence and autonomy in the international community.2os 
Secondly, the power of the court to provide effective remedies is fettered by poor 
enforcement measures206 so that a decision in favour of a wining state might later 
prove meaningless. Sha~o7 provides the Corfu Channel208 case as an apt example. 
The case arose as a result of incidences that occurred on 22 October 1946 in the Corfu 
strait where two British destroyers struck mines in Albanian waters, causing serious 
injury and loss to life. When the matter was raised before the Security Council, it was 
recommended that the matter be brought before the International Court of ]ustice?09 
One of the issues before the court was whether Albania was responsible for the 
explosion and whether there is a duty to pay compensation in this respect.2lO The 
court found in favour of the United Kingdom, holding that Albania was responsible 
for the explosion.211 As to the compensation, the court awarded a total of£843,977 for 
the damages caused to the British ships and the loss as a result of the injuries and 
deaths.212 During the proceedings, Albania announced that the IC] had no jurisdiction 
to fix the sum of compensation and its role was merely to deal with the matter in 
principle. It thus refused to take part in further proceedings, thereby refusing to 
implement the court's order. 
204 See above fn CHECK 
205 Shaw International Law 679. 
206 See 'Enforcement ofICJ decisions' below for a further discussion on this point. 
207 International Law 679. 
208 Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v Albania) 1947-1949, Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/icc/iccframe.htm on 16 June 2006). 
209 See Corfu Channel (judgment of25 March 1948) supra at 17. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/icc/icc ijudgmentliCC ijudgment 19480325.pdf on 16 June 2006). 
210 See Corfu Channel (judgment of9 April 1949) supra at 6. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/icc/icc ijudgmentliCC ijudgment 19490409.pdf on 16 June 2006). 
211 Supra at 23. 
212 Supra. 
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Thirdly, adjudication as a system of dispute resolution is highly inflexible as 
compared to other settlement procedures, in that a decision once given is final and 
binding on the parties before the court, unlike negotiation, which allows a state time 
to concede to particular measures. Finally, the court has often been viewed as a 
hegemonic force, particularly by Third World countries.213 This perception that the 
court is 'traditionalist developed-world dominated,214 was exacerbated by the lack of 
African or Asian representation on the court.21 5 Furthermore, the South West Africa 
cases2I6 were a sore disappointment for many developing states, in that they appeared 
to show the ICJ's inability to grasp the true essence of a dispute. The first phase of the 
case turned on the status of South West Africa; whether it was a territory still under 
the Mandate system. The Court answered this question in the affirmative?17 In the 
second phase of the case, Ethiopia and Liberia brought a case before the IC] in 1966, 
in their capacity as members of the former League of Nations.218 The basis of the 
213 Shaw international Law 679. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Shaw international Law 679. Today the court is represented by three African judges; Nabil Elaraby 
(Egypt), Abdul G Koroma (Sierra Leone) and Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar) and three Asian judges; 
Shi Jiuyong (China), Vladlen S Vereshchetin (Russian Federation), Hisashi Owada (Japan). See 
http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/igeneralinformationligncompos.html )accessed on 7 June 2006). 
216 South West Africa: Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa (Second phase, Judgment of 18 
July 1966). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ilsaesasummarv660718.htm on 10 June 2006). 
217 The facts were as follows: it concerned territory then called South West Africa, which had been 
renounced by Germany in the Treaty of Versailles (International Status o/South West Africa Advisory 
Opinion of 11 July 1950. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idecisions/isummaries/isswasummary50071l.htm on 10 June 2006). The territory was 
then placed under a Mandate conferred on the Union of South Africa. After World War II, the Union of 
South Africa alleged that the Mandate had lapsed and sought the recognition ofthe United Nations to 
incorporate the territory. The matter was submitted to the ICJ in 1946 for an advisory opinion after the 
Union of South Africa had failed to place the territory under Trusteeship as required by chapter 12 of 
the United Nations Charter (Supra). The issue in question was thus the status of the territory. The court 
fIrst considered the nature of the Mandate and if it was still in existence. It had been contended on 
behalf of the Union that the Mandate had lapsed because the League of Nations, the 'Mandator', had 
ceased to exist. The court however found that the role of the League of Nations as a 'Mandator' was 
simply a supervisory role and that the purpose of the mandate was to protect the inhabitants of the 
territory (Supra) This being the object, the mandate still existed because its raison d'etre was 
independent of the existence of the League. The court thus held that South West Africa was still a 
territory under the Mandate system, and therefore the Union Government was still obliged to report on 
the progress and status of its inhabitants (Supra). If the status were to be altered, the Union government 
could not do this unilaterally but must fIrst submit the territory under the trustee system as required by 
Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter. 
218 South West Africa (second phase: judgment of 18 July 1966) supra. 
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claim was a breach of certain duties entrusted to South Africa in the Mandate. The 
Court in its judgment returned to the essence of the Mandate as enumerated in the 
1950 decision and held that since the mandate was a 'sacred trust of civilisation', it 
indeed did concern all civilised nations.219 But in order for this interest to have a 
juridical basis it had to have more than just a moral or humanitarian content.220 Thus 
the court was viewed as a product of European imperialism that did not take into 
account the changing patterns of international relations.221 It thus appeared that the 
Court was wedded to western ideas and approaches to internationallaw.222 
In recent times the court has reformed its reputation. The court is busier than ever and 
has grown to be increasingly respected. Susan W. Teifenbrun223 shows the case 
statistics: from 1946-1987 the IC] conferred judgment on the merits of 23 cases, 
terminated 12 cases in the preliminary stages, discontinued five cases and issued 19 
advisory opinions. In the nineties, this reputation changed dramatically, largely 
because of a change in the global political climate. The 1991 reports show that in the 
two preceding years, nine new cases were submitted to the COurt.224 As from October 
1993, the World Court had a full docket and was operating at a productive pace. The 
figures reflected below demonstrate this?25 
1. 1992-1993: Eleven cases (at various stages ofresolution). 226 
2. 1993-1994: Thirteen cases (12 contentious cases and one advisory opinion). 227 
219 Supra. 
220 See South West Africa (second phase: judgment of 18 July 1966) at para 17. Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ilsaesasummary660718.htm on 10 June 2006). 
221 See further Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Camp. L.J2. 
222 Harris Cases and Materials on International Law 5th ed (1998) 989. 
223 Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'! & Camp. L.J, quoting Nagendra Singh The role and Record of 
the International Court of Justice (1989) 43. 
224 Highet 1991 Am. J. Int'! L 647. 
225 See Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'! & Camp. L.J 17. 
226 Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Camp. L.J 14. 
227 According to the Report of the Secretary General on the work of the organisation, September 1994. 
Also see Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'! & Camp. L.J at 15. 
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3. 1995-1996: Fourteen cases (12 contentious cases and two advisory opinions).228 
4. Aug 1999- July 2000: Two new contentious cases taken on, bringing the total 
number of contentious cases pending to 25.229 
5. Aug 2000- July 2001: Three new contentious cases, total of 26 contentious cases 
pending.23o 
6. Aug 2001- July 2002: Three new cases, total of25 contentious cases pending.231 
7. Aug 2002 - July 2003: Four new cases, total of28 contentious cases pending.232 
Thus the court got off to a bad start, with its poor performance peaking in the 1980s. 
The 1990s however brought much positive change for the court and it is hoped that 
this positive change will continue through the years to come. With the advent of non-
governmental organisations and increased corporate activity in the international plain, 
there is bound to be more work for the court as the players in the international field 
mcrease. 
3.3.2 The court as a means of dispute resolution 
Despite the abovementioned positives, the role of the ICJ in the international 
community is not as central as one might like to think. The ICJ does not hold the same 
position that a domestic court has, in that it does not stand as an authoritative body in 
international law in the same way that a domestic court stands as an authoritative arm 
of a national government. The reason for this is the make up of the international legal 
system, the consensual nature of the court's jurisdiction and the fact that there is no 
228 Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'/ & Compo L.J at 19. 
229 Report of the International Court of Justice, Ch V, para 78. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij .orglicjwww/igeneralinfonnationligeninC Annuat ReportsliICJ _ Annual_ Report_1999-2000.htm on 
27/08/05. 
230 Report of the International Court of Justice Ch V para 78. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/igeneralinfonnationligeninC Annual_ Reports/iICJ _ Annuat Report_ 2000-200 I.PDF on 
27 August 2005. 
231 Report of the International Court of Justice, Ch V, para 89. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/igeneralinfonnationligeninC Annual_ Reports/iICJ _ Annuat Report_ 200 1-2002.PDF on 
27 August 2005. 
232 Report of the International Court of Justice, Ch V, para 97. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/igeneralinfonnationligeninC Annual_ Reports/iicL annualJeport_ 2002-2003.pdf on 27 
August 2005. 
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system of stare decisis in international law alongside other political motivations. So 
as a starting point, the role of the IC] should be seen against the backdrop of other 
dispute resolution mechanisms in international law. The pluralistic context helps to 
highlight the complicated environment in which the court operates. 
There are vanous methods of peaceful resolution, rangmg from negotiation, 
mediation, and conciliation, to arbitration.233 Because of the variety of methods 
available to a state seeking to settle a dispute, judicial settlement may be resorted to as 
part of a broader strategy of dispute resolution. The Nauru234 case is an excellent 
example of this. In casu, a dispute arose with respect to the rehabilitation of certain 
phosphate lands. It was alleged that Australia, having the role of mandatory over the 
Nauru territory, had been exploiting certain phosphate deposits in Nauru.235 Nauru 
had attempted several negotiations, but Australia was not forthcoming. The dispute 
went through various stages and the gradual process to resolution involved many 
players, the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the Nauru Local Government 
Council and the IC]?36 But it was the IC] that played a crucial role in bringing the 
matter to a close. In response to the claims raised by Nauru, Australia argued before 
the IC] that Nauru had waived their rights in respect the rehabilitation of certain 
lands.237 These arguments, among others, were all rejected by the court. When dealing 
with the last point, the court's judgment set out reasons that show that Nauru had not 
waived its rights. These matters were all raised at the procedural stage of the case. 
Thus it was clear that at the merits stage, the court would have found in favour of 
Nauru.238 Adjudication was thus useful in the circumstances because it served to 
balance the playing ground between Nauru (a small nation) and Australia (a major 
233 Shaw 1997 1.c.L.Q at 836. 
234 Supra. 
235 See Memorial of the Republic of Nauru in Certain phosphate lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia). 
Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/icases/inaus/iNAUSpleadings/inaus _ ipleadings _199004_ MemorialNauru _Part 1 Chapter 
l.pdf on 27 August 2005. 
236 McLennan "International Dispute Resolution" (2002) 6 JSPL Articles (accessed at 
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/journal spJaw/ ArticleslMcLennan 1.htm on 27 August 2005). 
237 See Nauru case supra note 2 (Judgment of26 June 1992) at para 14 accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/inaus/inausframe.htm on 27 August 2005. 
238McLennan 2002 6 JSPL Articles. 
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power). The IC] thus played a crucial role in providing preliminary adjudication 
proceedings that would later enable Nauru to enhance its bargaining power against the 
other states sufficiently to allow for equitable negotiations to take place. Such 
negotiations did follow because on 13 September 1993, the court made an order to 
place the matter on discontinuance by agreement of the parties. The case is of 
relevance because in the end it was not the IC] that resolved the dispute but 
negotiations were eventually entered into after the case was withdrawn from the court. 
The court had acted as a catalyst to resolution in the case, primarily because it offered 
a means through which the playing fields could be levelled. Australia and Nauru 
could come before the court as independent and sovereign states, thereby disarming 
Australia of all its power. 
The case thus demonstrates how adjudication can be used in international practice as 
part of a greater strategy to resolve a dispute. Dispute resolution should not be 
compartmentalised. Consequently, the Ie] should not be perceived as the only means 
to resolve an international dispute, since it can playa role alongside other avenues in 
bring a matter to finality. 
3.3.3 Expanding the court's role 
The function of the international court as laid out in art. 38 of the IC] Statute is to 
"decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it". 
This article can be narrowly read to say that the court should merely settle the 
disputes before it by applying the relevant principles of international law. But a 
preferred interpretation is taken from a broad reading of this article. Therefore the 
better view suggests that the international court is not merely called upon to settle the 
dispute, but in doing so it must develop the law. The latter seems the better view, 
since international law evolves and the drafters of the various documents could not 
have conceived of every possible problem that would arise. 
Some academics have criticised the court's ability to make authoritative decisions 
based on law.239 The argument goes that the constitutional function and role of the 
239 Sellers "The Authority of the International Court of Justice" (2002) 8 In! 'I Legal Theory 41. 
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court is not to make authoritative decisions of law, but merely to settle disputes. 
Sellers240 suggests that the tendency to view the judgments of the IC] as decisive 
evidence of the content of international law arises by analogy with the role of 
domestic courts. He states that not only was the IC] never intended to determine the 
law but it is ill-equipped to determine the content of internationallaw.241 Despite this 
argument, it is clear that the impact of any decision of the IC] has far-reaching effects. 
These effects may not just be legal, but may be political. For example, in the Fisheries 
case, the Corfu case and Iran case242 we see clear examples of non-compliance with 
an IC] order; but despite the digression, the decision still had lasting impact that went 
beyond mere compliance. 
The above shows that the IC] should have a responsibility that goes beyond the 
narrow interpretation of its functions and its role to settle the dispute before it. 
It has been said that the IC] is at the apex of international legal development.243 This 
opinion suggests that the IC] should not just settle the dispute before it but it should 
develop international law whilst doing so. The separate opinion of Judge Lachs in the 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case244 is illustrative of this opinion. The case 
concerned a dispute with respect to the Aegean Sea continental shelf. Greece 
requested the court to declare the course of the boundary between the portions of the 
continental shelf. In casu, Greece sought to establish the court's jurisdiction on two 
240 Ibid 
241 See Sellers 2002 Int 'flegal Theory 46, where he argues that the Ie] as an institution of dispute 
resolution is not well equipped to detennine the content of international law because it is subject to the 
political control and oversight of interested states. He uses an example the election process of judges in 
the court and shows that such judges are elected with the significant participation of governments that 
hold seats in the UN General Assembly, which leaves then subject to the influence of these 
governments. The result is that the court lacks the independence that is necessary for a court to hold 
decisive authority. 
242 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v leeland) (1972-1974). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iai/iaiiYame.htm on 27 August 2005, Corfu Channel case supra, Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran) (1951-1952). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm on 25 August 2005. 
243 Shaw International Law 850. 
244 (Greece v Turkey) accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/igt/igtiYame.htm on 27 August 
2005. 
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.,-
bases, one of which was a communique made to the press by the Greek and Turkish 
Prime Ministers following a meeting between them.245 The communique stated that 
any problems between the two countries would be settled by means of negotiation and 
with respect to the continental shelf territory; the problem would be submitted to the 
ICJ.246 The court held that the communique was not a valid basis to establish 
jurisdiction because it did not indicate an unconditional intention to subject the matter 
to the court for adjudication?47 What was envisaged however, was a joint submission 
of the case by the two countries rather than a unilateral application as had occurred. 
The court thus found that there were no grounds for jurisdiction. 
In a separate opinion248, Judge Lachs dealt with the matter more extensively by 
describing the nature of the communique and expressing his opinion on the 
relationship between negotiations and the functions of the ICJ. He thus adds that 
negotiations and adjudication need not be seen as opposing forces but they should be 
seen as complementary means of resolving disputes, which may be used concurrently 
or successively, depending on which method would facilitate the resolution of the 
dispute efficiently and effectively?49 This case thus presents a situation where the 
court discharges its obligation to resolve disputes just as it should. One judge, 
however, then goes further than the dispute that appears before him and reflects on the 
problem in a manner that will be helpful to others seeking clarity on the legal issues 
drawn from the case. Judge Lachs's opinion thus sheds light not only on the matter 
before the court, but on the interplay of different dispute resolution mechanisms in 
international law, more specifically negotiations and adjudication. This case is thus a 
good illustration of the need to have the ICJ develop the law and not confine its role 
to merely settling the dispute in a narrow sense. 
245 Aegean Continental Shelf case (See judgment of 19 December 1978) supra at para 12. 
246 Aegean Continental Shelf Case supra at para 94. 
247 Aegean Continental Shelf Case supra at para 106. 
248 Aegean Continental Shelf Case accessed at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/icases/igt/igtframe.htm 
on 27 August 2006. 
249 Aegean Continental Shelf Case at 50 supra. 
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Thus ShavV50 argues that substantive law is very definitive on the role of the court, in 
that its enabling statute clearly lays out its function, powers and limitations. However, 
he goes on to further say that societal needs and expectations argue for a broader 
rather than a narrower approach for the court in its role of settling disputes. The role 
of the court should not just be confined to settling disputes, but it should be seen in 
broader context of other dispute resolution methods and the more general need to 
advance international jurisprudence by developing the current law through the court's 
decisions. 
3.4 ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
3.4.1 The Role of the Security Council 
The ICJ Statute does not provide for enforcement mechanisms, but art. 94 of the UN 
Charter covers this to a point. It reads: 
"1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. 
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it 
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may (own emphasis 
added) have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems 
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to 
give effect to the judgment." 
Thus the Security Council is tasked with the responsibility of enforcing the ICJ 
judgments. It is noteworthy that art. 94(2) is framed in very broad language, with the 
use of the permissive 'may' instead of more mandatory language. This gives the 
Security Council wide discretion with respect to enforcement. This wide discretion 
granted to the Security Council leaves the court to rely on the "logic of political 
negotiation between Members of the Council with regard to the enforcement of its 
250 Shaw International Law 51. 
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judgments ... ,,251 According to Tanzi, the section is so broadly framed that it in effect 
gives the Security Council the right not to enforce a decision of the court, even where 
a successful member requests it to do SO.252 However, Tanzi adds that this seemingly 
unusual situation is not atypical of the overall political underpinnings of the UN 
Structure.253 The Security Council is both the sole institution for the enforcement of 
ICl decisions and the UN's premier political organ. To place an absolute obligation 
on the Security Council to enforce a decision of the ICl would amount to subjecting 
the Security Council to the authority of the ICl.254 For example, if the political 
evaluations of a particular case differ from the legal evaluations of the Court, it would 
be unrealistic to assume that the Security Council would give way to the legal 
reasoning of the Court at the cost of political relations. Tanz/55 also highlights, and 
quite correctly so, the fact that the UN Charter is a construction centred on the five 
Permanent Members of the Council and it is unlikely that the Security Council will 
pass a resolution against one of these Permanent Members, where they lose a case 
before the ICl. In essence, Professor Tanzi finds that Article 94(2) is founded on 
political reasons. This argument seems plausible, since there would seem to be no 
logical legal reasoning for a clause that gives such a wide discretion, especially when 
poor enforcement mechanisms can threaten the institutional integrity of any court. 
The Case a/the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua256 is an 
example of a case where the inaction of the Council posed a threat to the authority of 
the ICl. After receiving judgment in its favour257, the Permanent Representative of 
Nicaragua to the UN requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the non-
251 Tanzi "Problems ofthe Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law 
of the United Nations" (1995) EJIL 1at 3. 
252 Ibid 
253 Ibid 
254 Tanzi 1995 EJIL 4. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Judgment of27 June 1986 (a~cessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusframe.htm on 
26 January 2006). 
257 Judgment of27 June 1986 supra. 
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compliance with a decision that had been passed by the IC] four months earlier.258 
The meeting was held and produced a draft resolution calling for the immediate 
compliance with the order?59 However, the draft resolution was not adopted by the 
President of the Council due to the negative vote of one of the members, the United 
States. The latter disputed the validity of the judgment on the basis that the IC] had 
neither jurisdiction nor competence in the matter.260 The objection by the United 
States was thus on legal and not political grounds. This had the effect of placing in 
question the authority of the IC] and ultimately its reputation. The authority of the 
court was however left intact due to the fact the other members of the Council who 
abstained from the vote, did so on political grounds?61 The case thus illustrates how 
the response of the Security Council can have a negative impact on the authority of 
the IC]. 
Tanzi concludes that the balance must be struck by separating the decision before the 
court and the issue of non-compliance with an IC] decision. His argument goes that 
the UN Charter charges a political body (the Security Council) with the enforcement 
of IC] decisions because at that point, the issue is no longer of a legal nature, but of a 
political nature. Prior to such point, that is, when the matter is still before the IC], 
issues of a legal nature necessarily prevail, making the IC] the best body suited to deal 
with the matter.262 
258 Letter dated 17 October 1986. See UN Doc. S/18415 (Accessed at http://www.un.orgldocuments/ 
on 26 January 2006. 
259 UN Doc. SI18428 (Accessed at http://www.un.orgidocumentsQ on 26 January 2006). 
260 UN DOC. SIPV. 2718 at 44 (accessed at http://www.un.orgidocumentsQ on 26 January 2006. 
261 For example Thailand, Fran~e and the United Kingdom who objected to the draft resolution on the 
grounds of political implications. (SEE Tanzi 1995 EJIL 7). 
262 Tanzi 1995 EJIL 36. 
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3.4.2 Enforcement by other bodies 
Measures aimed at enforcing an IC] decision may be taken by a body other than the 
Security Counci1.263 This finding is based on an extensive interpretation of Article 48 
of the UN Charter. This section reads as follows: 
"1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for 
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the 
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council 
may determine. 
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations 
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of 
which they are members." 
In theory, if one could show that action by the Security Council to enforce an IC] 
decision is necessary for the maintenance of peace, the Security Council could defer 
authority to deal with a defaulting party in terms of this section. This would not be 
incompatible with some treaties, for example the Constituent Treaty of the 
International Labour Organization, which provides that where there has been non-
compliance with an IC] decision, the "Governing body may recommended to the 
Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance 
therewith".264 
Thus methods of enforcement vary, deference to an international organisation being 
one option. A successful party may resort to diplomatic measures, negotiation and 
mediation, and even resort to economic pressure. 
An issue of great interest is whether a state may refer to municipal courts to seek 
compliance with an IC] order or judgment. The matter was raised in the Belgian case 
263 Tanzi 1995 EJIL 26. 
264 Article 33 of the Treaty of the International Labour Organisation. 
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of Scobelge v Greece265 in which a Belgian firm sought to attach the funds of the 
Greek Government in Belgium pursuant to a decision of the Permanent Court. The 
court denied the action on the basis of a technicality, but the case suggests nonetheless 
that an international judicial arbitral award may be the subject of a case before a 
municipal court. This issue will be explored further in later chapters. 
Resort to armed force to secure legal rights would not be in keeping with Article 2, 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the UN Charter. 266 This is thus not a valid means of enforcing a 
decision since it cuts at the heart of the purpose of the UN Charter: the maintenance of 
d . 267 peace an secunty. 
The provisions in art. 94(2) are thus in no way satisfactory, since they leave a state at 
the whim of the Security Council, which is itself a body with a political agenda. The 
intricate relationship between international law and politics cannot be done away 
with, but with the increase of players in the international field and rapid growth of 
human rights recognition, the question of enforcement will become even more 
important. Hence the issue of municipal courts enforcing international judgments is 
re-emerging. In the meantime, the court remains without sheriffs or constables to 
enforce its decrees in the same way that domestic courts do, and as such it largely 
relies on the goodwill of states. 
265 Societe Commerciale de Belgique c Etat Hellenic de Grece, Brussels Civil Tribunal (1951). 
266 Article 2(3) and 2(4) of the UN Charter provide that: 
"3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peac~ and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes ofthe United Nations." 
267 Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. 
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3.5 EVALUATING THE COURT 
3.5.1 The court's contribution to international law 
The PCIJ started off well, developing international law professionally and 
successfully resolving some serious disputes, thereby showing that the idea of a 
strong judicial body amidst the political goings-on of the world could work. A look at 
the court's jurisprudence will reveal that in the past the majority of its work emanated 
from Europe. This diminished the Court's global nature. The ICJ, however, has 
improved greatly in this respect. For one, it now operates as a truly global court. 
Disputes before the court range from South Arnerica268 through Africa269 and Gulf 
States270 right through to the Pacific regions.271 Another great achievement of the 
court is its contribution to the resolution of international tensions272 and in the realm 
of international law development.273 Judge Weeramantry refers to two areas in 
particular, where the ICJ has been instrumental in the advancement of those 
disciplines in international jurisprudence: the law of the sea and the interpretation of 
treaties.274 The Law of the Sea Convention, which now stands as a codification of the 
rules applicable to the Law of Sea, arose from ICJ jurisprudence. For example, the 
Fisheries275 set the baseline on how to determine territorial sea. With respect to the 
268 For example: Haya de la Torre (Colombia v. Peru) (1950-1951), Border and Transborder Armed 
Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras) (1986-1992), Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. 
Colombia) (2001-). Accessed on the ICJ Website at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm on 
28 January 2006. 
269 For example: Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) (2002), Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Democratic Republic ofthe Congo v. Burundi) (1999-2001), Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
FasolRepublic of Mali) (1983-1986). Accessed on the ICJ Website at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm on 28 January 2006. 
270 For example: Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain) (1991-2001). Accessed on ICJ website at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm on 28 
January 2006. 
271 Nauru Case supra. 
272 Weeramantry 1994 Monash Univ LR at 190. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway) 1949-1950. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjw,vw/icases/iukniiuknframe.htm. on 28 January 2006. 
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interpretation of treaties, the rules on interpretation gathered from the Vienna 
Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties come from decisions of the court. Thus 
the court's record of achievement has been good, despite its lack of enforcement 
procedures. 
One of the strengths of the court lies in its representative character. Article 2 of the 
ICJ Statute refers to "a body of independent judges". The perceived impartiality of the 
court is indispensable to the functioning of the court. The current composition of the 
court reflects thiS?76 
Another strength of the court lies in the ideal of the court itself. The world 'court' was 
established to address a universal need for the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes. Its very existence provides a state with the opportunity to resolve an 
international dispute legally.277 
3.5.2 Challenges for the Court 
However, the court is plagued by many weaknesses, some attributed to the structure 
and the functioning of the court and others simply to the international legal order. 
Firstly, the delays in the court's proceedings is a major deterrent for a prospective 
litigant. These delays are attributed to the large number of dissenting and separate 
opinions provided in each judgment.278 Some nations object to the procedure by 
which the judges are elected on the basis that they do not have uniform qualifications, 
impartiality and independence. Furthermore, the unpredictability of the court's 
decisions has weakened its attractiveness. The fact that the court applies an uncodified 
customary international law system means that a prospective litigant cannot know 
with certainty which way the court will decide and which law will be applied. Thus, 
the substantive law to be applied by the court is indeterminate. Even where the rules 
of customary law are known there is still the trouble of its acceptance. 
276 See note 215 above. 
277 Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. In! 'I & Compo L.J at 24. 
278 Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.Jat 20. 
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According to Falk279 the narrow positivistic jurisprudential style of the court 
significantly impairs its functioning. He argues that the style of the court is largely 
Western, making it less responsive to non-Western nations. He thus suggests a more 
pluralistic jurisprudence that takes into account the diversity and multicultural 
ideology reflected by the UN Charter.28o In response to this, Kelly281 argues that a 
more pluralistic standpoint will cause a fragmentation of the jurisprudence. The crux 
of his argument is that a tilt towards one paradigm is a shift away from another, 
because the problem lies in the disagreements of these so-called pluralistic norms?82 
Principles such as sovereignty, self-determination and even human rights have 
different meanings in different contexts and in applying a particular norm, the effect 
may be to raise a bias towards one state and so encourage the withdrawal of other 
states. Kelly283 identifies the root cause for the court's weakness in the fundamental 
disagreement of the content of norms in international law. He argues that the court is 
weakened by faulty perspectives of its role. The disagreements about the content and 
formation of international norms call into question the very legitimacy of the 
international legal order itself,284 thus weakening the court, as the applier of these 
norms. He says the only way to solve the problem is for sovereign nations to redefine 
customary international legal principles through multilateral treaty negotiations?85 
Whatever the root cause of the court's weaknesses, it would be too simplistic to ~ 
attempt to identify one cause and produce a solution. So both Falk and Kelly's i 
arguments hold some water. What is interesting about Kelly'S argument that the 
problem lies in the fluidity of the international norms is that it suggests that the 
problem lies not with the court itself but with the system of international law. 
279 Richard Falk Reviving the World Court (1986) 178-180. 
280 Ibid 
281 Kelly "The Changing Process of International Law and the Role of the World Court" (1989-1990) 
11 Mich. J. In!'l L. 129. 
282 Kelly 1989-1990 Mich. J.Int'l L at 159. 
283 Kelly 1989-1990 Mich. J.Int~1 L at 160. 
284 Kelly 1989-1990 Mich. J.Int'l L at 159. 
285 Kelly 1989-1990 Mich. J.Int'l L at 166. 
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Finally, one of the major weaknesses of the court is the poor compliance with its 
decisions. For example, the Corfu Channel case, the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the 
US. Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran case, and the Nicaragua case were not 
respected.286 
3.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The chapter has set out the limits of the ICJ's power and authority. This will be a 
foundation to understand many of the criticisms raised against the court's action in the 
LaGranfj87 case. It has also been shown that the ICJ as an institution for dispute 
resolution possesses great potential, in terms of it being a truly global court presided 
by independent judges who are selected by means of a stringent process. It was noted 
that the ICJ's function in international law has increased greatly in the 1990s, while 
attention was drawn to the fact that there remains much room for expansion in 
developing international legal norms. 
A prominent author once said whilst writing on the possibilities of world government 
through a world court : 
"There is little reason to expect that the nations of the world court could 
establish a world court with compulsory jurisdiction. How could it keep 
peace? The long-standing and operative causes of war do not constitute 
justiciable controversies. Nations go to war over problems that no court can 
settle. ,,288 
This opinion explains why the court has not lived up to many standards set for it. The 
court is often judged on the same basis that a national court is judged and when the 
286 Supra. On U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iusir/iusirframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
287 Germany v United States. Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm on 
27 January 2006. 
288 Briggs "The Cloudy Prospects for 'Peace Through Law' "(1980) 46 A.B.A.J. 490 quoted in John 
Dixon 'The Connally Amendment - The Conflict Between Nationalism and an effective World Court' 
(1964-1965) 53 Kentucky L. J. 164 at 166. 
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two are measured against each other, the former is often found wanting. However, the 
IC] does not exercise the same kind of authority as a domestic court. It does not 
command the same kind of respect and it does not hold the same kind of power. All 
these supposed weaknesses are attributed to the nature of international law and not to 
the workings of the court per se. Despite this, the decisions and opinions expressed by 
the IC] over time have played a vital role in the evolution of international law; the 
Nauru case being a prime example. According to McLennan,289 the Nauru case is an 
example where adjudication as a means of resolving a dispute worked for the best. On 
the one hand, it raised international confidence in the competence of the IC] whilst 
also quelling any suspicions that the court was an institution bent towards 
colonialism. So the Nauru decision stands as a victory for the IC], in that it 
demonstrates to the world that developing states could participate as sovereign states 
before the court, and encourages other post-colonial states to bring cases before the 
COurt.290 
In the chapters to corne, the future of the IC] will be examined. This chapter has 
shown that any discussion on the Court's success and development must be cognisant 
of the organisation of international law. It has also been shown that the costs of 
adjudication can be very high and unpredictable, very often deterring potential 
litigators. The risk of entrusting national interest in the hands of a few foreign judges 
who may be biased is overwhelming for many states, causing gravitation to other 
resolution methods.291 This does not, however, detract from the functionality of the 
Court. The chapter has shown that despite the complexities of the international 
context, the Court has attained a full roll and is now busier than ever. The focus of the 
remaining chapters will be to examine the role of the court vis-a.-vis domestic law, 
with the aim of attaining peaceful resolution through reciprocation with national 
courts. 
To conclude, in the words ofWeerarnantry: 292 
289 2002 JSPL Articles. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Tiefenbrun 1997-1998 Loy. L.A. Int'/ & Comp. L.J25. 
292 Weeramantry 1994 Monash Univ LR 191. 
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"the International Court of Justice... is the most valuable instrument yet 
available to the international community for developing international law 
adequately to meet the needs of a changing world, for providing a focal point 
for the peaceful resolution of international disputes, for radiating through the 
entire global community a consciousness of the international rule of law and 
for injecting an authoritative legal element into the processes of preventative 
diplomacy." 
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CHAPTER 4 
LAGRAND AND SIMILAR DECISIONS 
Contents 
1 Overview 
2 LaGrand (Germany v United States) 
3 Implications of LaGrand 
4 Before and after LaGrand 
5 Lessons From The Trilogy Of Cases 
6 Conclusion 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
In a highly contentious case, the IC] held that the United States had breached its 
international obligation to Gennany under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (VCCR/93• The case came to the Court after two Gennan 
Nationals had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but not infonned of 
their rights to Consular assistance. Once the Gennan Consulate discovered the matter, 
it engaged in various efforts to appeal the case on behalf of the nationals. The U.S. 
authorities did not pennit review of the case on the basis of a domestic law rule that 
prevented the claim being raised further. After the execution of one of the nationals, 
the Gennan government made an ex parte application to the IC], seeking a 
provisional measures order from the IC] in an attempt to stay the execution of the 
other national, still in detention. The court issued the order, which was subsequently 
disregarded by the United States. At the final hearing of the case, the court ruled that 
the United States had breached its international obligations to Gennany, and declared 
~ 
that provisional measures issued by the court had binding effect. 
293 Vienna Convention on Consular Rights. Apri124 1963. 
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LaGrand (Germany v United Statesi94 has been chosen as a case study because the 
issues dealt with in the case enumerate many points of concern in international law 
and is thus an ideal springboard onto the current topic. The case has been chosen for 
the following reasons: 
1. It presents a rare instance where the treaty obligations of a State, affecting 
individual rights, were the subject of international adjudication. As such, issues of 
the relationship between international law and domestic law immediately become 
relevant. 
2. The case also presents another rare instance where the issues concerning the 
criminal justice system of a state are placed before the IC], a matter that is not 
traditionally the subject of international law. 
3. The LaGrand decision signifies a momentous shift in the court's injunctive 
authority that is likely to impact the future work of international courts and 
tribunals. 
4. The case shows the tension between international law and national law. This is 
primarily evident with respect to the impact of a decision of an international court 
on domestic law. A less evident display of the tension between international law 
and national law can be seen through a clash of worldviews on the death penalty 
Issue. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the essential facts and issues arising in 
LaGrand. The section takes an in-depth analysis at the case and the comments of 
various academics on the issues raised in casu, more specifically the following 
questions: 
1 What is the effect of a declaration that provisional measures of the IC] are 
binding as a matter of international law? 
2 Was the case essentially about the international community's abhorrence for the 
death penalty? 
294 [1999] IeJ Reports 9 (3 March). (Hereinafter referred to as LaGrand). Accessed at http://www.icj-
ciLorglicjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
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3 Did the ICJ exercise undue power in LaGrand by interfering in the domestic 
proceedings of a sovereign state? 
4 What are the implications of the court's ruling that the VCCR gives rise to 
individual rights? 
It is not the aim of this chapter to consider the correctness of the ICJ's findings in 
LaGrand. This would involve a lengthy discussion of other international principles 
that do not fall within the scope of this thesis. Rather, this chapter will focus on the 
consequences of the findings in LaGrand, as this facilitates a discussion on the 
relationship between international law and domestic law. This chapter will thus begin 
with a broad outline of the background and facts of the case and the implications of 
the Court's decision. The next section will then analyse similar cases that have 
appeared before the Court to demonstrate the gravity of the problem and show how 
the court has advanced its argument since the first time it was faced with the problem. 
The final section draws out lessons to be learnt from LaGrand and the other Consular 
rights cases that have appeared before the Court. 
4.2 LAGRAND (GERMANY V UNITED STATES/95 
4.2.1 Background and Facts 
The facts of the case are as follows: In 1984, Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand were 
convicted and sentenced to death by the Superior Court in Arizona.296 Both were 
German nationals, but had gained permanent American residency since the family had 
moved to the U.S. in 1974. In terms of the VCCR, the brothers should have been 
informed of their consular rights but throughout their period of arrest and conviction, 
they were never informed of their right to communicate with the German 
295 Supra note 307. 
296 LaGrand Gudgment of 27 June 2001) (hereinafter referred to as the LaGrand judgment) supra at 
para 14, which shows that the brothers had been convicted of murder in the fIrst degree, two counts of 
kidnapping, attempted arm robbery and attempted murder in the first degree. 
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Consulate?97 At no point in the proceedings was the German Consulate informed of 
the arrests and convictions?98 
The brothers tried to challenge the decision in three subsequent legal proceedings but 
all three applications were denied.299 It was only at the stage of the third proceedings 
in December 1992 that the German Consulate was informed of the arrests. 300 The 
German Consulate then filed a writ of habeas corpus301 in the United States District 
Court for the State of Arizona, seeking to have their convictions and sentences set 
aside?02 Multiple claims were raised, one of which was that United States authorities 
297 Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) reads to the effect that: 
1. Consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of a sending State and to have 
access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to 
communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State; 
II. If a National so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, 
inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that 
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other 
manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, 
custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. 
The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights 
under this sub-paragraph; 
III. Consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, 
custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular 
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or 
detention ifhe expressly opposes such action. 
(The terms 'sending State' and 'receiving State' are used throughout the treaty. 'Sending State' refers 
to the state of origin ofthe foreign consulate. 'Receiving State' refers to the host state where the 
foreign consulate is located.) 
298 LaGrand judgment supra at para 15. Furthermore, the LaGrand brothers had learnt of their rights 
from two German inmates and not through the Arizona authorities. (See LaGrand (Memorial ofthe 
Federal Republic of Germany) supra at para 2.06. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idocket/igus/igusfrarne.htm on 27 January 2006. 
299 First, the matter went on appeal in early 1987 to the Supreme Court of Arizona, where the 
application was rejected on a ratio of 3:2 (LaGrand judgment supra at para 19). The second attempt 
involved petitions for post-conviction relief to the Arizona State court, which were also denied (see 
LaGrand (judgment supra at para 20). 
300 See LaGrand judgment supra at para 22. 
301 A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate to a prison official ordering that an inmate be brought 
to court to determine ifhis detention is lawful and ifhe should be released from custody. (Lectric Law 
Library homepage, http://www.lectlaw.com/defIhOOl.htm. Accessed on 28 January 2006.) See also 
Weinman "The Clash betweenp.S. Criminal Procedure and the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations: An analysis of the International Court of Justice Decision in the LaGrand Case" (2001-
1002) 17 Am. U. Int'/ L. Rev. 857 at 881. 
302 See LaGrand judgment supra para 23. 
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had failed to notify the Gennan Consulate of the arrest as required by the VCCR.303 
This claim was rejected on the basis of the procedural default rule, a federal rule that 
dictates that before a State defendant can obtain relief in a federal court, the claim 
must be presented to a state court first. 304 Thus a defendant could raise a new issue at 
federal level only if he could show' cause and prejudice' .305 The purpose of the rule is 
to allow state courts an attempt at the issues before the federal courts intervene. The 
United States District Court found on the basis of the habeas corpus application that 
the LaGrands had not shown good cause or prejudice since they had failed to show an 
objective external factor that prevented them from raising the lack of Consular 
assistance earlier in the case.306 
Despite vanous diplomatic efforts, Karl LaGrand was executed on 24 February 
1999.307 On 2 March 1999, Gennany filed an application with the IC], requesting 
provisional measures against the execution of Walter LaGrand.308 The application 
sought to rely on Article 1 of the Optional Protocol as a jurisdictional basis, which 
allows for all disputes involving the interpretation and application of the VCCR to lie 
within the court's compulsory jurisdiction. On the same day a letter was sent to the 
United States Secretary of State urging her to suspend Walter LaGrand's execution.309 
A letter was then sent from the State Secretary to the Governor of Arizona 
recommending that the execution be stayed pending a final outcome of the IC] 
decision. Despite such recommendation, the Governor felt it in the interests of justice 
303 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24 1963. 
304 See LaGrand judgment supra para 23. 
305 Ibid 
306 Ibid 
307 Into 1999, Gennany tried various diplomatic efforts to prevent the execution of the LaGrands. The 
Gennan Foreign Minister and the Gennan Minister of Justice wrote to relevant United States 
counterparts, including the Governor of Arizona and the United Sates President on the issue of the 
death penalty generally. A letter followed this, from the Gennan Foreign Minister to the United States 
Secretary of State referring to consular notification in the LaGrand case. This was two days before Karl 
LaGrand's scheduled execution. (see LaGrand judgment supra para 26). 
308 See LaGrand judgment supra para 30. 
309 Ibid. 
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to go forward as scheduled.31o On 3 March 1999, the IC] granted a provisional order 
directing the United States to take all measures at its disposal to ensure Walter was 
not executed pending final decision in the IC] case and that the USA should inform 
the IC] of all measures taken in implementing the court order.311 On the same day, 
Germany brought proceedings before the U.S. Supreme Court against the Governor of 
Arizona, in an effort to enforce the order. The Court held that an order of the IC] 
indicating provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial 
relief.312 The case was thus dismissed and it was later that day that Walter LaGrand 
was executed. 
4.2.2 The merits of the case 
Two days later, proceedings in the LaGrand matter continued before the IC]. What 
follows is a brief summary of the submissions made by Germany at the end of the oral 
d· 313 procee mgs : 
1. The United States had violated its international obligations to Germany under 
2. 
section 36(1) of the vceR by not informing the LaGrands of their rights under 
the VCCR, thereby depriving Germany of the possibility of rendering its 
assistance. 
By applying rules of domestic law (the procedural default rule), and barring 
the LaGrands from raising their claims under the VCCR, the United States had 
violated its international obligation to Germany under Article 36(2), which 
reads: 
3 IO LaGrand judgment supra para 31. 
311 See LaGrand judgment supra para 31 or refer to LaGrand (provisional measures order of 3 March 
1999) at para 29. Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm. Accessed on 
28 January 2006). 
312 See LaGrand judgment supra para 33 or see the case of Federal Republic a/Germany v United 
States, 526 U.S. III (1999). 
313 LaGrand (Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany) at para 7.02. Accessed at http://www.icj-
ciLorglicjwvvw/idocketligus/igusframe.htm on 28 January 2006. 
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"The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving state, subject to the 
proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to 
be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are 
intended. " 
3. The United States, by failing to take all measures at is disposal to ensure that 
Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of the IC], had 
violated its international obligation to comply with an order issued by the 
court. 
In pursuance ofthe aforesaid, Germany also submitted that:314 
4. The United States should provide Germany with an assurance that it will not 
repeat its unlawful acts and that in any future cases, the United States will 
ensure in law and practice the effective exercise of rights under Article 36 of 
the VCCR. 
The United States did not contest the alleged breach set out in Germany's first 
submission. It was the three remaining submissions that were contested, notably that 
Germany's submissions were not admissible on the basis that they sought to use the 
IC] as an international criminal court of appeal, which it was not.315 The Court 
rejected this argument on the basis that Germany's submissions merely sought the 
court to do no more than just apply the relevant rules of international law to the 
dispute.316 
314 See LaGrandjudgment suprg para 53. 
315 See LaGrand judgment supra para 50. 
316 See LaGrand judgment supra para 52. 
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4.2.3 The Court's finding 
As to the first submission, the court found that the United States had indeed violated 
section 36(1 )(b), since it was clear that the United States authorities failed to inform 
the German Consul. It went on to find that the violation of section 36(1)(b) also 
creates a violation of sections 36(1)(a) and (c), since an omission by the United States 
had the result of preventing Germany from exercising its rights under 1 (a) and (c). A 
further significant finding of the court on the first submission was the court's 
declaration on the status of section 36(1) in international law. The court stated that 
section 36(1) had the character of an individual right. Hence a breach of section 36(1) 
constituted a breach of the LaGrand's individual rights to consular assistance, not just 
Germany's right to information.317 
As to the second submission that the application of the procedural default rule had the 
effect of violating art 36(2) rights, the court began by distinguishing between the 
procedural default rule itself and the effect of its application. It found that the rule in 
itself does not violate the VCCR and merely stands as a domestic rule with a sound 
rationale. However, the problem arose with the application of the rule. When applied, 
the rule violated the international right to consular assistance by preventing the 
LaGrand brothers from challenging their convictions on the basis of the VCCR. The 
procedural default rule thus prevented full effect to be given to the purpose for which 
the rights were accorded under Article 36.318 
With respect to the third submission, on provisional measures, the IC] considered the 
binding nature of the provisional measures in terms of Article 41 of the IC] Statute. 
Taking a purposive interpretation, the court held that provisional measures are 
binding, the raison d'etre being that for the court to fulfil its function of judicial 
settlement, its provisional measures orders must be binding.319 Such a finding was in 
317See LaGrandjudgment supra para 74-78. 
318 See LaGrandjudgment supra para 91. 
319 See LaGrandjudgment supra para 102. 
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keeping with the long recognised principle of international law that parties before a 
court must abstain from any measure that would aggravate a dispute or prejudice the 
execution of a decision.32o 
The fourth and final submission led to the court's finding that a mere apology for the 
violations in question would be insufficient in the circumstances because of the 
severity of the penalties involved. The court, however, did accept a commitment by 
the United States to engage in specific measures to ensure the performance of Article 
36 rights in future. 321 
In summary, the Ie] held that the United States had breached its obligations to both 
the LaGrand brothers and Germany. It ruled that the United States violated the 
LaGrand brother's rights when it failed to inform them of their rights without delay. 
Furthermore, the United States had violated Germany's rights by depriving it of its 
ability to grant timely assistance to the respective accused in terms of the treaty. In 
addition, the United States had violated the provisional order by executing Walter 
LaGrand prior to the outcome of the Ie] case. As a result, the court ruled that in 
future cases the United States must allow review and reconsideration of the conviction 
and sentence where the rights of Germans are protected in Article 36.322 
4.3 IMPLICATIONS OF LA GRAND 
The case raises many issues on the substance and procedure of international law. The 
judgment touches on certain aspects of relevance to modem international law that 
have previously not been settled. The case also clearly demonstrates the 
ineffectiveness of the court to adequately protect human rights while providing 
general lessons for international law. (Such lessons will be discussed later in the 
chapter.) The following sections provide a more detailed analysis of the implication of 
LaGrand on intemationallaw. 
, 
320 See LaGrand judgment supra para 103. 
321 LaGrand judgment supra para 127. 
322 LaGrand judgment supra para 125. 
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4.3.1 Provisional measures in the ICJ 
4.3.1.1 Article 41 
The court, in tenus of Article 41 of its Statute, is empowered to issue interim 
measures. This is not a sui generis characteristic of the court, since this power is often 
held by domestic courts and not an international court.323 There are multiple purposes 
for this provision: firstly and most importantly, it is aimed at the preservation of the 
rights that are the subject matter of the dispute. Thus the article was designed for 
LaGrand-like cases where there is an ongoing violation sought to be suspended 
pending the outcome of a decision of the Court.324 Secondly, it is aimed at providing 
urgent relief to situations that may be threatening international rights. Finally, the 
prOVISIOn is also designed to prevent the extension of a dispute and irreparable 
harm.325 
The problem with the provisional measures lay with the ambiguity of Article 41(1).326 
The section reads as follows: "The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it 
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." 
The English version uses the phrase "ought to be taken", which suggests that the 
parties should take (own emphasis) these measures, while the French version uses the 
words "doivent etre prises", which connotes that the parties must take these measures. 
The two texts, both being authoritative, had to be reconciled through a process of 
interpretation. The court thus turned to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
323 See Dj<tiic "The Effect ofIntemational Court of Justice Decisions on Municipal Courts in the United 
States: Breardv Greene" (1999-2000) 23 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Review 28 at 35 (see fu 17). 
324 Ibid 
325 Ibid 
326 It reads as follows: 
"The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any 
provisional measures which eught to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." 
(English version). 
"La Cour a Ie pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l'exigent, quelles mesures 
conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent etre prises a titre provisoire." (French version). 
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(VCL T)327 that requires the Court to make a judgment that would best merge the two 
meanings. The Court thus found that the object of the IC] statute is to facilitate the 
settlement of disputes and in order to do so, its provisional measures had to be 
binding.328 
Informing the court's conclusion was the general principle of international law that 
parties to a case should not engage in any measure that would frustrate or prejudice 
the execution of a decision to be given.329 Some academics have found the use of this 
principle to justify an interpretation of Article 41 as arbitrary. For instance, 
Thirlway330 notes that it is one thing to suggest that parties to a case should not 
frustrate the judicial process and yet another to suggest that those parties are bound to 
follow that decision. On the contrary, Schabas331 states that LaGrand is of 
significance to other courts precisely because the court did not confine its finding to 
an interpretation of Article 41, but it went ahead to cite with approval a well 
recognised international law principle. Thus the IC] gave some guidance on the 
rationale for the binding nature of provisional measurers intended to be a guideline for 
other courts and tribunals. 
4.3.1.2 The impact of the finding on international law 
There is a plethora of material on the binding nature of provisional measures. This 
contentious matter has divided international law academics for a significant part of the 
327 27 January 1980. Article 33(4) of the treaty mandates that: 
"Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the 
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not 
remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty, shall be adopted." 
328 LaGrand judgment supra para 102. 
329 See Electricity case [1939] PCIJ (ser AlB), No 79, 199 cited by the ICJ in LaGrandjudgment supra 
para 103. 
330 "The Indication of Provisional Measures by the International Court of Justice" in Rudolf Bernhart 
(ed) Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts (1994) 1,30. 
331 (Symposium: LaGrand) "The ICJ Ruling against the United States: Is it really about the Death 
Penalty?" (2002) 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 445 at 449. 
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4, 
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last century/32 but previous jurisprudence of the IC] on the matter is virtually non-
existent. The Court has commented on compliance with provisional orders on several 
occasions; for example, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases333 and the Nuclear Test 
Cases.334 It was only in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
Case335 that the court came very close to any declaration of the binding nature of 
provisional measures. It stated:336 
"When the court finds that the situation requires measure of this kind should 
be taken, it is incumbent on each party to take the court's indications seriously 
into account, and not to direct its conduct solely by reference to what it 
believes to be its rights." 
Schabas337 shows that it is not only the IC] statute that suffers from ambiguity in 
respect to provisional orders. Take for example the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which is also silent on the issue. This, when combined with the fact that 
history has shown poor compliance with interim orders by many states, makes 
LaGrand seem all the more important. Thus, the United States were not the first to 
disregard an interim order of the IC], and neither was the IC] the first international 
332 Kammerhofer "The Binding Nature of Provisional Measures of the International Court of Justice: 
the 'Settlement' of the Issue in the LaGrand Case" (2003) 16 LJIL 67, estimates that the debate has 
been going on for 80 years. 
333 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v Iceland) Judgment of 25 July 1974. Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iailiaiframe.htm on 28 January 2006 where the court issued a 
provisional order on 14 August 1972, in terms of which Iceland was ordered not to take any measures 
to enforce the provisions of Regulation 14 July 1972 on United Kingdom vessels engaged in fishing 
outside a 12-mile fishery zone. 
334 Nuclear Test case (Australian v France) Judgmen of 20 December 1974. Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwwwlicasesliajliafframe.htm on 28 January 2006,and Nuclear Test Case (New 
Zealand v France) judgment of 20 December 1974, Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwwwlicaseslinzjlinzjframe.htm on 28 January 2006. In these cases the court had ordered that 
neither government should do anything that would aggravate or extend the dispute, or have the effect of 
prejudicing the rights that are the subject of the dispute. In particular, it ordered that the French 
government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fall-out on Australia territory 
in the case of the Australian case and New Zealand territory in the case of the New Zealand case. 
335 Nicaragua v United States of America judgment of 27 June 1986. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/icases/inus/inuS'frame.htm on 28 January 2006. 
336 Nicaragua v United Sates of America supra at para 289. 
337 2002 Yale J. Int'[ L. 449. 
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tribunal to face this problem of non-compliance.338 Since the problem of non-
compliance with interim orders is a frequent one, both for the ICJ's jurisprudence and 
for other courts and tribunals, the ICJ's finding on the issue is highly significant. The 
statement sent out by the IC] in LaGrand to other international bodies is that interim 
measures to prevent irreparable harm which cannot be corrected in a final decision, 
are an inherent function of adjudicative bodies and must therefore be deemed to be 
binding.339 
It would certainly seem that the matter has now been settled, but Kammerhofer34o 
raises a very significant point; that of the lack of any system of precedents and stare 
decisis in international law. He points out that among international lawyers there is 
consensus that there is no doctrine of stare decisis341 in international law. This means 
that the IC] is under no obligation to apply or interpret the law in the same way that 
the Court did in its earlier seating. This is supported by Article 59 of the IC] Statute, 
which provides that decisions of the court have no binding effect except as between 
the parties and in respect of that particular case. Thus the decision of the court in 
LaGrand is only binding between Germany and the United States and any 
pronunciation of the law made by the court is only relevant for that particular case. 
The question thus follows: if this is the state of affairs, can it then be said that the IC] 
settled the matter of provisional measures in LaGrand? Was the court's finding an 
authoritative declaration of international law on that point? The obvious answer 
would seem to be no, since the statute is clear that there is no doctrine of stare decisis 
in international law. Nonetheless, as has been articulated in Chapter 2 of this work, 
that international law is not only a matter of statutes, treaties and academia, but also a 
matter of practice. So although not bound by its decisions, the IC] is reliant upon its 
past decisions to determine matters before it. This would seem pragmatic since states 
338 In 1993, the Human Rights Committee had issued an order directing Canada not to extradite two 
death row fugitives, Charles Ng and Joseph Kindler. Canada proceeded to do so in defiance of the 
order (Kindler v Canada (1993) 15 Human Rights Law Journal 307, Ng v Canada (1994) 15 Human 
Rights Law Journal 149). 
339 Schabas 2002 Yale J. Int'l L. 451. 
340 2003 LJIL 76. 
341 This is a formal presumption that an earlier decision must be followed in later decisions. 
(Kammerhofer 2003 LJIL 77). 
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appearing before the court would expect it to reason as it has done before and 
adjudicate with some level of continuity and stability in its reasoning?42 
The declaration of the binding nature of provisional measures by the Ie] is certainly a 
positive step in terms of the court's injunctive authority.343 It has increased the 
consequences of an application for provisional measures by creating a new set of 
obligations for a party if the interim order is granted. This is a welcome move, since it 
is self-evident that if a court is to settle disputes before it, it must have the power to 
bind the parties that appear before it. "If a court cannot by issuing orders of an 
injunctive character, preserve its own ability to render an interim binding judgment, 
then its ability to render a final, binding judgment is illusory.,,344 By settling this 
issue, the Ie] has gone a long way to restore its reputation as an international court 
and the judgment in LaGrand reads more like that of a court that is the United 
Nations' premier judicial body. 
4.3.2 Human Rights before the ICJ 
The IeJ's declaration in La Grand that the VeeR gives rise to individual rights raises 
two significant issues that directly impact current international law and not just 
342 Ibid. 
~ 
343 The court's decision is however not without its problems. The ICJ's power to issue interim S 
measures was designed for situations where there would be some element of urgency, and as such the 
court need only satisfy itself that it has prima facie jurisdiction. It is only at the fmal hearing stage that 
the court does an in-depth analysis of its jurisdictional power over a case. Suppose the Court satisfies 
itself that it has prima facie jurisdiction and the respondent complies with the interim order only to 
discover later that the court did not have jurisdiction. This situation would jeopardise the court's 
reputation, on which it is already heavily reliant because of a system where the court's jurisdiction is 
based on consent. Stephens ("Case Note: LaGrand Case" (2002) 3 MJIL 157) thus says the court would 
have to ensure that before it makes any provisional orders, it has jurisdiction over the case. Failing such 
assurance, a respondent may find itself prejudiced if it complies with the order and yet in breach of 
international law if it does not. Should the IC] later determine in the merits phase of the case that it 
does not have jurisdiction, such a respondent will have no remedy. Thus Thirlway (Indication of 
Provisional Measures by the International Court of Justice 33) suggests that the power to indicate 
provisional measures should be qualified by a clause that the applicant will undertake to pay 
compensation in the event that the judgment goes against it. It is this somewhat anomalous position 
created by the court's fmding that has led to the opinion that it will create a fear factor that will result in 
states withdrawing their acceptance of the IC]'s jurisdiction rather than risk adverse orders (See 
separate opinion of Judge Oda in LaGrand judgment supra at para 10. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm on 28 January 2006.) 
344 Quigley (Symposium: LaGrand) "LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. Judiciary" (2002) 27 Yale J. 
Int'I L 435 at 439. 
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Gennany and the United States. Firstly, it highlights the fact that the IC] is an 
unsuitable forum for vindicating human rights?45 The fact remains that only states can 
be parties to IC] decisions, since individuals have no standing before the court. It is 
only in a case where a state's rights and the rights of its citizen are somehow linked 
that an IC] case will implicate individual rights. For individuals, it is only their 
respective states that can assert these rights before the IC]?46 Secondly, the events in 
LaGrand show that although public international law (whose main subject is the state) 
and private international law (whose main subject is the individual) are distinct fields, 
the distinction is not a watertight one. 
4.3.2.1 Why the ICJ is unsuitable as a guardian of human rights? 
The ICJ's finding that Article 36 rights are those that attach to individuals and not 
states, is a significant one. It effectively means that individuals should be able to corne 
before their national courts to vindicate these rights where they have been violated. 
Clearly, an individual cannot seek to enforce his/her claim in the IC], and as a result 
he/she must rely on their respective domestic courts for enforcement. This then raises 
the problem of how the IC] can ensure that its declaration is implemented by domestic 
courts. The binding nature of provisional measures now means the IC] is in a better 
position to preserve individual rights through interim orders. But the issue of 
enforcement still remains undecided. Additionally, there is the problem of a remedy. 
There exists a well-known Latin maxim, ubi ius ibi remedium (where there is a right, 9 
there is a remedy) What use would this individual right be where there is no remedy ~ 
for its violation? 
345 This point of clarification is made because Germany submitted that the "United Nations Declaration 
on the human rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they live," adopted by 
a General Assembly resolution in 1985, 'confirms the view that the right of access to the consulate of 
the home State, as well as the information on this right, constitute individual rights of foreign nationals 
and are to be regarded as human rights of aliens' (LaGrand judgment supra para 75). Thus Germany 
argued that Art. 36 rights were not only individual rights but had assumed the status of a human right. 
The Ie] in LaGrand did not however comment on this submission, but simply confirmed that Art. 36 
rights were individual rights (therefore attaching to individuals and not states, para 77 of the LaGrand 
decision supra note 294). It is-regrettable that the court did not comment on whether Art 36 rights had 
gained the status of a human right because had this been found to be the case, the effectiveness of Art. 
36 would have been of greater importance. 
346 LaGrand judgment supra para 77. 
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On the one hand, it is recognised that the IC] is designed to have jurisdiction over 
states and not individuals. So in theory, the issue of human rights is not central. 
However, the problem still remains, where a case before the IC] does in fact implicate 
individual rights, especially where human life hangs in the balance, what is the correct 
remedial action that the court could take without overstepping its mandate?347 The 
issue of a suitable remedy was covered in the judgment only to a point. The Court 
found that the United States is under a duty to "allow review and reconsideration of 
the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation set forth in the 
convention".348 The court did not, however, specify the exact content of the duty, 
leaving the means to the United States. According to Fitzpatrick and Quigley,349 it is 
regrettable that the IC] did not give more prescriptive remedies for those whose Art. 
36 rights have been violated. However, a bolder move would have met much 
opposition because it would seem as though the IC] was dictating to the U.S. courts 
how to manage their criminal justice system. It can only be that the Court adopted a 
cautionary approach so as to avoid allegation of undue intrusion into domestic law 
matters. 
So it can be seen that despite the fact the court can now grant i~unctive relief to those 
who seek interim orders, the IC] is still ill-suited to be a forum for the preservation of 
human rights, especially human life. Not only is the enforcement of the decision of 
individual rights uncertain, but the issue of the appropriate remedy is still a point of 
contention. 
347 Germany asked the court to order the United States to give three assurances: Firstly, not to repeat 
the violations, secondly to ensure effective exercise of consular rights and fmally to provide for 
effective review of and remedies for criminal convictions (LaGrand judgment supra para 117). In 
response to this, the United States raised an objection, on the basis that this would be an unorthodox 
use of the ICJ's remedial powers. The court rejected this argument, finding that where there is a basis 
for jurisdiction over as a matter, the court does not need separate jurisdictional basis to determine the 
appropriate remedies (LaGrand judgment supra para 48). 
348 LaGrand judgment supra para 125. 
349 Quigley 2002 Yale J Int'I L 435. Fitzpatrick (Symposium: LaGrand) "The Unreality of 
International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case" (2002) 27 Yale J Int'/ L. 427. 
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4.3.2.2 The intersection of norms in international law 
Germany founded the jurisdictional basis of its claim on article 1 of the Optional 
Protocol to the VCCR.350 The application thus turned on the interpretation of Art. 36 
of the VCCR, but in the course of their argument Germany alluded to general 
principles of international law relevant to the application; such as the rights to due 
process and human rights factors. The United States, however, preferred to contain 
their argument to the interpretation of the treaty.35! Two distinct opposing views of 
the international law thus emerged in the case. On the one hand was a view to the 
effect that international law consists of water-tight compartments as demonstrated by 
the U.S. argument; on the level of sources, customary international law and treaty law 
exist separately: likewise, with respect to rights and obligations, inter-state rights may 
never converge with the rights of individuals.352 Thus consular rights must be 
understood as the rights of a state and not an individual. The two may not converge.353 
Germany argued the very opposite, proposing that treaties are not self sufficient but 
may interact with other international norms in their application.354 Thus Germany's 
position was that relations involving states cannot be seen in isolation: states exist 
because of and for individuals, and it thus follows that their relations will affect 
individuals.355 Monica Feria Tinta356 points out that multilateral treaties are now a 
complex web of intertwining rights and duties not just of states, but, more recently, 
those of individuals. LaGrand is thus an example of this. The VCCR, itself a 
multilateral treaty, primarily concerns state-to-state obligations. But it is now clear 
from the decision in LaGrand that Art. 36 of the Convention confers rights on 
individuals. In sum, the VCCR is a treaty that intertwines the rights of both states and 
350 Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the 
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol. 
351 See Tinta "Due Process and the Right to Life in the context of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations: Arguing the LaGrand case" (2001) 12 No.2 EJIL 363 at 366. 
352 Ibid. 
353Ibid 
354I bid. 
355 Monica Feria Tinta 2001 EJIL 365. 
356 Monica Feria Tinta 2001 EJIL 367. 
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individual. It is thus clear that a worldview presupposing that international norms are 
of no concern to treaty interpretation cannot be correct. The reality of contemporary 
international law is that interstate relations take place in a world populated by 
individuals and as a result individuals are often affected by breaches of these 
international obligations.357 
Previous academic surveys have been conducted of the IC] jurisprudence on 
provisional measures and it is said that the results display a growing tendency of the 
court to recognise the human realities behind disputes involving States.358 The case 
concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria359 and 
the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute360 are examples of cases that illustrate the 
growing humanitarian nature of IC] jurisprudence.361 The cases both involved 
disputes regarding territory, yet the court makes reference in its order to the possible 
risk of irreparable harm to persons and property. The Land and Maritime Boundary 
case was a dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula in which Cameroon filed an application 
with the IC] after armed conflict had taken place in the territory. The court 
acknowledged that the rights in issue were sovereign rights of the two states, but it 
went on to add that these rights affected persons.362 In the Frontier Dispute case, the 
court remarked that armed actions in the disputed territory form a justifiable basis for 
the court to issue an order of provisional measures, since a failure to do so will expose 
the persons and property of that area as well as the interests of the states to serious 
risk of irreparable damage.363 The ICJ's bold declaration in LaGrand stands as a 
357 Monica Feria Tinta 2001 EJIL 368. 
358 Higgins, "Interim Measures for the Protection of Human Rights" in Charney et al (eds) Politics, 
Values and Functions: International Law in the 21'1 Century, Essays in Honor of Professor Louis 
Henkin (1997). 
359 (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)(Provisional Measures Order of 15 March 
1996). Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketiicn/icniTame.htm on 28 January 2006. 
36°(Burkina Faso v Mali) (Provisional Measures Order of 10 January 1986). Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iHVMlihvrnframe.htm on 28 January 2006. 
361 Stephens 2002 MJIL 92. 
362 (Cameroon v Nigeria) (Provisional Measures Order of 15 March 1996) para 39. Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnframe.htm on 29 January 2006. 
363 (Burkina Faso v Mali)( Provisional Measures Order) supra at para 2l. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iHVMlihvmframe.htm. 
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further example of the court's recognition of the human realities behind state 
conflicts. 
The cornerstone of the LaGrand case was undeniably the interpretation of the VeeR. 
Irrespective of this, the vindication of the rights of the LaGrand brothers was also a 
concern. Whether this is recognised or not, the observance of human rights in the 
international legal field has become of prime importance even by institutions not 
created to defend human rights per se. So whether one finds that the case was 
essentially about Germany's rights or the rights of its citizens, the case nonetheless 
illustrates that interests of individuals may intersect with those of states so that a 
decision of the Ie] may have a very real effect on specific individuals, albeit 
indirectly. 
4.4 BEFORE AND AFTER LA GRAND 
LaGrand was not the first time the issue of provisional measures, or violations of the 
VeeR had come under the spotlight. The case is a landmark contribution in a trilogy 
of cases that have appeared before the court on the basis of an almost identical series 
of events. It is important to consider these cases as they show the steady evolution of 
the problem, beginning with Breard, followed by LaGrand and finally Avena. 
4.4.1 The case of Angel Breartf64 
On 1 September 1992, Virginia authorities arrested a Paraguayan national, Angel 
Breard, for murder.365 Breard was not informed of his rights in terms of the VeeR 
and he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.366 The execution was 
364 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States) 
Gudgment of 10 November 1998). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausiTame.htm on 29 January 2006 (hereinafter referred to as Breard). 
365 Breard (pleadings of the Republic of Paraguay 9 October 1998) at para 2.1. Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlipaus/ipausframe.htm on 29 January 2006. 
366 Breard (pleadings ofthe Republic of Paraguay) supra at para 2.10 and 2.12. 
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scheduled to be on 14 April 1998.367 Like the LaGrand brothers, Breard tried various 
efforts for relief in the federal courts: he appealed his case to the Virginia Supreme 
Court, then to the United States Supreme Court. Both these efforts failed so he filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a Circuit court?68 All claims were dismissed. It 
was only in April 1996 that the Paraguayan Consuls learnt of Angel's Bread's 
conviction and sentence.369 They thus began to render assistance, which included 
numerous applications in the United States district court and appeal courts and various 
diplomatic efforts, which all came to naught.37o On 3 April 1998, Paraguay brought an 
action before the IC] and sought a provisional measures order from the court directing 
the United States to ensure that Breard was not executed pending the disposition of 
the case in the IC]. After establishing that the United States had indeed failed to 
inform Angel Breard of his rights, the Court made the following provisional order: 
"The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that 
Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these 
proceedings, and should inform the court of all the measures which it has 
taken in implementation of this Order ... ,,371 
Breard then sought to have the order enforced in the Supreme Court and the Court 
dealt with the application in the case of Breard v Greene. 372 The Court denied Breard 
relief on the grounds that his failure to raise the violation in the Virginia State courts 
barred him from raising the violation in federal proceedings.373 The Court went on to 
add that even if the matter were justiciable, Breard would have to prove that the 
omission on the part of the United States authorities prejudiced his case.374 The Court 
367 Weisburd "International Courts and American Courts" (1999-2000) 2 1 Mich. J.Int'/. L 877 at 880. 
368 Breard (pleadings of the Republic of Paraguay) supra at para 2.12, 2.13, 2.14. 
369 Breard (pleadings of the Republic of Paraguay) supra at para 2.16. 
370 Breard (pleadings ofthe Republic of Paraguay) supra at para 2.18. 
371 Breard (provisional measures order of 9 April 1998) supra at para 41. Accessed at http://www.icj-
ciLorglicjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm on 29 January 2006. 
372 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
373 Breard v Greene supra at 375-379. 
374 Breard v Greene supra at 374. 
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held that on the facts it was not possible to make such a conclusion. In effect the 
Court was saying that Breard had not shown that Consular access would have helped 
his case in any event. 
What is interesting about the Supreme Court's analysis of the facts in Breard v 
Greene375 is that it did not discuss or comment on the effect of the ICJ's provisional 
order except in passing, as "a request". It can only be assumed from these facts that 
the court did not consider it bound to honour the order at all. Weisburd376 points out 
that although the Supreme Court did not discuss the legal effect of the IC}'s interim 
order, it is implicit in its denial of Bread's petition that it did not consider it bound to 
the order. 
Despite the IC} order, Bread was executed on 14 April 1998. In pursuance of the 
matter, the case returned to the IC}, this time on different pleadings.377 However, late 
1998, after submission of its memorial, the Government of the Republic of Paraguay 
informed the court that it did not wish to continue with the proceedings. Accordingly 
the court made an order regarding the discontinuance of the matter and the removal of 
the case from the Court's list. As a result of this discontinuance, the IC} did not have 
the opportunity to deal with the issue on the merits and could not therefore rule on the 
status of provisional measures. The Breard case is worth mentioning nonetheless 
because it was the first of the trilogy of cases and it clearly shows the attitude of the 
United States with respect to the IC}'s interim orders. Breard is also important as a 
backdrop to the current thesis because it shows the prevalence of the problem of 
consular rights notification. 
375 Supra at 374. 
376 1999-2000 Mich. J. Int'!. L 882. 
377 Paraguay raised three claims before the court: 
o The United States had violated Article 36(1) of the VeeR and as a result Paraguay sought a 
declaration and reparations (Memorial of the Republic Of Paraguay in Breard supra at para 
1.5 & 1.6). 
o The United States breached Article 36(2) of the VeeR by invoking the municipal procedural 
default rule, thereby preventing Angel Bread from raising his action in the federal courts 
(Memorial of the Republic Of Paraguay in Breard supra at para 1.7). 
o The United States had breached a binding order of the Ie] by failing to carry out the 
provisional measures order issued by the court and going ahead with the execution (Memorial 
ofthe Republic Of Paraguay in Breard supra at para 1.9). 
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4.4.2 The case of Avena and Other Mexican Nationals378 
According to the judgment of 31 March 2004, the facts in Avena are briefly as 
follows: 52 Mexican nationals had been detained with no notice of their consular 
rights under the VCCR, and only in two cases had the nationals been informed, such 
information however not being given "without delay" as required by Art. 36(1)(b).379 
49 out of the 52 cases were at the time of the application at various stages of 
proceedings before the United States judicial authorities.38o In three cases, judicial 
remedies within the United States had already been exhausted and for fear that 
executions may follow, the IC] made a provisional order in respect of these three 
cases.381 The court ordered unanimously that382: 
a) "The United States shall take all measures necessary (own emphasis added) to 
ensure that Mr. Cesar Roberto Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos and Mr. 
Osvaldo Torres Aguilera are not executed pending final judgment in these 
proceedings. 
b) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the Court of all 
measures taken in implementation of this Order." 
The court noted, however, that by the time it issued its judgment on the merits, the 
Oklahoma Court of Appeals had already set an execution date for Torres.383 This 
move is of great concern because for the third time running, a U.S. court had shown 
blatant disregard for an order issued by the IC]. The essential difference between the 
Oklahoma court and the U.S. courts in LaGrand and Breard is that in the current 
378Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) judgment of 31 March 
2004) (hereinafter referred to as Avena). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusiTame.htm on 27 January 2006. 
379 Avena Gudgment of31 March 2004) supra at para 19. 
380 Avena Gudgment of 31 March 2004) supra at para 20. 
381 Avena Gudgment of31 March 2004) supra at para 21. 
382 Avena Gudgment of 31 March 2004) supra at para 3. 
383 Avena Gudgment of 31 March 2004) supra at para 21. 
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matter, the court disregarded the IC] order in the face of an absolute declaration of the 
binding nature of IC] provisional measures orders. This then begs the question: what 
is the impact of the LaGrand decision for U.S. criminal proceedings? This will be the 
subject of Chapter 5 ofthis thesis. 
Before the court, Mexico requested the usual pronouncements as to the violations of 
Article 36. However, it went further by asking the court to declare that Mexico be 
entitled to full reparations for injuries sustained by the detainees in the form of 
restitutio in intergrum?84 It was argued that, in the circumstances, restitution would 
consist of an obligation to restore the status quo by annulling the convictions and 
sentences of the detainees.385 The crux of Mexico's argument before the court was 
twofold. Firstly, Mexico argued that since the decision in LaGrand no changes had 
been made to the procedural default rule and that the rule continued to continued to 
act as a bar to Article 36 claims?86 Secondly, whilst the U.S. had been given 
discretion with respect to the correct remedy, the remedy chosen was not adequate. It 
was common cause that the U.S. after LaGrand decision employed review and 
reconsideration by way of clemency as a remedy to Article 36 violations. However 
Mexico argued that this method was insufficient as a remedy for Article 36 violations 
since it did not present any real legal benefit to a foreign defendant. 387 
The court found in a decision of 14 in favour, 1 against, that the United States had 
violated its Article 36 obligations, in some though not all cases. It found that the 
application of the procedural default rule still had the effect of violating Article 36 
rights. As to the issue of review and reconsideration, the court rejected Mexico's 
claim that restitutio required annulment of convictions and sentences. The court 
reiterated that its role is not to determine the correctness of a sentence or conviction 
but to interpret Article 36, thereby leaving the issue of the correct remedy to the U.S. 
government. 388 However, it found that clemency procedures were insufficient means 
384 Avena Gudgment of 31 March 2004) supra at para 12(2). 
385 Avena Gudgment of31 March 2004) supra at para 14(5). 
, 
386 Avena Gudgment of 31 March 2004) supra at para 111 & 112. 
387 Avena Gudgment of31 March 2004) supra at para 135. 
388 Avena Gudgment of31 March 2004) supra at para 122 & 123. 
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of review and reconsideration, especially in the face of the procedural default rule.389 
It went on to comment that effective review and reconsideration in the LaGrand sense 
should be achieved within the overall judicial proceedings.39o So without directing 
which remedy should be adopted, the IC] in Avena revealed that the intention is to 
provide a judicial, not a political, remedy for violations of Article 36 rights. This 
suggests that implementation of the IC] judgments should take place within the 
confines of the judicial system. This idea is expanded upon in Chapter 5. 
Avena in one sense simply reaffirmed the principle set out in LaGrand that a state 
may not invoke its municipal legal structure to excuse or justify violations of 
intemationallaw.391 Yet in another, Avena is an advancement from LaGrand in that 
the court took a bolder step of ordering that the court should take "measures 
necessary" as opposed to measures at its disposal, as was the case in LaGrand Thus 
in Avena, the Court took a stronger stance by using the more injunctive term 
"measures necessary" than the more discretional "measures at its disposal". This 
seemingly small move shows the Court's dissatisfaction with United States response 
to IC] orders in the past. 
Avena was a step up from LaGrand in more ways than one. Mexico's application 
resembled that of the United States and Paraguay, in that they requested a guarantee 
of non-repetition. However, two further remedies were requested.392 Firstly, Mexico 
asked the court to order that the United States take whatever steps were necessary and } 
sufficient to ensure that its municipal law enables full effect to the purposes for which 
the rights in Article 36 are intended.393 Secondly, it asked that the United States 
389 Avena Gudgment of31 March 2004) supra at para 142. 
390 Avena Gudgment of 31 March 2004) supra at para 140 & 141. 
391 Sloane "Measures necessary to Ensure: The ICJ's Provisional Measures Order in Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals" (2004) 17 L JJL 673 at 674. 
392 Avena (Application Instituting Proceedings of9 January 2003) at para 281. Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
393 Avena (Application Instituti~g Proceedings) supra at para 281. It would seem that Mexico was 
pushing to have the United Sates take action, since after LaGrand no moves had been taken by the 
United Sates to reform the application of the procedural default rule in cases where there had been 
consular rights violations. 
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should establish meaningful remedies at law for violations of Article 36 rights.394 One 
gets the sense that Mexico was seeking to ensure that the United States would have no 
conceivable justification for digressing from any orders made by the Court this time. 
With respect to the request for provisional measures, Mexico went so far as to prove 
ways in which the United States could ensure compliance with any measures ordered 
by the IC]. Mexico cited academic commentaries, federal cases and the United States 
Constitution, to demonstrate that the United States had ample means at its disposal to 
ensure that its authorities comply with Ie] provisional orders.395 
Thus, in many respects, the Avena case went further than its predecessors. According 
to Sloane/96 Avena weighed heavily before the court for two reasons: firstly, the 
gravity of the claim was heightened by the fact that Mexico and United States share a 
border. In its application, Mexico highlighted that because of its geopolitical 
proximity and the frequent interstate relations between the two countries, a reciprocal 
consular convention had been signed 20 years before the VCCR.397 As a result of a 
well-established relationship, Mexico had acquired 45 consulates throughout the 
United States, as compared to Germany and Paraguay who had only nine consulates 
each.398 Secondly, the form and substance of Mexico's application was considerably 
different from Germany and Paraguay. As a starting point, it covered in detail the 
importance of consular assistance in Mexico's domestic law and the prior efforts of 
Mexico to obtain relief for its detained nationals?99 The detail with which Mexico 
addressed the matter was reflected in the length of the application, which ran to more 
than 70 pages, while Germany and Paraguay had applications totalling less than 10 
pages.400 
394 Avena (Application Instituting Proceedings) supra at para 281. 
395 Sloane 2004 L JIL 678. 
396 Sloane 2004 L JIL 676. 
397 Avena (Application Instituting Proceedings) supra at para 23. 
398 Avena (Application Instituting Proceedings) supra at para 23. 
399 Avena (Application Instituting Proceedings) supra at para 29-66. 
400 Sloane 2004 L JIL at 677. 
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Finally a noteworthy observation in Avena was the following comment made by the 
court: 
" ... the fact that in this case the Court's ruling has concerned only Mexican 
nationals cannot be taken to imply that the conclusions reached by it in the 
present judgment do not apply to other foreign nationals finding themselves in 
similar situations in the United States." 401 
After three cases coming before the court on strikingly similar set of facts, it is not 
surprising that the court felt it necessary to clarify the general applicability of its 
findings. The implications of Avena cannot be overemphasised. It is disturbing that 
within four years, three cases alleging the same violations by the same nation should 
appear in the ICl. This was bound to seize the attention of the international 
community. Breard gained the attention of many academics, but because the Court 
was unable to settle the many issues raised, much remained hanging in the balance. 
This left the international community waiting with bated breathe for resolution. 
LaGrand was thus welcomed and drew much attention, mainly because of the ruling 
on the binding nature of provisional measures. Avena, however, stands as a symbol of 
the gravity of the issues raised by LaGrand and Breard and the prevalence of consular 
rights violations in the United States. This trilogy of cases has thus come under the 
spotlight and is well worth analysing, as they have enduring implications for 
international law. 
4.5 LESSONS FROM THE TRILOGY OF CASES 
The trilogy serves as a good example of the changing international legal landscape. 
These changes can be attributed to a host of factors that have been classified under the 
rubric of globalisation. Two aspects of the decisions clearly demonstrate changing 
mindsets about how international law should be framed. This is with respect to the 
international law/ national law dichotomy and also the administration of the death 
penalty. 
401 Avena (Judgment of31 March 2004) supra at para 151. 
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4.5.1 The international law versus domestic law 
The issues raised by the three cases can be placed in a wider framework of 
international law to illustrate the intersection of international law with municipal law. 
For instance, the cases deal with the obligation of municipal courts to take into 
account decisions ofthe IC] and the effect ofIC] decisions on municipal courts, and it 
demonstrates how municipal law doctrines can come under international scrutiny. All 
the above thus reveal that there are no clear demarcation lines between international 
law and domestic law. 
4.5.1.1 Reconciling the two systems 
Chapter 2 of this thesis considered the monist-dualist debate and it was suggested that 
a more practical analysis of the international law/municipal law dichotomy was 
preferred. It was argued that international law as a system has developed sufficiently 
for there to be set principles that can be used to reconcile international law with 
domestic law, based on established practice. The trilogy is an apt example. The cases 
show that the application of a domestic law rule (the procedural default rule) could 
result in the violation of an internationally protected right (the consular rights), so that 
there is effectively a clash between the two systems of law. To this, the monist would 
say the United States should comply with international measures because international 
law and domestic law are a single concept. 402 The dualist, on the other hand, would 
argue that the United States is only obliged to disregard the procedural default rule if 
that is so permitted by legislation because international law and domestic law are two 
different fields. 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that neither perspective adequately resolves the problem of 
what to do when there is a conflict. The monist solution to the problem raised by the 
trilogy is unsatisfactory because as a starting point the trilogy seems to nullify the 
monist's fundamental presupposition, by illustrating that international law and 
402 See Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 2nd ed (2001) 43 for a discussion of the 
theories of monism and dualism. 
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national law are not in fact a single concept, which is why they can clash. In addition 
to this, the idea that U.S. courts are bound to apply international decisions simply 
because they are international is also unacceptable. The dualist solution, although 
more plausible, is also unsatisfactory. Whilst United States legislation does not permit 
a U.S. court to disregard the procedural default rule, the U.S. remains nonetheless 
bound to review and reconsider both the sentence and convictions of foreign detainees 
where there has been a lack of consular notification, irrespective of whether their 
claim has been procedurally defaulted or not. Consequently, the dualist solution is no 
solution at all. 
To resolve a conflict one must pay regard to the practice of states in international law. 
The Court in LaGrand raised the well recognised principal of international law that 
states should refrain from any action that would frustrate the outcome of a decision.403 
If U.S. courts continue to apply the procedural default rule despite the IC] rulings in 
the trilogy, this would have the effect of frustrating the outcome of the case. Hence 
proper international law practice demands that the United States refrain from applying 
the procedural default rule when it prevents review and reconsideration of the 
accused's sentence and conviction. This conclusion should not be interpreted as 
hegemonic because the United States has consented to the jurisdiction of the IC] and 
it is a signatory to the VCCR. 
4.5.1.2 The position of the ICJ vis-it-vis municipal law 
After LaGrand, it was contended that the ICJ's institutional integrity was brought into 
question.404 The consensual nature of the IC] places it at the whim of its member 
states. Whilst the court has incredible power and influence as the United Nations' 
premier judicial body, its institutional integrity remains of paramount importance, 
since its jurisdiction is purely consensual. As a result, the Court must act only within 
its power to act and it must strictly stand by its role in the international community. 
403 LaGrand judgment supra para 103. 
404 See Schabas 2002 Yale J. Int'! L. 
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~ . 
As a general rule, provisional measures orders affect matters traditionally understood 
as concerns of international law;405 matters such as the rights and duties of states as 
they interact in the international arena. In the Nuclear Teslo6 case the court ordered 
France to refrain from nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fallout on 
Australian territory. In Passage through the Great Belt407, it denied Finland's request 
for an order that Denmark should refrain from continuing with construction works 
that would hamper the passage of ships in the East Channel. Finally, there are the 
classical territorial disputes involving sovereignty rights.408 Such are the usual 
subjects ofthe IC] decisions. 
On the surface, the trilogy is concerned with the violation of the Art. 36, but at the 
same time it brought the u.S. criminal justice system under scrutiny. This meant the 
IC] had to exercise caution in resolving the matter to avoid a situation where the IC] 
intrudes in domestic law by substituting its judgment for decisions of the U.S. courts. 
The court would thus be placing itself as an international court of appeal, which it is 
not empowered to do.409 To this end, the court would be exceeding its legitimate 
authority both in terms of its own statute and article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which 
states that nothing contained in the Charter authorises intervention in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. 
Those who suggest that the IC] played the role of an appeal court in the trilogy are not 
without justification. An order requiring the stay of proceedings, or directing the } 
review and reconsideration of sentences and conviction, are typically the orders of an 
appeal court. Despite any appearances, the subject of the cases was the Vienna 
Convention.410 The court's decision did implicate matters of domestic criminal 
405 Sloane 2004 L JIL at 683. 
406 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iaf/iafframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
407Passage Through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark). Accessed at http://www.ici-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/ifdlifdframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
408 For example, see the more re~ent case involving Sovereignty over Pedra Branca Pulau Batu Puteh 
Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imasi/imasiframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
409 LaGrand judgment supra at para 51. 
410 Sloane 2004 L JIL at 684. 
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procedure, but this was not due to an inappropriate exercise of the court's power. 
Rather, it was an inevitable result of the sequence of events that took place in the 
cases. The trilogy thus shows that the IC] must operate within its boundaries, but 
there are instances when the boundary lines are blurred because of the intertwining of 
rights and obligations in a case. It is my opinion that the Court found the balance in 
LaGrand by declaring the violation and interpreting the VCCR, but leaving the 
question of an appropriate remedy to the U.S. Even after the IC] showed its 
disapproval of clemency as a remedy in Avena, it was not regaining control of the 
matter so much as it was clarifying the Court's intention in LaGrand 
4.5.2 The death penalty issue 
It is undoubtedly the death penalty factor that makes the trilogy of greater concern. 
This is understandably so considering the irreversibility of the punishment and the 
wide international disapproval of this method of punishment.411 Inherent in such a 
matter is the likelihood that the Court would take a stronger position against the 
United States, not because of the violations that are the subject of the case, but 
because of the fact that human life was at stake. Yet the court in Breard seemed at 
pains to emphasise that it was not attempting to unduly expand its jurisdiction in this 
way, saying: "The issues before the Court in this case do not concern the entitlement 
of the federal states within the United States to resort to the death penalty for the most 
heinous crimes ... ,,412 The court sought to avoid the contentious issue of the death 
penalty, but the comment made by one of the judges shows that this matter was 
simply unavoidable in the circumstances. The same tendency can be seen in LaGrand 
In a separate opinion, Vice-President Shi413 commented as follows: 
411 See Schabas 2002 Yafe J. Int'f L. 445. 
412 Breard (Provisional Measures Order of 9 April 1998) supra at para 38. 
413 See separate opinion of Vice-President Shi in LaGrand judgment supra at para 17. Accessed at 
http://www.icj-ciLorglicjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm. on 27 January 2006. 
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"I should like to make it clear that it was not for reasons relating to the legal 
consequences of the breach of Article 36(1 )(b), that I voted in favour of the 
ICJ's conclusion on Germany's assurance and guarantee submission. This 
[conclusion] is of particular significance in a case where a sentence of death is 
imposed, which is not only a punishment of severe nature but also one of an 
irreversible nature." 
Notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, the death penalty issue weighed heavily 
before the court. Capital punishment has fallen into disuse as part of a criminal justice 
system in almost all of Europe, most of Latin America and much of Africa. Japan and 
the United States are the only two developed countries that still retain the death 
penalty.414 Statistics of the Secretary General of the United Nations show that two 
thirds of the world has abolished the death penalty.415 The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights and the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights have all spoken against the death penalty. All 
of the above point to an international community that is opposed to the death penalty. 
Schabas416 suggests that it is evident that the death penalty was only a subtext issue in 
LaGrand, but it remains a decision that has advanced the protection of individuals 
facing capital punishment. 
Germany sought to emphasise that its application was not directed against capital 
punishment; neither in general, nor in regard to the way in which the death penalty is 
applied in any particular country.417 However, there can be little doubt that the 
willingness of Germany to bring the case before the ICJ was influenced by the death 
penalty factor; firstly because of its own view of capital punishment,418 and also 
414 Schabas 2002 Yale J. Int'l L at 445. 
415 See Report of the Secretary-General, "Capital Punishments and Implementation of the Safeguards 
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty," U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. 
E/2000/3 (2000). Accessed at http://www.un.org/esa/coordinationiecosoc/doc2000.htm#EI on 27 
January 2006). 
416 2002 Yale J. Int'/ L at 452. 
417 LaGrand (Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany) supra at para 1.08 .Accessed at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
418 Article 102 ofthe Basic Law of the Republic of Germany expressly abolishes capital punishment. 
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because of the irreparable nature of the punishment. Whether the trilogy is in actual 
fact about the death penalty is mere speculation. The certainty, however, is that in the 
years to come defenders of the death penalty will come under severe pressure for the 
administration of that form of punishment. This pressure will come in the form of 
insistence that the United States give nationals facing capital punishment the 
maXImum level of due-process protection, in accordance with international law 
standards. 
International law, which once was seen as exotic and idealistic, has been instrumental 
in the reformation of laws for capital punishment. Sandra Babcock points out that 
capital punishment litigators have now begun to invoke international treaties and 
customary international law in state and federal courts across America.419 As a result 
of this, domestic courts are having to review decisions of international tribunals and 
foreign courts. Babcock argues that international law has had measurable effects in 
capital cases and has been the cause for the growing unease with the administration of 
capital punishment in the USA. She uses the VCCR as a prime example, showing that 
in such cases numerous executions might have gone unnoticed by the world were it 
not for the fact that the detainees had not been informed of their consular rights. 
4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Breard, LaGrand and Avena are cases that involved the enmeshment of various 
delicate matters of international concern: the boundaries of the ICJ's power, the 
balance between international law and domestic law, the administration of the death 
penalty and the issue of international norms in treaty interpretation. Chapter 4 has thus 
shown that the trilogy of cases discussed has awakened the IC]'s injunctive authority. 
By declaring that interim orders of the IC] are binding, the Court was re-establishing 
its role as a court in international law. This chapter also highlighted the issues 
surrounding the three cases and the arguments raised by the parties before the Court 
that demonstrated the fact that international law cannot be compartmentalised. 
Consequently, the IC] might have to consider individuals' rights in the process of its 
decision making, although individuals do not have standing in the court. In the same 
419 Babcock "The Role ofIntemational Law in U.S. Death Penalty cases" (2002) 15 LJIL 367. 
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way, customary international norms may be raised in the process of treaty 
interpretation. This is not to say, however, that the IC] is suited to adjudicate on 
matters involving individual rights. Finally, the chapter showed that in the trilogy the 
IC] had to engage in an exercise of balancing international law with domestic law. It 
was submitted that the Court did this well, achieving the balance between mere 
intrusion and supervision. Finally, the chapter showed that the death penalty issue was 
unavoidable. It was also submitted that whilst shedding light on the nature of the 
rights and obligations contained in the VCCR, the trilogy also showed that states that 
choose to retain the death penalty as a method of punishment shall be subject to 
greater international scrutiny. 
The cases very clearly demonstrate the tensions that can exist between international 
law and domestic law; more specifically, the role of international institutions vis-a.-vis 
domestic institutions and the coexistence of conflicting legal and moral norms in the 
international arena. The aim of the next chapter is to see if these tensions can be 
minimised through the arm of domestic judicial process. The Chapter will also 
attempt to answer some questions that still linger after the Court's judgments. If the 
IC] Statute requires the United States to give domestic effect to IC] judgments, is 
such a move constitutional? In addition, is it fair to subordinate national courts to IC] 
decisions and at what cost?420 The fact that the problem concerning the VCCR has 
appeared three times in the IC] means that the issues it raises are not just of academic 
significance, but have much practical import. As mentioned in a previous chapter, 
globalisation and the resulted increase in international communication places a greater 
need to reconcile any tensions between international law and domestic law, or at least 
to resolve any such conflicts. Nations are becoming more entwined every day and 
with this process clashes between systems will only became more apparent. 
420 Weisburd 1999-2000 Mich. J.Jnt'l. L at 878. 
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CHAPTERS 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ICJ DECISIONS IN LAGRAND 
AND AVENA 
Contents 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter showed that the ICJ in LaGrand made significant rulings on the 
nature of the rights found in the Vienna Convention. This was the first step towards 
the vindication of the rights. An equally important aspect of concern in any ruling is 
the implementation of the ruling. It is here that the schism between international law 
and domestic laws becomes more evident. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the 
problems faced by states and more specifically state courts in the enforcement of 
international decisions. It will thus consider the response of the United States to the 
ICJ decision. 
The ICJ in LaGrand not only left the form of remedy to the United States, but it also 
did not specify which branch of the government should implement the decision. It 
thus remains unclear whether the Court intended the American legislature to 
reformulate the procedural ,default rule to allow the courts to hear LaGrand-like cases, 
or if the executive should exercise its powers to prevent violations in future cases, or 
if the courts should apply the law in VCCR cases in conformity with the interpretation 
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of the treaty in LaGrand. The chapter therefore begins by addressing this issue. It is 
argued that although LaGrand does not show which branch of the government should 
implement the decision, Avena tends to suggest that the ruling was directed at the 
national courts. The focus is then placed on the response of the U.S. courts to the IC] 
decision in order to reflect upon the attitudes of judges in municipal courts towards 
the International Court. Finally, the chapter looks at the hurdles that a national court 
would encounter were it to directly implement a decision of the International COurt.421 
Accordingly, the following issues are the subject ofthis chapter: 
1. Which arm of government is best suited to implement the IC] decision in 
LaGrand? More specifically, is the judiciary the correct institution to deal with the 
matter, or should it be deferred to the political branch, especially since the case 
involves foreign affairs't22 
2. If United States Courts is required to give effect to the IC] decisions, does their 
Constitution permit this?423 
3. Would the above scenario not amount to the subordination of U.S. Courts to the 
IC]?424 
The fact that VCCR violations have been raised, not once or twice but three times, is 
indicative that the matter must now be raised from the level of an academic discussion 
to a level of practical import. It must be noted that U.S. responses to international 
adjUdication is an extensive topic that could be the subject of its own paper. In this 
421 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari (a writ issued by a United States appellate 
court to a lower court in order to review its judgment for legal error, See Wikipedia, accessed at 
http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Certiorari) in Medellin v Dretke (125 S. Ct 2088 (2005)) to address two 
questions: whether the United States is bound by the IC],s treaty interpretation in Avena and if not, 
whether the U.S. courts are in any event obliged to defer to the IC], s decision in the interest of comity 
and uniformity. The main issues in this chapter may have been settled by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
this case; however it is regrettable that the Court later dismissed the writ of certiorari on the basis of a 
procedural error. 
422 See further Drinan "Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights: Private Enforcement 
in American Courts after LaGral1cf' (2001-2002) 54 Stan LR 1304. 
423 See further Weisburd "International Courts and American Courts" (1999-2000) 21 Mich J. Int 'I L 
877 at 878. 
424 Ibid. 
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context, it is covered only to the extent that it brings out the complex relationship 
between domestic courts and the IC]. 
5.2 WHO SHOULD ENFORCE THE DECISION? 
The judgment in LaGrand reads as follows: 
" .. .it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow reVIew and 
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the 
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. This obligation can be 
carried out in various ways. The choice of means must be left to the United 
States.,,425 
The ruling thus begs the question: which branch of the government should enforce the 
decision? 
5.2.1 The Executive 
The United States Constitution confers upon the President the power and the duty to 
carry out U.S. obligations under international law.426 This clause would tend to 
suggest that the executive should implement the IC] decision, since the IC] decision 
amounts to an obligation under international law. However, until recently the 
President remained silent on the issue of the observance of consular rights.427 This 
response was rather disturbing because the reciprocal nature of the VCCR means 
systematic non-compliance by the U.S. may create tensions with other states and 
jeopardise the position of U.S. citizens abroad. However, on 28 February 2005, the 
President issued a memorandum order directing state courts to give effect to the ICJ's 
425 LaGrand (Germany v United States) (Judgment of27 June 2001) hereinafter referred to as LaGrand 
judgment. Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.orgiicjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm. on 28 January 2006. 
426 Article II, section 3 of the Constitution of the United States of America (hereafter referred to as the 
U.S. Constitution). 
427 Paulus "From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International Adjudication" (2004) 15 No 
4 EJIL at 798. 
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decision in Avena.428 The directive seems to blur the line between the President's 
executive power and the power of the courts to apply law. The president's directive 
could thus be construed as an interference with the judiciary and therefore a violation 
of the doctrine of separation of powers. Consequently, the validity of his action is 
potentially questionable. A positive element, however, is that in directing State Courts 
to adhere to the ICJ decision, the President was making a statement of what should be; 
in essence that U.S. State Courts should adhere and defer to the ICJ in the case at 
hand. However, this directive might not have the desired effect, because its legality 
remains uncertain. 
This was not the first effort of its kind from a member of the executive. The United 
States argued in LaGrand that several executive initiatives were underway, for 
example, a federal programme to enhance the awareness of the requirement to inform 
foreign detainees about their consular information.429 Such means did not achieve 
compliance by state officials, so that even where the executive did speak out, this was 
not met positively. For example, the United States Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright, wrote a letter dated 13 April 1998 to the governor of Virginia 430 in which 
she requested a stay of Angel Breard's execution. Governor Jim Gilmore responded 
as follows: 
" ... the International Court of Justice has no authority with our criminal justice 
system. Indeed, the safety of those residing in the commonwealth of Virginia is 
not the responsibility of the International Court of Justice. It is my responsibility 
and the responsibility of law enforcement and judicial officials throughout the 
Commonwealth. I cannot cede such responsibility to the International Court of 
Justice. ,,431 
428 Weisburd "International Judicial decisions, Domestic Courts and the Foreign Affairs Power" (2004-
2005) Cato Supreme Court Review 287 at 307. 
429 This was recognised in LaGrandjudgments supra at para 123-124. 
430 See Aceves "International Decisions: Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(Paraguay v United States) and Breardv Greene" (1998) 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 517 at 520. 
431 Cited in Charney and Reisman "The facts" (1998) 92 Am J. Int'! L. 673-674. 
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This is a problem of federalism and it is clear that there is nothing that binds the state 
governor to act in conformity with the Secretary of State's recommendation. A similar 
opinion is found in a statement made by the Solicitor General, who is the legal 
representative of the executive branch before the Supreme Court, in which he argued 
that the IC] does not exercise any judicial power over the United States; which is 
vested exclusively by the constitution in the United States federal CourtS.432 The 
dualist idea of international law and national law can clearly be seen in these two 
opinions. The underlying presumption in these comments is that international law and 
national law are two separate systems. As a result, an international institution cannot 
direct the affairs of a state since it would be overstepping the international/domestic 
boundary line. 
There has thus been very little positive response from the executive. At best, the U.S. 
State Department was recorded as saying the following: " ... we are passing along 
requests from Mexico concerning this case to the State of Texas authorities ... We have 
asked Texas authorities to give specific attention to the consular notification issue.,,433 
According to Andreas Paulus, this can be understood as the U.S. State Department's 
effort to avoid open defiance and rather seek compliance through persuasive rather 
than legal means.434 No politically risky moves have been made by the executive, 
such as an appeal to the court to implement the decision or a recommendation to 
conform U.S. laws to the LaGrand decision. It is worth noting that the executive has 
shown a stronger stance in matters dealing with trade law. For example, when the 
European Union imposed sanctions against the U.S. for failing to adapt its privileges 
for Foreign Sales Corporations to the WTO Appellate Body, the executive urged 
congress to implement the ruling.435 It would thus seem that the United States is more 
432 Us. v Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, cert denied, 124 S.Ct.920 (2003). 
433 Comment by Philip T. Reeker (Deputy Spokesperson). See Daily Press briefing, Washington DC, 
13 August 2002 at 10. Accessed at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002112644.htm. on 30 January 
2006). 
434 Paulus 2004 EJIL 799. 
435 Statement by Scott McClellan on European Union Tariffs (Press Briefing of 1 March 2004). 
Accessed at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/2004030 1-4.html#3 on 19 October 
2005. 
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willing to take bolder steps in matters of trade law, where there is a likelihood of 
economic gain, than in matters concerning human rights. On this basis, it is unlikely 
that any concerted action will be forthcoming from the executive to implement the 
IC] decision. The federal system in the United States will allow the executive to pass 
requests along to different departments ad irifinitum, with no resolution being 
attained. While executive statement and action would certainly help to ease the 
tension of the situation brought about by LaGrand, any such response from the 
executive will corne as a surprise. 
5.2.2 The Legislature 
It is equally uncertain that change will corne through the legislative branch of 
government. Traditionally, the executive is the branch of government most concerned 
with the implementation of foreign law decisions. Contemporary international legal 
rules now penetrate into the domestic. Consequently, even the legislature has corne 
into more contact with international laws and, with that, increased pressure to legislate 
in accordance with prevailing international norms. 
Historically, the U.S. Legislature has been the least amenable to international 
pressures. In the 1950s, Congress considered an amendment to article II section 2 of 
the U.S. Constitution which gave the President the power to make treaties with 
foreign states. The amendment, known as the Bricker amendment, sought to limit this 
power by mandating that treaties could become effective as internal law in the U.S. 
only through legislation.436 This proposal was fuelled by fears that treaties would 
supersede the constitution, since the supremacy clause in the Constitution provides 
that treaties shall be the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary in the Constitution.437 This record of minimising the internal effect of treaties 
436 See Justin Raimondo 'The Bricker Amendment' . Accessed at 
http://www.antiwar.com/essaysibricker.html on 5 February 2006). 
437 Article 6 Clause 2 of the u.s: Constitution reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. " 
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has continued. For instance, since the withdrawal of U.S. acceptance of the Optional 
Clause, the Senate has not given its advice and consent to treaties providing for the 
binding interpretation of the I.C.] without some form of reservation. 438 Additionally, 
it was the Congress that openly supported the administration by allotting funds to the 
Contras (rebels) in the Nicaragua case two days before the IC] came to a decision on 
the matter. Thus Paulus439says; "[AJt least in the area of international peace and 
security, there is little evidence that congress would be willing to follow international 
rulings if considered adverse to the US." 
Even after LaGrand little was done to amend the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death 
penalty Act of 1996, which legislated the doctrine of procedural default. Legislative 
amendments do require time, but since 2001, there has been no evidence of any 
intention to do so. The hostility towards international judicial institutions is even more 
apparent through a move by 50 members of Congress to introduce a resolution asking 
courts to cease to refer to foreign adjudicatory bodies.44o This hostile attitude towards 
international law is likely to persist. As a consequence, the legislature, although a 
means to implement the IC] decision, is unlikely to be the medium through which 
change comes. 
5.2.3 The Judiciary 
It is not solely the willingness of the courts to implement IC] decisions that warrants 
discussion, but also the ability of the courts to do so. The latter will be discussed in 
this section, whereas the former is the subject of the next chapter. 
As already mentioned in this thesis, the lack of enforcement in international law has 
been regarded as one of the main hurdles to its effectiveness. But the possibility of 
enforcement of IC] decisions being deferred to national courts has not received much 
attention until recently. Chapter 3 of this thesis showed that the drafters of Article 94 
438 Paulus 2004 EJIL at SOO. 
439 Ibid 
440 Draft H. Res. 56S, 10Sth Congress, 2d Session, 17 March 2004. Accessed at 
http://www.house.gov/feeneyldownloads/reaffres.pdfon 31 January 2006). 
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of the United Nations Charter used imprecise language, giving the Security Council 
wide discretion in matters of enforcement. The section does not however mention the 
role of domestic judiciaries in enforcing the IC] decisions. This is significant, since it 
could indicate an intention that the Security Council be the sole enforcement 
mechanism of the IC].441 If there were an absolute discretion on domestic judiciaries 
to enforce IC] decisions, the wide discretion conferred on the Security Council would 
certainly be compromised. It would thus appear that in terms of the Charter, 
enforcement of IC] decisions is left solely to the Security Council and no absolute 
requirement rests on domestic courts to enforce a decision. The question is: what 
would be the result if the IC] in its ruling makes a directive that requires a response 
from the domestic government? 
LaGrand required 'review and reconsideration' of the sentence and conviction by 
means of United State's own choosing, but the United States argued in Avena442 that 
clemency was an effective method of review and reconsideration, since in many cases 
it results in "pardons of convictions and commutations of sentences". Furthermore, 
executive clemency was considered appropriate because it involved the broad 
participation of clemency advocates who are not bound by the broad principles of 
prejudice and procedural default.443 Mexico disputed this claim, arguing that the 
United States interpretation of 'review and reconsideration' was not correct, in that 
executive clemency is not what was envisaged by the court in LaGrand and is wholly 
inappropriate because it is "standard-less, secretive, and immune from judicial 
oversight.,,444 The Avena court observed that the decision in LaGrand proceeded on 
the premise that 'review and reconsideration' should occur within the overall judicial 
proceedings.445 The court in Avena thus reasoned that effective review and 
reconsideration "should take account of the violation of the rights set forth in the 
441. Tanzi "Problems ofthe Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law 
of the United Nations" (1995) EJIL 3. 
442 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) (Judgment of 31 March 
2004) [hereinafter referred to as Avena Judgment] at para 143. Accessed from http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idocketlimus/imusframe.htm on 10 February 2006. 
443 Avena judgment supra at para 13 7. 
444 Avena judgment supra at para 135. 
445 Avena judgment supra at para 141. 
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Convention ... and guarantee that the violation and the possible prejudice caused by 
that violation will be fully examined and taken into account. .. ,,446 The court found 
that the forum best suited to ensure this was the judiciary.447 In effect the Court was 
specifying that effective implementation of the LaGrand decision must be done by the 
U.S. judiciary and not left to the executive. 
It would thus seem that although it was not expressly said in the LaGrand judgment 
that the American judicial system should implement the decision, it is embedded in 
the judgment that change to VCCR cases must take place in the context of the 
judiciary.448 It would not therefore be presumptuous to say that LaGrand amounted to 
a case where the IC] issued a directive, albeit implicitly, to the U.S. national courts to 
change their approach to VCCR cases by disregarding certain domestic rules when 
their application would result in the violation of rights contained in the convention. 
The following questions must then be asked: does international law mandate that 
national courts should be active enforcers IC] decisions, and do national courts have 
the authority to do so in terms of U.S. law? 
5.3 ENFORCEMENT BY THE U.S. NATIONAL COURTS 
The relationship between the IC] and domestic courts is unlike any other court 
relations. It is unlike the relationship between a domestic court and a foreign court } 
and very unlike the relationship between a superior court and a lower court in a 
domestic system. It is for this reason that Weisburd449 argues against the idea that 
domestic courts should enforce international judicial decisions of the IC]. He points 
out that cases before the IC] often involve issues of great political complexity because 
only countries can be party to a case before the IC]. To suggest that a domestic court 
should enforce a decision of the IC] would be both awkward and unfair since it would 
446 Avena judgment supra at para 138. 
447 Avena judgment supra at pam 140. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Weisburd "International Courts and American Courts"(l999-2000) 21 Mich. J. Int'! L. 877 at 890. 
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amount to burdening a court with a duty it is neither intended to address nor geared to 
resolve.45o 
One factor raised against national enforcement of IC] decisions by courts is the fear 
that it would appear that the IC] is functionally superior to u.s. domestic courts. 
However, international law does not trump national law simply because it is 
international. Weisburd451 warns that such a belief is misplaced because international 
tribunals and courts are mechanisms of government and their utility is no more self-
evident than that of any other governmental institution. Thus they should not be seen 
as neutral institutions, detached from the political endeavours of the day. 
Consequently, Weisburd finds that there is a lack of evidence to support the direct 
enforcement of IC] decisions by domestic courts. He reinforces his argument by 
showing that the general approach to enforcement in international law is that where 
execution by domestic courts is mandated, the treaties indicate this expressly.452 He 
shows further that article 17 of the General Act on Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes453 (General Act) and its successor the Revised General Act for the Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes (Revised Act)454 provide the following article: 
450 Ibid. 
"If, in a judicial sentence or arbitral award, it is declared that a judgment, or a 
measure enjoined by a court of law or other authority of one of the parties to 
the dispute, is wholly or in part contrary to international law, and if the 
constitutional law of that party does not permit or only partially permits the 
consequences of the judgment or measure in question to be annulled, the 
parties agree that the judicial sentence or arbitral award shall grant the injured 
party equitable satisfaction.,,455 
451 Weisburd 1999-2000 Mich. J Int'!. L at 935. 
452 Weisburd 2005 Cato Supreme Court Review 302. 
453 26 September 1928 (an act that required parties to arbitrate or submit their disputes to the PCU). 
454 28 April 1949 (an act that requires parties to arbitrate or submit disputes to the ICJ). 
455 General Act supra art. 32, Revised General Act supra art. 32. 
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This section makes provision for the possibility that domestic law may preclude 
enforcement of international decisions by national courts. Weisburd thus argues that 
the language in this section only makes sense if it is assumed that the drafters did not 
intend IC] decisions to have domestic legal effects,456 and therefore there is no need 
for enforcement by municipal courts. He also adds that his finding is in keeping with 
the enforcement of proceedings of other international tribunals such as the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,457 which 
provides that the judgments of the European Convention are only directly enforceable 
in signatory nations where domestic law provides for such enforcement. 458 The Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal has made statements to the same effect.459 He thus 
shows that where there is intended to be enforcement by domestic courts, the general 
approach is to do so expressly. 
The centre of Weisburd's argument is the fact that neither the IC] Statute nor the UN 
Charter mentions enforcement by domestic courts. It is simply left to the Security 
Council. He thus concludes that this indicates an intention by the drafters that national 
courts will not be active enforcers of IC] decisions. The problem with this argument is 
that it alleges that the absence of one thing denotes the presence of another. This is 
not automatically so. The fact that the IC] Statute and the UN Charter are silent on 
enforcement by domestic courts is not necessarily indicative of the drafter's intention 
that there is no enforcement by domestic courts. There might be other reasons for the 
silence. Firstly, the Statute was drawn up during the early stages of international law, 
and it is possible that the drafters considered the Security Council to be the best 
enforcer of international law because of the political nature of the cases, which render 
enforcement by domestic courts more complex. As international law has developed 
however, it has become apparent that the Security Council is not always the most 
suitable body to deal with a matter.460 This leads to the second point, that the silence 
456 Weisburd 1999-2000 Mich. J.Int'l L at 884. 
457 4 November 1950. 
458 Weisburd 1999-2000 Mich. J./nt'! L. at 888. 
459 Ibid. 
460 See Chapter 3 discussion on enforcement. 
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in the IC] Statute and the UN Charter could be explained away by the fact that the 
drafters did not intend IC] decisions to have domestic legal effects.461 Weisburd 
acknowledges this fact, and Breau!, LaGrand and Avena are clear demonstrations that 
IC] decisions can have domestic legal effects (albeit rarely). Consequently, his 
argument is unsatisfactory. 
In any event, the facts in the trilogy warrant a discussion of the possibility of domestic 
enforcement of IC] decisions. The issue is a relatively new one, and as a result, very 
little case law sheds light on the question. One noteworthy case is that of Socobel v 
The Greek State. 462 In this case, a Belgian corporation sought to enforce, in the 
Belgian Courts, a judgment against Greece, delivered by the PCIJ twelve years 
earlier. In this case the PCIJ had found certain arbitrations between the corporation 
and Greece to be valid. The domestic court, however, rejected the case on the basis 
that a decision of the PCIJ could not have direct domestic effect with respect to a 
matter litigated before the PCIJ The court thus held that the international decision was 
equivalent to a foreign judgment, that is, the PCIJ decision was not one of a superior 
tribunal, and consequently it had only persuasive value. 
In Administration des Habous v Deal463 a French lower court in Morocco had found it 
did not have jurisdiction to hear a matter involving the eviction of an American 
national. This decision was reversed in a higher court, by the Appeal Court of Rabat, 
relying on a decision of the PCIJ in the Rights of Nationals of the United States of 
America in Morocco (Fr v US/64 where the IC] had held that Americans were not 
exempt from the jurisdiction of French Courts in Morocco. This is the only court 
where a domestic court enforced a decision of the international court directly, thereby 
treating it as precedent.465 
461 This is in terms of art. 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
462 18 I.L.R. 3 Belg. Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles (1951). 
463 19 I.L.R 342 (Morrocco, Ct. App. Rabat 1952). 
464 1952 I.C.J. 175 (Aug 27). 
465 It must be noted that the decision has met with some criticism (see Weisburd 2005 Cato Supreme 
Court Review at 304). 
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The above references do not, however, sufficiently address the umque situation 
created by LaGrand. It is clear that the order was directed to the United States and 
therefore required some response. Some argue for the increased involvement of the 
jUdiciary in resolving the problem. Ray466 suggests that the only body that can settle 
the issue and enforce the IC] decision is the U.S. Supreme Court. This is simply 
because it has the means to resolve it and the authority to implement the decision.467 
She argues that the Paquete Habana468 case declares that international law is 
incorporated into domestic law and must be enforced by the domestic courts. The 
question is whether international decisions qualify as 'international law' in this sense. 
It has been said that the ICJ's role is not to declare law but interpret it.469 If this is the 
case, then its decisions cannot simply be accepted as law. However, the case at hand 
deals with a treaty that is the subject of interpretation. Secondly as signatory to the 
United Nations Charter,the U.S. accepts the decisions of the court as binding under 
Article 94. It then follows that the U.S. is, as a matter of international law, bound to 
the interpretation of the Court. This means they must now enforce the decision. This 
might be an oversimplification, but the only reason that the United States should be 
excused from implementing the IC] decision is if it will result in some 
unconstitutional end. This is problematic. United States law distinguishes between 
treaties that can be applied by the courts without legislative intervention (self-
executing) and those that require legislative enactment before they can be applied by 
domestic courts (non-self-executing).47o As the Vienna Convention is a self-executing 
466 Ray "Domesticating International Obligations: How to ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations" (2003) 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1729 at 1766. 
467 Ibid 
468 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In this case the Supreme Court declared: "[I]nternationallaw is part of 
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as 
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." 
469 Sellers "The Authority of the International Court of Justice" (2002) 8 Int'l Legal Theory 41 at 46. 
470 The courts have establisheq that despite its status under the Supremacy Clause, a treaty does not 
generally create private rights that are enforceable in the courts. However, a treaty will create 
individually enforceable rights if it is deemed to be self-executing. For a further discussion on this, see 
Schiffman "Breard and Beyond: The Status Of Consular Notification And Access Under the Vienna 
Convention" (2000) 8 Cardozo J. Int'l & Camp. L. 27 at 34-37. 
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treaty, there is no need for enabling legislation before the Courts can accept this471 
and further, individuals should have standing to enforce the rights in the VCCR. 
The question remains, what if this produces an unconstitutional end? Article VI clause 
2 of the U.S. Constitution places the Constitution, U.S. laws and treaties on a par, 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution. This means as a treaty, 
the VCCR should be applied in spite of anything in the constitution, and furthermore, 
such application by the courts is lawful since it is a self-executing treaty. Thus, Ray472 
concludes that the matter can be enforced very easily by a Supreme Court ruling in 
accordance with LaGrand and such ruling would not be unconstitutional. From this, it 
would seem that it would not be unconstitutional to require the courts to enforce the 
IC] decision. This conclusion seems to be more in keeping with the finding of the 
court in Avena, 473 but it does not account for other difficulties. While it is 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court is well positioned to settle the situation, at least 
in respect of the lower courts, the Supreme Court still has to grapple with difficulties 
such as the separation of powers and the political question doctrine.474 Consequently, 
Ray's position cannot be accepted as a conclusive solution to the issue. 
The problem with the above is that it appears to place the IC] in some position of 
authority over the U.S. domestic courts. In one sense this is exactly as it appears. 
471 Ray 2003 Cal. L. Rev 1767. After much controversy this was settled in the case of Standt v United 
States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 at 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) for a discussion on the self-executing nature of the 
VCCR. 
472 Ray ( ibid). 
473 However, courts have not accorded treaty rights the same respect as constitutional rights (Luna & 
Sylvester (1999) 17 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 147 at 153). It has been said, "Although States may have an 
obligation under the Supremacy Clause to comply with provisions of the Vienna Convention, the 
Supremacy Clause does not convert violations of treaty violations ... into violations of constitutional 
rights" (Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d at 100). Similarly, see the decision of the Southern District of 
New York in which it was said: "A convention or treaty signed by the United States does not alter or 
add to our Constitution. Such international agreements are important and are entitled to enforcement, as 
written, but they are not the bedrock and foundation of our essential liberties' (Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. 
Supp. 2d at 994). But in the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino (376 U.S. 398 at 428 (1964)), 
the Supreme Court held that "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a 
particular area of the international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render a decision 
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances 
of fact". It has certainly been shown that there is much need for consensus in the area ofVCCR rights, 
not only because the courts have displayed remarkable disunity in this area, but also because of the 
frequency of applications before the IC] and the high number of immigrants residing in the United 
States. 
474 These doctrines are discussed further later in the chapter. 
117 
After all, the u.s. submits to the ICJ's jurisdiction, therefore running the risk of an 
adverse judgment. Yet in another sense it is not so, because while the ICJ has a 
measure of authority over U.S. courts, it does not give the Court license to be a 
despot. What makes the ICJ's approach in the LaGrand even less despotic is the fact 
that the court showed respect for domestic laws by leaving the question of an 
appropriate remedy to the U.S. By the time Avena came before the court, it was 
apparent that the u.s. had misunderstood this discretion and the Court merely clarifies 
its position. This is hardly the response of a despotic institution. So to require u.s. 
courts to implement the ICJ decision would not be to subordinate them to the ICJ. 
Rather, it is simply an international obligation that the United States, and indeed its 
courts, has incurred. 
In sum, there is no clear provision in the various instruments of international law that 
indicates an absolute obligation on the domestic courts to enforce decisions of the ICJ. 
At best it can be argued that U. S courts should implement the decision of the ICJ for 
two reasons; firstly, because the order in LaGrand was directed at the judiciary, and 
secondly, because the Supreme Court of Appeal has the means to resolve the matter 
speedily and efficiently, although this is not without its difficulties. 
5.4 THE RESPONSE OF U.S. COURTS TO THE ICJ 
DECISIONS 
5.4.1 The history of Article 36 in the U.S. 
It is important to begin by looking at the history of the problem in the U.S. since it 
serves as a good indication of future behaviour by the U.S. courts. The history of 
Article 36 in the United States is not impressive. Cara Drinan475 suggests that the 
courts have often erred in two respects: Firstly, they have treated the rights in Article 
36 as belonging to states and not individuals476 and secondly, the courts have 
475 Drinan 2001-2002 Stan LR 13.05. 
476 Although some courts have held that Article 36 rights had individual rights status, the matter had not 
been settled by the US Supreme Court before LaGrand See the case of Breardv Greene, 523 U.S. 371 
(1998) at 376, where the court said Article 36 arguably creates an individual right. 
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considered the violations to be best remedied by political organs and not the courtS.477 
This meant that the courts have a relatively minor role to play since Article 36 did not 
disrupt the criminal justice process. But now the ICTs findings in respect of the 
procedural default rule and the nature of Article 36 rights requires a shift by the 
American courts. It is worth noting that this work does not deal with the u.s. courts' 
responses to the IC] provisional measures orders. The legality of their responses to the 
provisional orders or lack thereof is the subject of other papers and will not be 
included in the scope of this one. Rather, this work will look at the response of the 
courts after the final order was made, with the aim of securing the way forward for 
future litigants. 
VCCR claims on the basis of Article 36 violations began in the mid-1990s. The U.S. 
Courts had acknowledged the purpose and importance of these rights, but were 
unresolved on the nature of rights envisaged by Article 36.478 Does the article give 
rise to individually enforceable rights? And if it does, what remedy would be 
appropriate for these violations? Though treaties are contracts between sovereigns and 
thus generally enforced by government action, the United States has accepted that 
self-executing treaties are of a different nature and can be enforced by the COurtS.479 
The problem is that there has been a lack of consensus on the application of this rule. 
Some COurtS480 have found that Article 36 rights are not individually enforceable, 
while other COurtS481 have held to the contrary. Even for those courts that did find that 
Article 36 rights had the character of privately enforceable rights, there was still the 
hurdle of a remedy. Most U.S. courts held that in order to have a remedy, a litigant 
477 See for example, United States v Li 206 F.3d 56 63-64 (lSI Circ. 2000) where it was said 'the 
remedies for failures of consular notification under the VCCR are diplomatic, political or exist between 
states under international law. 
478 Ray 2003 Cal. L. Rev 1737. 
479 Head Money cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (l884), where it was said, "[A] treaty may also contain 
provisions which confer certain rights upon citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the 
territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of 
enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country." 
480 Kasi v Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (Va. 1998). 
481 United States v Lombera-Camorlinga 170 F.3.d 1241 (9th Circ, 1999). 
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would have to prove prejudice,482 but the IC] dismissed this as irnrnateria1.483 No 
ruling has to date been made by the Supreme Court on the matter. Now the IC] has 
ruled in LaGrand that Article 36 rights have the status of individual rights and still 
other international bodies have found the same. For example, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights found, after a comprehensive study of Article 36, that it 
contained rights analogous to the individually enforceable rights contained in article 
14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.484 
5.4.2 Article 36 jurisprudence in the U.S. after LaGrand 
The IC] ruling in LaGrand was thus bound to be significant, since it touched on 
matters previously unsettled. But it remains unclear which branch of the United States 
government should respond. It is understood from the judgment that the intention was 
not to use the Security Council to enforce the decisions in this particular case. In any 
case, LaGrand is unique because it deals with matters so quintessentially domestic 
that only internal measures, or measures initiated by the United States itself, could 
effectively enforce this. 
The response of the United States judiciary to the LaGrand decision was far from 
impressive. The United States judiciary displayed a notable failure by not referring to 
LaGrand at all and those that did, did so inadequately. After LaGrand, between July i 
2001 and March 2002 eight decisions involving consular rights violations appeared 
before the courts. In these eight cases, only one even made reference to LaGrand.485 
482 In essence, the litigant must show that he position has been prejudiced as a result of the lack of 
consular access (Ray 2003 Cal. L. Rev 1740). 
483 See LaGrand judgment supra at para 74. Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm on 30 January 2006. 
484 See "The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the 
Due Process of Law." Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-A. Ct. H.R. ser. A. 16 (1999). Accessed at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr!seriea inglindex.html on 12 February 2006. 
485 Us. v Dixon No 01-4298, 2002, U.S. App Lexis 2402 (4th Circ Feb 32002), Us. v Cowo, No. 00-
1499,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24963 (1 Circ. Nov. 20, 2001), Us. v Canilo and Solo 269 F.3d 761 (7th 
Circ. 2001), Us. v Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980 (lOth Circ. 2001), Us. v Dwyer No. 99-2483, 2001 
U.S. App. Lexis 16142 (6TH Circ. July 16,2001), Us. v Emuegbunam 268 F. 3d 377 (6ty Circ. 2001), 
Us. Felix-Felix 275 F.3d 627 (7th Circ 2001) Us. v Bustos de la Pava 268 F. 3d 157 (2nd Circ. 2001). 
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In the Alvarez486 case, LaGrand was mentioned, but the court rejected the relevance 
of LaGrand on the basis that the ICJ did not consider the exclusionary rule to 
violations of Vienna Convention. Thus, the only court that did mention LaGrand did 
so unsatisfactorily; furthermore the same court only one month after LaGrand is 
recorded as having said: "[I]t remains an open question whether the VCCR gives rise 
to any individually enforceable rights. ".487 
There is one exception to this general trend. In the case of United States ex reI. Madej 
v Schoming,488 a district court found that a state should not use the procedural default 
rule as a basis for denying relief in cases of Article 36 violations. As to the nature of 
the rights, the court uttered its view that the ICJ decision on the status of Article 36 
rights was authoritative. The court said: 
"[T]he interpretations of the Vienna Convention by the International Court of Justice 
(LC.J.) are binding as to the terms of the treaty. To disregard one of the ICJ's most 
significant decisions interpreting the Vienna Convention would be a decidedly 
imprudent course. [A ]fter LaGrand .. . no court can credibly hold that the Vienna 
Convention does not create individually enforceable rights. "489 
Although a positive step, it is unlikely that this decision will bring change to federal 
jurisprudence. The Valdez490 case was an even more positive response to LaGrand. In 
this 2002 case the court granted relief to a Mexican national on death row, although 
on a separate legal basis. The Court was unable to stand on the ICJ's reasoning in 
LaGrand and it concluded that despite its own opinion, it was bound by the ruling in 
Breard, until a Superior Court changes the ruling.491 One is tempted to criticise this 
fmding on the basis that the court found a convenient way to avoid the problem. 
486 Supra at 987. 
487 Supra at 986. 
488 223 F. Supp. 2d 978-79 (N.D. 111,2002). 
489 Supra at 1. 
490 Valdez v State, 46 P. 3d 703 (2002). 
491 Supra at 709. 
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However, the Court's reasoning is a perfectly acceptable take on the matter. The 
bottom line is that until a matter has been settled by a superior court, the lower courts 
are unable to disregard the decisions of these higher courts. 
Drinan492 argues that U.S. courts have operated from an ideological standpoint that 
opposes the role of the IC] in national law. The fear that LaGrand will have any 
practical impact on national law is simply an out working of this ideology. She then 
raises the interesting point that the lack of acknowledgement of LaGrand in the U.S. 
is also the result of the perception that the drafters of the VCCR in 1963 did not 
intend it to alter the domestic criminal procedure in the dramatic way that LaGrand 
does.493 Another reason is the long-standing tradition of deferring matters that 
implicate policy to the political branches of the government. (This subject is expanded 
upon later in the chapter under the heading 'Political question doctrine'.) Finally, 
Drinan494 also points out that courts at domestic levels are ill-informed on 
international law matters, so they might seek to avoid mentioning the IC] for fear that 
they will be unable to resolve the matter correctly, and thereby draw attention to 
themselves through appellate review. While it is acceptable that the above-mentioned 
reasons form contributing factors, it is most probable that the predominantly negative 
response by the U.S. courts is because they were simply applying U.S. precedent 
handed down in Breard v Greene. 495 So in one sense, the poor response can be 
appreciated. Until recently, the legislature and the executive had been silent on the 
issue, and these two branches seemed to be the most obvious avenues for change. Yet 
at the same time, the courts, being independent bodies, should also be unafraid to 
entertain such cases in order to bring change where it is necessary. The fact that this 
did not happen is indicative of the unreality of international law in the United 
States.496 
492 Drinan 2001-2002 Stan LR at 1310. 
493 Drinan 2001-2002 Stan LR at 1311. Also see Li Case supra at 65-66. 
494 Drinan 2001-2002 Stan LR at 1312. 
495 Supra. 
496 See Fitzpatrick "The Unreality of International law in the United States and the LaGrand case" 
(2002) 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 427. 
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5.4.3 The prevalence of international law in the domestic sphere 
The issues in LaGrand, although complex, implicate treaty obligations; which 
domestic court judges should not be unfamiliar with. Babcock497, writing in 2002, 
states that in tenns of international law the U.S. is undergoing a paradigm shift. 
Previously, few lawyers understood the relevance of international law to an accused 
undergoing domestic legal proceedings. This is attributed to the fact that few law 
schools had international law as a required subject.498 However, this has changed. 
International law issues are litigated in the courts with greater frequency, meaning 
national courts and judges need to be infonned on the international legal nonns. It has 
been put as follows: 
'Globalization has now so pervaded our national culture and identities that a 
court that consistently ignored international precedents and experiences when 
considering human rights issues, even if merely for their persuasive or moral 
weight, risks irrelevancy.,499 
It is this aspect that makes LaGrand of particular interest. LaGrand is an intricate 
weaving of rights and obligations on the international and national level. These rights 
and obligations intertwine in such a way that they clearly show the interdependence of 
international law and domestic law; more specifically, how international legal 
principles have now penneated the domestic sphere. The response of the U.S. courts 
after LaGrand was far from impressive. But apart from criticising the courts for their 
ignorance of contemporary legal decisions, the case also highlights a further matter of 
interest, and that is the problem of how courts can relate to the Ie] while remaining 
within the boundaries of the jUdiciary. There are numerous hurdles that courts face in 
applying international decision such as LaGrand that must be factored. 
497 Babcock "The Role of International law in U.S. Death Penalty Cases" (2002) 15 LJIL 367-387. 
498 Ibid 
499 Davis "Lecture: International Human Rights and United States Law: Predictions of a Court 
Watcher" (2000) 64 Alb. L. Rev 417. 
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5.5 BARRIERS TO ENFORCEMENT 
5.5.1 Separation of Powers 
One of the major barriers to an increased role for national courts in the international 
sphere is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers. This doctrine requires the 
functions of government to be classified as legislative, executive or judicial, and 
requires each branch to perform separate functions.500 This then creates a system of 
shared power called checks and balances. 501 The rationale behind this system is to 
avoid a concentration of power in a single person or body. 
Separation of powers is a modem feature of contemporary democratic constitutions. It 
is often implicit in constitutions.502 For instance, the application of the separation of 
powers doctrine in the U.S. can be inferred from the division of the government into 
three branches, the Legislature,503 the Executive504 and the Judiciary.505 So the 
Constitution sets out very specifically what each branch is permitted to do. This 
doctrine can form a barrier to national courts' enforcement of international decisions, 
because international law regulations often deal with the relations between states; 
many of which are a question of foreign policy. Therefore, strictly speaking, this is 
the domain of the Executive. This then limits the role that a court can play. 
Suppose the U.S. Courts did directly enforce the ICJ decision in LaGrand: would they 
be infringing upon the domain of the executive? It is possible to argue that the real 
obligation is incurred on the international level, when the U.S. through its executive 
500 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005) 18. 
501 Mahler 'Constitutional Topic: Separation of Powers'. Accessed at 
htt;p:llwww.usconstitution.net/consttop sepp.html on 8 February 2006. 
502 See also the South African decision in South African Association of Personallrljury Lawyers v 
Heath 2001(1) SA 883 (CC) at para 21, where the judge shows that this is a feature of the United 
States, Australian and South African Constitutions. 
503 The Legislature is composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate. See Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution. Available at htt;p:llwww.usconstitution.net/const.html. (Accessed on 8 February 
2006). 
504 See article II of the U.S. Constitution (ibid). 
505 See Article III of the U.S. Constitution (ibid). 
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arm, became a signatory to the VeeR and submitted to the jurisdiction of the Ie]. 
The incurring of the obligation and the implementation thereof are two separate 
matters. Whether the national courts implement the decision in LaGrand or not, they 
are not the avenue through which the obligation was incurred. It is merely a question 
of enforcement at this stage. So although the idea of national courts acting as direct 
enforcers of Ie] decisions at first glance appears to breach the separation of powers, 
this is not the case. 
5.5.2 The political question doctrine 
It has been mentioned that the doctrine of separation of powers requires separate 
functions for each branch of the government. The doctrine of political question is an 
extension of this principle. 
The political question doctrine is a rule that issues of political nature, especially 
foreign affairs, require separate treatment and should be immune from judicial 
scrutiny.506 It states that laws of a political nature ought to be enforced by another 
branch, the Executive.507 So for instance, United States courts have refused to deal 
with questions of recognition, territorial sovereignty and the international legality of 
hostilities.508 These issues are deemed non-justiciable because of their political 
character. The issue frequently comes up in international law because of the inherent 
political nature of the field. Previously this did not pose a problem because 
international rules were rarely enforced on the domestic plane. Now the position has 
shifted as international legal principles permeate the domestic legal systems, 
particularly through the human rights instruments. So now these highly political 
relations can implicate the rights of individuals, who will in some cases only have an 
action at the domestic level. This was the turn of events in the trilogy of cases that are 
the subject ofthis thesis. 
506Djajic "The effect of international Court of Justice decisions on Municipal Courts in the United 
States: Breardv Greene" (1999-~OOO) 23 Hastings Int'!. & Compo L. Rev. at 65. 
507 Ibid 
508 Ibid 
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The consequence of determining that an issue is of a political nature is to deny a 
judicial remedy in the face of a violation. This is the manner in which the U.S. courts 
dealt with the trilogy. Djajic509 criticises this and suggests that the U.S. courts' initial 
response to Breard may have prevented international suit had the courts not tried to 
make a justiciable issue non-justiciable. She argues further that a case is not 
necessarily non-justiciable because state and individual interests are at stake.510 As it 
was said in the famous case of Baker v Carr511 , "it is error to suppose that every case 
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognisance". 
This is an important consideration, because the doctrine of political question is not 
intended to be used as an escape mechanism. Without a clear definition on what is 
'political', such abuse may ensue. According to Nafziger512 , the political question 
doctrine routinely embarrasses the constitutional system. He states that although in 
theory the doctrine relies on principles of democracy to allow courts to shun rulings 
on international issues that might complicate foreign relations, in practice, this 
justification is simply a technique of judicial management. He states the doctrine is 
the governments' weapon to weed out the controversial cases.513 
While this might not always be the case, it is certainly a possible danger. As a result 
courts need to balance the requirement of enforcing international law with 
requirements such as the political question doctrine.514 How this balance is struck 
509 Djajic 1999-2000 Hastings Int'! & Compo L. Rev 67. 
510 Ibid. 
511 369U.S.186,211 (1962). 
512 Nafzinger "Political Dispute Resolution by the World Court, with Reference to United Sates 
Courts" (1997-1998) 26 Denv. J. Int'l L & Pol'y 775. 
513 Ibid. 
514 The Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran at para 35 and 36 
(Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/icases/iusir/iusir ijudgment/iusir iJudgment 19800524.pdf is an example of an 
instance when the balance was struck. In the case, Iran argued inadmissibility on the basis that the 
taking of hostages was only on\( incident in a complex web of political activities. Such matters were 
therefore not amenable to adjudication. The court rejected this argument, holding that the case showed 
clear legal issues and the mere fact that legal issues had a political dimension did not render the case 
injusticiable (see Franscioni "International Law as a Common Language for National Courts" (2001) 
36 Tex. Int'! L. J. 587 at 590). 
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depends on the facts and it would be impossible to define the boundaries between 
political and legal matters. It suffices to say, if a court is faced with a legal issue, such 
issue should not be deferred to the executive branch merely because it has political 
implications. 
The political implications of LaGrand are obvious. The outcome of the case would 
have had serious effects on the relationship between Germany and the United States. 
This immediately invited some executive attention. Yet at the same time, the legal 
issues can be clearly seen. An analysis of the issues raised by Germany in LaGrand 
will show that many of those issues were in fact legal issues: the binding nature of 
provisional measures, the interpretation of the VeeR and the issue of an appropriate 
remedy. Such issues are not political in nature and it is only the context in which they 
were raised that gives them a political edge. So LaGrand and indeed Avena were thus 
cases involving essentially legal issues with political implications. If seen in this light, 
the political question doctrine cannot be raised as a defence by national courts for the 
lack of implementation of the Ie]' s decisions in LaGrand and Avena. 
As a general rule, when discussing the enforcement of international law decisions by 
domestic courts, one must be cognisant of the political question doctrine, because 
whether it is accepted or not, this doctrine poses a great barrier to courts getting 
involved in political or even quasi-political matters, which very often includes matters ~ 
of foreign policy. , 
5.5.3 Stare Decisis and Res Judicata 
The legal doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata are also potential obstacles to any 
thesis that promotes enforcement of international decisions by national courts. These 
doctrines are a lot less surmountable than the doctrine of political question because 
they are not merely principles of practice, but deeply formed legal rules. 
127 
5.5.3.1 Stare Decisis 
"The common law doctrine of stare decisis holds courts to principles of law expressed 
in earlier decisions which must be applied to subsequent cases where the facts are 
substantially the same."SI5 The rationale behind the principle is to curb excessive 
judicial discretion and allow for some consistency in the legal jurisprudence. It is thus 
not only a sound practice, but a deeply ingrained legal tenet in most modern legal 
systems today. 
However, this doctrine does not apply with respect to decisions of the International 
Court of Justice. Article 59 of the Court's Statute states that decisions of the Court are 
binding as between the parties, and only in respect of that particular case. This section 
would thus seem to indicate that there is no precedential system as between the ICJ 
and national cOurtS.SI6 This position is not peculiar when one considers the make up 
of international law. There is no international legislature to override the improper 
decision and the ICJ's body of jurisprudence, although on the increase, is in no way 
near as large as that of national courts. This makes any system of precedents difficult, 
since a court would not have as large a body of precedent to turn to.517 Additionally, it 
has been argued that international law must remain an evolving and flexible field, and 
a system of precedents would shackle the flexibility of the current system.SI8 
As a direct consequence, this doctrine cannot be relied upon to compel national courts 
to enforce ICJ decisions. So the very nature of international law does not lend itself to 
the operation of this doctrine. In this way, the finding in the Socobel case 
demonstrates how national courts might tend to respond. 
515 Reilley & Ordonez "Effect of the Jurisprudence Of the International Court of Justice On national 
Courts" (1995-1996) 28 N.Y. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 435 at 445. 
516 Ibid 
517 Ibid. 
518 Ibid 
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5.5.3.2 Res Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata prevents a litigant approaching the courts a second time 
on the basis of the same cause of action. So it is a doctrine that bars a claim, if that 
claim has already been heard on the same merits. The logic of this rule is plain, in that 
it enables courts to adjudicate a matter with fmality. Although the issues before the 
ICJ would not necessarily be the same as the issues founding a claim before a 
domestic court, the judgment in LaGrand alters this position. The problem is if the 
U.S. courts are compelled to enforce the ICJ's decision in LaGrand or Avena, it 
would amount to a directive to reopen a case that in terms of U.S. law is closed.519 
Even if the courts did so, on their own volition, it would still be a breach of the res 
judicata rule. So, on the basis of this legal rule, national courts would not be able to 
implement the ICJ's decision in LaGrand or Avena. The requirement to review and 
reconsider cuts at the heart of the res judicata rule by necessitating that the cases be 
re-opened and re-heard. It thus poses a further difficulty for courts to simply 
implement the IC], s decision in LaGrand or Avena. 
These legal rules are difficult hurdles to surmount. It is hard to conceive of a basis 
upon which they can be disregarded. Internationalists who advocate a greater role of 
national courts as enforcers of international decisions must take these legal rules in to 
account. Whatever the opinion that one holds about these doctrines, it is clear that the 
general rationale in the trilogy is that where there have been prolonged sentences and 
severe penalties,52o the need to vindicate the rights of the detained individual is so 
important that it warrants departure from certain law and practice. In a sense, the ICJ 
was stating that the rights at risk in these cases, namely Article 36 rights of detainees 
and those on death row, are important enough to warrant departure from these legal 
rules. This is understandable, since the punishment in question was irreversible. 
519 Weisburd 2004-2005 Cato Supreme Court Review 314. 
520 See LaGrand judgment supra at para 125. 
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5.5.4 Dualism 
When a domestic court is dealing with an IC] decision, the constitution, statutes and 
customs of the country concerned will play a vital role.521 But the degree to which a 
domestic court will defer to the decisions of the IC] is dependant on the status of 
treaties and customary international law in that nation's legal order. Thus for instance 
if a nation adopts a monist theory, they will accept a decision of the IC] as if it were 
coming from their own highest court,522 whereas a dualist approach accepts domestic 
law as supreme within the domestic system. 
The United States courts have showed a dualist approach to the matter of Article 36 
violations in that they have consistently refused to apply the IC] decision, thereby 
deferring the responsibility to the executive branch of the government. The history of 
Article 36 claims in the courts referred to above has shown this. This is obviously 
because of the perceived conflict between the domestic criminal justice rules and the 
order of the IC]. The oversight, however, is that the legislative act that is being 
awaited has already come and gone. Firstly, the executive has assented to be party to 
the United Nations and is therefore obliged to implement any decisions of the IC] to 
which it is party. Secondly, the United Nations has assented to the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Rights and is thus obliged to ensure that the rights contained therein are 
effected. 
5.5.5 Constitutionality 
The overarching problem with all the abovementioned barriers is that it is not certain 
that a move by U.S. courts to implement the IC] decision in LaGrand would be 
constitutional. Some of the barriers mentioned above are only implicitly 
unconstitutional, but there are express clauses of the U.S. Constitution that may 
prevent the U.S. court acting on the IC] decision in LaGrand and Avena. 
521 Reilly & Ordonez 1995-1996 NY.U J Int'l L. & Pol 449. 
522 For further discussion on Monism and Dualist theories, see Chapter 2. 
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Article III of the U.S. Constitution deals with the judiciary as a branch of government. 
It provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain.523 In the 
case of Plaut v Spendrift Farm Inc,524 it was stated that this section should be read 
with the understanding that a judgment conclusively resolves the case, because the 
judicial power in question is one to render dispositive judgments. Thus the U.S. courts 
do not have the authority merely to rule on cases, but also to decide such cases. It is 
thus inherent in this section of the Constitution that no other person or body has the 
authority to decide on cases, be it the Executive, Congress or an international tribunal. 
Suppose it was accepted that national courts are obliged to enforce decisions of the 
IC], the IC] would be put in the position of an appellate or review court, which would 
be in direct contravention of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 
Once again, the prospect of an absolute obligation on U.S. national courts to enforce 
IC] decisions is doubtful. Even in the face of a directive by the IC], the legality and 
constitutionality of such a move is uncertain.525 One may argue that this can be 
circumvented because the IC] left it up to U.S. courts to decide. Thus it would not be 
the IC] that is reviewing the case, but the Supreme Court. This would be in 
conformity with Article III. The reality is, however, that if U.S. courts do not have the 
option to reject the ICJ's directive to review and reconsider the sentence and 
conviction, it is really the IC] that is acting, albeit through the agency of U.S. courts. 
Yet at the same time, it must be remembered that the events as they occurred in the i 
trilogy are rare in international law. 
Another important point that emerges from this dilemma is the need for reconciliation 
of international obligations with constitutional provisions. After the Second World 
War, there was a move to include what was then referred to as the law of nations in 
national constitutions.526 Now, in the post-Cold War era, the world is witnessing yet 
523 Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. 
524 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
525 See further Weisburd 1999-2000 Mich. J. Int'!. L 900-924. 
526 Vereshchetin "New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship between International 
Law and National Law" (1996) 7 EJIL at 1 in which he shows that after World Wars I and II, far 
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another such move. The problem that remains is the classic issue of the relationship 
between international law and domestic law.527 
The ability of U.S. national courts to enforce the IC] decisions in LaGrand and Avena 
is thus a thorny issue, in that the courts must first overcome the problem of separation 
of powers, the political question doctrine and the legal principles that stand in the way 
of their enforcement. Even if these are to be overcome, there is still the requirement 
that whatever the national courts do must be constitutional. When dealing with highly 
charged issues, like those raised in LaGrand and Avena, it is tempting to simply 
surmise that the courts were in error because they had not done as the IC] had 
directed. This section has shown that the matter is not as simple as that. There are 
legal and political obstacles that stand in the way of national courts being direct 
implementers ofIC] decisions . 
5.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
With the increase of interdependence forced on the world by global economics, 
international adjudicative bodies will also increase. With this increase there is a 
growing need to understand how the decisions of these international adjudicative 
bodies will impact national decisions and how international obligations will be 
reconciled with national obligations where they conflict. These issues were all 
implicit in LaGrand and Avena. 
This chapter thus looked at the response of the U.S. government to these cases. It was 
said that although all three branches of government are able to influence the 
implementation process, the IC] decision in LaGrand was directed at the courts. The 
chapter then considered the U.S. consular rights jurisprudence after LaGrand and 
showed that many ofthe cases did not even reject LaGrand, but merely disregarded it. 
But before one is tempted to pass judgement on the U.S. courts for their failure to 
implement the decisions, the chapter also showed the difficult position that domestic 
reaching provision on the status of intemationallaw were introduced in the Gennan and constitution 
and after World War II, in the Italian and Japanese constitutions. 
527 Vereshchetin (ibid). 
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courts fInd themselves when dealing with LaGrand-like cases. Barriers to 
enforcement were highlighted and such barriers will exist in any democratic and 
constitutional state. 
Some conflicting views were raised with respect to the constitutionality of national 
courts enforcing Ie] decision. On the one hand, the VeeR is self-executing and 
therefore privately enforceable; on the other hand, there is the danger of breaching the 
constitution by treating the Ie] as an appeal court. 
The chapter has thus drawn out the complexities of the issues raised by LaGrand and 
Avena. Regardless of how willing the Ie] is to issue directives aimed at securing the 
rights of detainees, the implementation of such directives is equally important. On a 
moral level, it is easy to conclude that the U.S. courts should implement the Ie] 
decision, but on a legal level, there are numerous difficulties that courts would 
encounter in doing so. Having to grapple with all these issues shows that LaGrand left 
as many gaps open as it covered. However, these gaps are welcome, as the case has 
incited academic debate on the possibility of using national courts to enforce 
international decisions. 
The next chapter of the thesis will consider the merits of judicial comity as a new 
basis upon which the international law can be developed to allow for judicial co- ~ 
operation between the Ie] and national courts. , 
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CHAPTER 6 
JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Contents 
1 Introduction 
2 The Example O/The European Union 
3 Judicial Comity 
4 Conclusion 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Far from settling matters for u.s. consular rights law, LaGrand in fact left many other 
matters open. These were addressed in the previous chapters. A principal concern for 
most academics and practitioners is the impact of the ICJ ruling in LaGrand on 
municipal law and practice. The ICJ chartered a new course on the possibility of using 
national courts to enforce its decisions. The matter is not simple, though, because 
national courts are bound by internal doctrines such as the political question doctrine 
and the doctrine of separation of powers, which limits their ability to be active 
enforcers of international decisions. Nonetheless, while it was found that there is no 
absolute obligation on national courts to enforce ICJ decisions, equally, there does not 
seem to be an absolute prohibition on such action. It would thus seem that if the 
courts are able to overcome some of these difficulties, they might indeed have a role 
to play in implementing ICJ decisions. 
An analysis of the current system used in the European Union (EU) reveals that the 
use of national courts to enforce supranational decisions is indeed an effective one 
and bears a greater return~than if one body (like the Security Council) is set up to do 
the job. Consequently, this chapter will consider the building blocks of the EU court 
134 
system as a platfonn to the question of whether such a system can be transplanted into 
other systems, which will be considered in the final chapter. 
Slaughter528 states that the U.S. Supreme court should have honoured the IC] request 
as a matter of judicial comity. The principle being set out is that in the absence of an 
absolute international legal rule and except where it would be contrary to national law 
to do so, a domestic court should honour the decision of an international court as a 
matter of courtesy. LaGrand was a perfect display of the tensions that exist between 
international law and domestic law. Slaughter's response to this is judicial comity, 
what she describes as the lubricant of transjudicial relations.529 This chapter will thus 
deal with this concept of judicial comity and consider its effectiveness as a ground 
upon which courts can rely to implement IC] decisions. 
Chapter 6 thus seeks to draw conclusions about how domestic courts can relate to 
international courts in the future by looking at the subject of judicial comity. The 
European Union system will be examined as an example of judicial co-operation. The 
specific issues that will be addressed, which were all implicit in the trilogy of cases 
that are the subject of this thesis, are the following: 
1 Is there a legal understanding of comity that can facilitate the resolution of 
disputes where there are international law and municipal tensions? 
2 Could the United States have enforced the IC] decision in LaGrand as a matter of } 
comity? 
3 Is the EU system adaptable to other parts of the globe? 
After concluding that there is no existing international legal rule that mandates that 
national courts be active enforcers of international decisions, this chapter seeks to 
examine the remaining ground upon which it is alleged that national courts should 
enforce IC] decisions in LaGrand-like cases. 
528 Slaughter Agora: Breard. "Court to Court" (1998) 92 Am. J. Int'J L 711. 
529 Ibid 
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6.2 THE EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The make-up of the European Union is an example of a progressive network of courts 
that has captured the heart of international law as an integrative body of laws. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a prototypical example of supranational 
adjudication. Supranational adjudication is adjudication by a tribunal established by a 
group of states or the entire international community and that exercises jurisdiction 
over cases involving both states and private individuals.53o Traditional international 
adjudication by contrast, involves only state to state litigation.531 The ICJ is therefore 
an example of the latter and as such it is immediately distinguishable from the ECJ. 
The European Community (now referred to as the European Union) was established 
in 1957 in an effort to unify its member countries, who were historical enemies.532 
Thus the purpose of the union was to prevent a resurgence of the hostilities that had 
led to the world wars. This system shows how judicial co-operation can work and is 
thus an example for the world at large. The distinguishing factor about the European 
Union is the remarkable incorporation of national courts into the community 
framework. The national courts of the European Union are responsible for the 
implementation of directly enforceable community rights within the national 
sphere.533 These national courts operate within their own specific national order and 
the judges are appointed and act in terms of the national constitutions. Yet at the same 
time, these courts are tasked with the implementation of European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) decisions in certain circumstances.534 Integration in the system has been 
achieved by the operation of two doctrines: the doctrine of supremacy (which places 
community law above national law) and the doctrine of direct effect (which makes all 
530 L Helfer and A Slaughter "Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication" (1997-
1998) Yale L.J273 at 287. 
531 Ibid 
532 Jones "Opinions of the European Union in National Courts" (1995-1996) 28 NY. l.1.J. Int'.l L. & 
Pol. 275. 
533 Maher "National Courts as European Community Courts" (1994) 14 legal Stud 226. 
534 Ibid 
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rights under community law directly accessible to individuals). 535 In addition to this, 
the integration of the community is strengthened by the inclusion of certain clauses in 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community that have the effect of giving more 
. 1 536 power to natlOna courts. 
6.2.1 The Treaty Establishing the European Union 
Part Five of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EEC Treaty) sets up a 
number of institutions: the European Council and European Commission, which 
initiate and adopt legislation,537 the European Parliament, which considers legislation 
to be adopted538 and the European Court of Justice, which adjudicates claims and is 
tasked with the adjudication of disputes that concern Union Law.539 Three groups are 
given locus standi in the court: the EU institutions, member states of the EU and 
nationals of the member states.540 The ECJ thus has wider jurisdiction than the ICJ 
because not only the member states, but individuals may submit a matter to the ECJ. 
A second and noteworthy difference is that the ECJ does not have jurisdiction by 
consent in the same way that the ICJ does. In this sense, it stands in a similar position 
to that of an Appeal Court on the domestic plane.541 
535 This was established in the case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration [J 963 J 1 where the court noted that the European legal order grants rights to 
individuals without the need for implementing legislation (accessed at 
http://www.curia.eu.intlen/contentljuris/index.htm on 16 March 2006). 
536 Maher 1994 Legal Stud 226. 
537 Part Five, Section 2 and 3 of the EEC treaty respectively. 
538 Part Five, Section 1 of the EEC Treaty. 
539 Part Five, Section 4 of the EEC Treaty. 
540 Art 173 of the EEC Treaty. 
541 A matter can come before the ECJ in one of four ways. Firstly, as a result ofa 'reasoned opinion' by 
the European Commission stating that one of the member states is in violation of its rights under the 
EEC Treaty (Art 1690fthe EEC. Treaty). Secondly, one member states may bring another member 
before the ECJ on the basis that it is in violation of an obligation under the EEC Treaty (Art. 170 of the 
EEC Treaty). Thirdly, a natural person may bring an institution before the ECJ to protest a decision 
(Art. 173 of the EEC Treaty) and finally a matter may be submitted to the ECJ through a process of 
referral through a preliminary opinion (Art. 177 of the EEC Treaty). 
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One of the most remarkable features ofthe EU legal community is the extent to which 
national courts have been drawn into the enforcement process of EC] decisions. There 
is thus clear co-operation between the national courts of EU member states and the 
EC]. This co-operation may be attributed to a collection of provisions in the EEC 
Treaty that give the national courts such power. These provisions will be analysed in 
tum. 
6.2.1.1 The principles of direct effect and supremacy 
In the 1978 case of Administrazione delle Finanze v Simmenthal, 542 the following was 
said: 
"Every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply community 
law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and 
must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may 
conflict with it, [own emphasis] whether prior or subsequent to the 
Community rule." 
In this case, the EC] was confirming the already established rule that private 
individuals have rights and obligations under EEC law and also that EEC law was 
superior to national law. This position has come to be known as the 'doctrine of direct 
effect' and the 'doctrine of supremacy' respectively.543 
Direct Effect 
In terms of the doctrine of direct effect, individuals have rights that are directly 
effective544 which has had the effect of allowing maximum use of the court. In the 
case of Van Gend en LOOS545 the court determined that the articles of the EEC Treaty 
542 Case 106177 [1978] ECR at para 21. Available at 
http:// europa.eu.intl smartapi/ cgi/sga doc?smartapi! ce lexp Ius! prod! CELEXnumdoc& Ig=en&numdoc=6 
1977JOI06. (Accessed on 25 February 2006). 
543 Maher 1994 Legal Stud 1 fn~ and 3. 
544 Van Gend en Loos case supra. 
545 Supra. 
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create rights and obligations of individuals. In casu the court stated that the objective 
of the EEC treaty is to establish a market that serves all interested parties in the 
community. The court found further that this meant that the treaty existed not just for 
the member states, but also for its peoples. This was supported by the preamble, 
which refers not only to governments but people.546 
The court was thus stating that the rights contained in the EEC treaty were not only 
designed to privilege states, but also its peoples. The effect of this is that courts have 
an obligation to protect the rights of individuals where their EEC treaty rights have 
been violated. This is different to the situation of domestic courts and the IC]. The 
decisions of the IC] are not directly enforceable, because technically IC] decisions 
should not have direct impact on individuals. The events in the trilogy are a challenge 
to this presupposition. The facts of these cases show that although rare, it is possible 
that individuals would be directly affected by IC] decisions. The enforcement of such 
decisions is thus crucial. It also follows that the best institutions to deal with such 
enforcement are the national courts. So the doctrine of direct effect is a powerful tool 
that allows national courts within the ED to protect the rights of individuals; a 
privilege not accorded to national courts when dealing with IC] decisions. 
The Supremacy of Community Law 
It was said in the Ammistrazione delle Finanze case that where a national court is ~ 
called upon to apply any provision of community law, it is obliged to do so even 
where this may mean that conflicting provisions of national legislation are 
disregarded. Furthermore, it was held that the national courts need not wait for 
national legislature to set aside the conflicting national law before applying 
community law.547 Essentially, this case is authority for the fact that community law 
takes precedence over the laws of the member states. Through this doctrine of 
supremacy, the national courts of the EU member states have acquired a community 
function, and are obliged to apply the decisions of the EC] as precedent. This position 
is opposite to the position of a domestic court vis-a-vis the IC]. No system of 
546 See section II at para B. 
547 Supra at para 24. 
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precedent system applies from the ICJ, and to suggest that ICJ decisions should in 
some way be viewed as superior is simply unacceptable in international law. 
These two doctrines have therefore been instrumental in creating an atmosphere for 
judicial co-operation. 
6.2.1.2 The preliminary reference procedure 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty548 creates a preliminary reference procedure. In terms 
of this section, a member of the Union may request the court to make a decision on a 
matter prior to a hearing at the national level. This clause enables the ECJ to first 
interpret law and then such law is implemented by the national COurt.549 The national 
courts of the EU have accepted this system of referrals, which means they have 
implicitly accepted the supremacy of the EeJ in the hierarchy of courtS.550 This is 
unlike the position of the ICJ, which is not viewed as supreme. The reason is simply 
that the ICJ is seen as operating in a different field, because very often it does not 
adjudicate on the same matters as national courts. The ECJ, however, is supreme in 
the same sphere as the national courts of the EU member states. 
Article 177 is thus the clearest demonstration of the co-operative nature of the 
relationship between the ECJ and the national courts of EU member states. ~ 
6.2.1.3 The obligation on member states to implement ECJ decisions 
In terms of article 169 of the EEC treaty, the ECJ can declare its member states to be 
in breach of their Community obligations, in which case the member state is obliged 
to comply with its obligations under article 171. 'Member state' has been interpreted 
548 Available at http://www.hri.orgidocslRome57IPart5Titlel.html#Pt5TitIChal Sec4. (Accessed 16 
March 2006). 
549 Jones 1995-1996 N. Y. u.J. Int'l L. & Pol 285 states that "the courts of the member states treat the 
preliminary rulings of the ECJ :Rursuant to art. 177 as binding on all subsequent judgments in the same 
case. The German Constitutional Court even has gone so far as to explicitly integrate ECJ art. 177 
actions into its constitutional hierarchy." 
550 Jones 1995-1996N.Y.U.J.Int'.IL & Pol 279-280. 
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, 
to cover all organs of the state, including its judicial arm.551 This clause empowers 
national courts to deal with governments that are in breach of community law. The 
national courts in the EU are themselves obliged to give effect to the EEC treaty, 
because they form the judicial arm of government. Not only are they bound by 
community law, they are also bound to ensure the implementation of community law, 
because a failure to do would so would render them in breach of article 171. 
It is interesting to note that if the ICJ statute had a similar clause, the implementation 
issue in LaGrand and Avena would have been clear. Take, for example, the comment 
by Weisburd552 that: 
" ... the United Sates as an entity was obliged to obey the ICJ order, incurring 
international responsibility if it failed to do so. It does not follow, however, 
that this international legal obligation required American courts to carry 
out the ICJ's order." [Own emphasis] 
If it were clear that all organs of the state are bound by ICJ decisions, then this 
comment would have been somewhat misplaced. Yet the relations between the ICJ 
and domestic courts are such that implementation is often seen as the responsibility of 
the executive and not the courts. The ECJ, in contrast, specifies (in art. 169 read with 
art. 171) that even the courts are subject to ECJ decisions and must enforce them p 
when called upon to do so. It can be seen from the above that the position of national ~ 
courts vis-a.-vis ECJ decisions is not left to interpretation, but it is clear from the 
literal reading of the EEC Treaty. 
6.2.1.4 National courts empowered against their recalcitrant governments 
551 See the case of Commission o/the European Communities v Kingdom o/Belgium [1970] ECR 237 
at para 13-16 where the effect of the court's decision was to say that obligations to comply with 
Community law fall on the whoJe state and not just the government (Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eulsmartapilcgilsga doc?smartapi !celexplus !prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=61969 
J0077#SM.) (Accessed on 9 July 2006). 
552 "International Courts and American Courts" (1999-2000) 21 Mich. J. Int'l L. 881 at 882. 
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Article 5 of the EEC treaty provides that the member states will take all appropriate 
measures to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under the treaty. The ECJ has 
often looked to the European national courts to ensure compliance on the part of 
legislatures where there has been failure to comply with ECJ directives.553 Thus in the 
case of Von Colson,554, the ECJ indicated that as part of their obligation under article 
5, national courts are required to interpret domestic law in a manner consistent with 
the relevant directive.555 The importance of the article 5 principle and its effect on 
national courts was elaborated upon in the case of Francovich, 556 in which the court 
allowed for damages to be awarded against a national government where an 
individual had suffered loss as a result of the non-implementation of a directive. The 
impact of this decision was to increase the powers of the national courts as against 
recalcitrant governments. Consequently, the ECJ can rely on national courts to keep 
their own governments in check on the basis of article 5. This is an important aspect 
of Community law because ordinarily domestic courts are not willing to go against 
their governments, but article 5 ensures that they do so, failing which they are in 
breach of Community law. 
The above clauses thus facilitate a community role for the member courts of the EU. 
It is also clear that the role of national courts in the EU as enforcers of community law 
is not done merely on the basis of courtesy, but is firmly entrenched in the EEC 
Treaty. So when considering the possibility of transplanting a similar system to 
1 
relations between domestic courts and the ICJ, one must be mindful of the fact that } 
553 See further De Burca "Giving Effects to European Community Directives" (1992) 55 MLR 215 at 
217. 
554 Case 14/83 Von Colson v Land N ordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 189. Available at 
http://europa.eu.intismartapilcgilsga doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=6 
1983J0014 (Accessed 16 March 2006). 
555 In casu, the court was requested to set out the rules of community law in the event of discrimination, 
more specifically the interpretation of Council directive No 70/2071EEC of the 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. The applicants requested 
whether the directive in question must be sanctioned by requiring an employer to employ the victim of 
discrimination. The case is available at http://curia.eu.intienicontentijuris/index.htm (accessed on 25 
March 2006). 
556 Case C-6& 9/90 Francovich v Italian State [1993] CMLR 66. Available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapilcgilsga doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=6 
1990J0006 (Accessed 16 March 2006). 
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national courts in the ED are empowered by legislation, not merely goodwill and 
courtesy. 
6.2.1.5 The Response of ED member courts to the ECJ 
There have been varying responses to this system by national courts. For example, the 
Belgian courts have readily accepted the supremacy of community law.557 Many of 
the ED member states treat ECJ preliminary rulings as binding.558 The French Cour de 
Cassation (court of cassation) was the first of France's three Supreme Courts to 
respond substantially to the ECJ, even in the face of threats from the French 
legislature.559 Other courts have taken an opposite approach, such as the Italian 
Constitutional Court, which has stated that community law is supreme, all the while 
retaining the power to review community acts in light of their constitution.56o 
6.2.2 Lessons from the ED legal order 
6.2.2.1 The benefits of using national courts as enforcers of supranational 
decisions 
From the above it can be seen that the founding documents of the European 
community and their interpretation by the ECJ go a long way to integrate national 
courts into the system. Maher561 states: "Court judgments can be seen as an assertion 
of a nonnative order - one that has the approval of the judges as impartial legal 
experts and one that reflects the constitutional traditions of the states." 
557 In the case of Belgium v Fromagerie Franco-Suisse "Le Ski"(1972) CMLR 372-373, the Court de 
Cassation stated: "[W]hen the conflict is one between a rule of domestic law and a rule of international 
law having direct effects within the domestic legal order, the rule established by the treaty must prevail; 
it preeminence follows form the very nature of international treaty law. This all the more so when the 
conflict is one ... between a rule of domestic law and a rule of community law." 
558 See Jones 1995-1996 NY. UJ.lnt 'I L. & Pol 285 where she shows that the Irish High Court, the 
Danish Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Courts and the Greek Courts have closely followed 
ECJ decisions whilst many of the other member states have adopted a similar degree of deference by 
their unquestioning application ofECJ preliminary rulings. 
559 See Plotner, "Report on France" in Slaughter et al (eds) The European Courts and National Courts 
- Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social Context (1998) 44-45. 
560 Maher 1994 Legal Stud 238. 
561 1994 Legal Stud 234. 
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This statement shows that national courts are in an optimum position to either work 
for the increase of international law into the domestic system or otherwise. This is 
clearly seen in LaGrand and Avena. Without all the complexities involved in the u.s. 
Supreme Court implementing the IC] decision, it is undeniable that the Supreme 
Court is the best positioned to settle the matter, not only in terms of being able to set a 
precedent that lower courts will be bound to follow, but also in terms of settling the 
matter expediently. 
Because individuals can approach the national courts to enforce EC] decisions, this 
has greatly reduced the likelihood that national governments will ignore EC] orders. It 
would thus seem that domestic enforcement of international or supranational 
decisions is one way to ensure compliance with orders. The down-side of the 
arrangement is that it will only work as long as national courts and the EC] maintain 
their co-operative arrangement. At the end of the day, the judges who sit on the 
national court level are appointed by national governments and take oaths to that 
state.562 This places a direct limit on the control that the EC] can exercise over the 
national courts. 
The central involvement of national courts in the application of community law has 
placed pressure on the member states to fulfil their community obligations. The fact 
that enforcement is brought home creates a greater atmosphere for accountability, 
which is far more effective than remote enforcement. 
6.2.2.2 The dangers of using national courts as enforcers of supranational 
decisions 
While revealing the benefits of using national courts to enforce supranational 
decisions, the European system also shows the complexities faced by national courts 
when their role is so expanded. 
562 Ibid 
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The first problem has been touched upon. The judges in national courts are appointed 
within the domestic legal order and expected to function in terms of their own 
constitutions. Maher, says, as a result of this arrangement, national judges can never 
truly be community judges.563 In the first place, judges are promoted and paid within 
the domestic realm. There is thus no real incentive for allegiance to community law. 
Secondly, they are trained within the domestic realm so their culture and traditions are 
inevitably from the domestic laws. So there may be cases where national judges are 
not familiar with community law. This has resulted in a system that has foreseeable 
weaknesses. It would not be presumptuous to say that were there no legal obligation 
on national courts to enforce the ECJ decisions, they would not be likely to do so. The 
situation is thus very much like the ICJ and domestic courts. The major difference is 
that the European domestic courts are legally bound to enforce the decisions. Yet this 
problem is not an insurmountable obstacle. Member states often send judges as 
rejerendaires564 to the ECJ, where they receive training in community law and return 
to their national states to give legal expertise.565 Additionally, European law schools 
are now stressing the importance of Community Law in undergraduate programmes, 
so that in time, most judges will graduate already having some knowledge of 
Community law.566 
A second problem with the European community arrangement is that there may be a 
blur between the roles of the legislature and the judiciary.567 Where a member state 
fails to implement a directive and is then forced to do so by a national court, it 
amounts to an intrusion by the judiciary into the legislative function. In such a case, it 
would seem that the ECJ is calling on national courts to make laws, a role that is 
confmed to the legislature in democratic societies. In essence, the problem with 
national courts taking such a central role in integration is that there is a fme line 
563 1994 legal Stud 235. 
564 These are law clerks from the ECJ, often drawn from the ranks of judges, lawyers, legal academics 
and legal administrators. See Kenney "Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts As Organizations 
By Comparing Referendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme 
Court" (2000) 33 No 5 Comparative Political Studies 593 at 595. 
565 Maher 1994 Legal Stud 235. 
566 See Goode "The European Law School" (1993) 13 Legal Stud 1 at 13-14. 
567 Maher 1994 Legal Stud at 237. 
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between application of supranational court decision and the intrusion into foreign 
policy lawmaking. The disadvantage with this is aptly summed up in the following 
words: "If the national courts are seen to be politicized, they may lose some of their 
authority and legitimacy which is predicated to such an extent by their neutrality.,,568 
One notable aspect of the European system, briefly referred to above, is the fact that 
although the Ee] decisions must be implemented by national courts, the exact remedy 
and the procedural rules followed in the implementation process are left entirely up to 
the court. The so-called margin of appreciation doctrine is applied by the court, which 
allows a state appearing before it some leeway on how to the court is to implement the 
rights within its territorial borders.569 The potentially intrusive nature of the 
arrangement is thus averted by the application of this doctrine. Gross and Ni Aolain57o 
say the margin of appreciation doctrine is a means through which the sovereignty of 
member states is balanced against the need to ensure that EU obligations are 
observed. It is a "realistic and appropriate tool through which an international court 
facilitates its dialogue concerning sensitive matter with national legal and political 
system and with their unique values and particular needs".571 
6.2.3 Concluding remarks 
Thus the European legal system has gone a long way to integrating the European 
community. The role of the national courts in this process has been significant. 
Although not a perfect system, it is a good example of how the rift between domestic 
568 Ibid. 
569 Gross & Aolain "From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 ofthe European Convention on Human Rights" 
(2001) 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 625 at 626. 
570 Ibid. 
571 Gross & Aolain 2001 Hum. Rts. Q 627. Whilst some recognise this as strength, other criticise the 
doctrine on the basis that it is too obscure. Some opinions have been held very strongly. For instance, 
Lord Lester of Heme Hill, "The concept of the margin of appreciation has become as slippery as an eel. 
Again and again the Court now !!-ppears to use the margin of appreciation as a substitute for coherent 
legal analysis of the issues at stake ... the danger of continuing to use this standard less doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation is that ... it will become the source of a pernicious 'variable geometry' of 
human rights, eroding the acquis of existing jurisprudence and giving undue deference to local 
conditions, traditions and practices.'" (See Gross & Aolain 2001) Hum. Rts. Q 627 at fu 13). 
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rules and international or supranational standards can be reconciled through the 
medium of the judiciary. The EC] has found the balance of supervising the process 
through interpretation without intruding into the domestic states. The fact that 
remedies and procedures are left up to the national courts means their sovereignty as 
state courts is not compromised, while ensuring the application of Community law 
standards. However, Maher poses a very significant question: to what extent can these 
national courts be truly European Community COurtS?572 It has been shown that their 
community role is limited - after all, they are national courts whose allegiance is 
owed to their national states since they are both paid and promoted within the national 
sphere. Consequently, whilst national courts are enforcers of community law, they 
cannot ever be community courts since their legitimacy may be questioned if they are 
too active in their roles as community courts. 
Nonetheless, the European system is an example of a community that has attempted to 
keep abreast with globalisation by creating a framework that supports integration. At 
the heart of the system are the national courts of the member states. Whether this 
system is transplantable to the IC] however is doubtful. One the one hand, the EC] is 
a supranational institution which means it has powers to make decisions that directly 
affect both individuals and states. On the other hand, it is an institution whose 
decisions are binding on national courts in tenus of Community Law. No such 
support structure and authority exist for the IC] since there is no system of stare 
decisis and decisions are binding only on the parties before the IC]. In spite of these i 
significant differences, it is interesting to note that the very weaknesses of the 
European legal system are also raised as reasons why domestic courts cannot enforce 
IC] decisions. This is significant, because it shows that so-called barriers to national 
court enforcement of IC] decisions are not in fact barriers in the true sense of the 
word, but challenges. Accordingly, it is well worth considering the use of national 
courts as enforcers of IC] decision because the EU system, with all its weaknesses, 
has brought judicial co-operation and increased compliance to community law. The 
fact that the EU national courts are faced with the same challenges as any national 
court would, if it sought to enforce an IC] decision, shows that the two systems are 
not worlds afar from each other in likeness. 
572 Maher 1994 Legal Stud 243. 
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It has been suggested that the European system cannot be seen as a model because it 
is network of countries on their way to becoming a federation. 573 Whatever one's 
opinion might be on this issue, the point still remains that countries that were once 
enemies are today part of the same system. This says something about the role that 
national courts can play in bring integration were once there were differences. The 
question inline is whether such a system is adaptable in other places around the world. 
Unlike, the EU national courts, the rest of the world's national courts are not 
empowered by legislation to enforce Ie] decisions. Thus it begs the question: on what 
grounds can courts implement international decisions to bring about greater co-
operation? This will be the subject ofthe next section. 
6.3 JUDICIAL COMITY 
The previous section highlighted two aspects about the EU legal order that are of 
significance to this thesis and add to the argument for a greater involvement of 
national courts in the enforcement of Ie] decisions. Firstly, it was shown that the 
main enforcers of Ee] decision are national courts, who are empowered to do so in 
terms of community legislation. Secondly, it was shown that the EU set-up, while 
different to the set-up between the Ie] and national courts, is not worlds apart. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the argument often raised against national court 
enforcement of Ie] decisions, such as the issue of separation of powers, forms the 
present weaknesses of the EU legal order. In theory therefore, the EU system should 
be adaptable to suit the Ie]-national court relations. In practice however, this is not so 
simple, because the European national courts are empowered by legislation while 
other national courts generally do not act in terms of such authority. A revision of the 
Ie] Statute is highly unlikely, so alternative means will have to be sought to justifY 
the implementation of Ie] decision by national courts. 
One such alternative is the doctrine of comity. This doctrine has elicited much 
discussion in academic ci~cles for many years and more so recently.574 The baseline 
573 Slaughter "Judicial Globalization" (1999-2000) 40 Va. J. Int'/ L. 1103 at 1107. 
574 See for example Ramsey "Escaping International Comity" (1997-1998) 83 Iowa L.Rev 893, 
Slaughter 1999-2000 Va. J. Int'/ L. 1103, Lien "The Co-operative and Integrative Judicial Models of 
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argument is that if it is accepted that IC] decision have no binding effect on domestic 
proceedings, the IC] decisions should still be afforded persuasive deference, at least 
on the basis of comity. The purpose of this section is to discuss the concept of comity 
and the likelihood of it being the ground upon which domestic courts can be 
compelled to enforce international decisions. 
6.3.1 Defining Comity 
Comity is an issue that has undergone much analysis in the last decade. The exact 
content of this term is uncertain, but it can at best be described as a value that entails 
sovereign nations respecting each other for the sake of convenience and courtesy. 575 
The term appears in judicial discourse where a party seeks the protection of a foreign 
judicial decision or the party contends that foreign law should apply in a particular 
case.576 Comity thus applies in a variety of situations, such as decisions on whether 
domestic, foreign, or international norms should prevail, the procedures of proving 
foreign law, the enforceability of foreign judgments and a decision whether to stay 
domestic proceedings pending the outcome of an international or foreign court 
decision.577 
What is striking about comity is that although there is lack of consensus on its 
meaning, its use is widespread. When embarking on a study of the doctrine, it is 
immediately evident that there are as many definitions of comity as there are writings ~ 
on the subject. It is therefore impossible to discuss all definitions of comity, but this , 
section will be confined to those that raise certain problems with the doctrine or shed 
light on the research question. In the case of Hilton v Guyot578 the United States 
Supreme Court stated that comity is "neither a matter of absolute obligation on the 
one hand nor of mere courtesy and goodwill upon the other". This definition is both 
International Judicial Comity: Two Illustrations using Transnational Discovery and Breard Scenarios" 
(2000-2001) 50 Cathoic. [CORRECT?] U. L. Rev 593, Paul "Comity in International Law" (1992) 32 
Harv.Int'/ LJ 1, Waller "The Twilight of Comity" (1999-2000) 38 Colum. J. Transnat'/ L 563. 
575 Paul 1992 32 Harv.Int'/ L. J. 3. 
576 Ramsey 1997-1998 Iowa L .1J.ev 893. 
577 Lien 2000-2001 Cathoic. U. L. Rev 598. 
578 159 US 113 at 163-164. 
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vague and confusing, and shows why comity has met much resistance in legal circles. 
On the one hand, the doctrine is not of a legal nature in the sense that there is no 
absolute compulsion on the court to apply a decision on the basis of comity. The 
question that follows is how, then, does one enforce the doctrine? It is not a legal 
doctrine in the sense that separation of powers is, and as such failure to implement 
comity cannot be sanctioned by law. Yet at the same time, it is not purely a moral rule 
in the sense that the law may not sanction a failure to implement comity. This is 
obviously confusing, and all that is certain is that comity falls somewhere between the 
measure of morality and law.579 
A more recent and detailed understanding of comity tries to delineate between comity 
in a legal sense and comity in a general sense. According to Ezer and Bendor,580 
comity can be understood as the expression of a foreign policy commitment, or it can 
be understood in the legal sense. An example of the former is when a court is induced 
to apply or enforce a foreign decision for the sake of promoting good relations, 
outside of any treaty obligation to do so. Comity in this sense is seen as exclusively 
politica1.581 On the other hand, comity in the legal sense is when a court applies a 
foreign decision on the basis of some treaty obligation.582 In this sense, comity is a 
legal consideration, making it a binding commitment. In essence, the writers say that 
comity can only be considered a legal doctrine when it is being applied pursuant to a 
treaty obligation. This then entitles a party to a consideration of its interest where such 
interest is disregarded. For example, the writers would say that United States courts 
should give effect to the IC] decisions in LaGrand and Avena on the basis of comity 
because comity in this sense is simply an expression of their commitment as 
signatories of the VCCR. This form of comity is thus not merely a political 
expression, but a legal one. 
579 See Paul 1992 32 Harv.Int'/ L J 48. 
580"The Constitution and Conflict of Laws Treaties: Upgrading the International Comity" (2003-2004) 
29 N C.J.Int'[ L & Com. Reg, 42. In this work, the learned writers contend that a treaty is the optimal 
expression of comity since it contains explicit legal commitments of one nation to another. As such, 
comity in treaty law has an upgraded function. 
581 Ibid 
582 Ibid 
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In effect, the writers are distinguishing between comity in a general sense and comity 
when applied pursuant to a treaty or some other legally binding obligation. They 
contend that it is only the latter form of comity that is enforceable in the sense that a 
country is legally entitled to a particular consideration. The main problem with this 
understanding of comity is that it is redundant. If comity is understood as an act of 
courtesy, then its being based on a legal obligation no longer renders it an act of 
courtesy. The public do not follow traffic laws as a matter of courtesy; they do so out 
of obligation. Likewise, a domestic court is obliged to enforce a foreign judgment if 
such enforcement is mandated by a treaty or other legally binding document not out of 
courtesy, but out of obligation. So the idea of comity based on a binding legal 
obligation makes no sense and yet again, there remains uncertainty about the 
boundaries of comity. 
Slaughter583 builds on the basic definition of comity by describing its fundamental 
premise. She states that at the foundation of comity is the "appreciation of 
assignments and global allocation of judicial responsibility, sharpened by the 
realization that the performance of one court's function increasingly requires 
cooperation with others ... [IJt does not import subordination or even the more subtle 
constraints of ritual deference. ,,584 Slaughter's definition is a more grounded way of 
understanding comity, in that it is seen as a value whose foundation rests in the need 
for judicial co-operation. This is important, since the increasing connectivity of the 
l 
world will increase the likelihood of laws conflicting. So, the first helpful aspect of } 
Slaughter's definition is that we see that the purpose behind the doctrine shows us 
why it must be given a place in international law. A second enlightening point of 
Slaughter's definition is that she tackles the immediate discomfort that the doctrine 
raises. The mere mention of deference imports ideas of two bodies on an unequal 
footing, and the lower of the two submitting to the higher in the name of comity. 
Slaughter deals with this by asserting from the outset that comity is not about 
subordination.585 This finding is implicit in the understanding that comity is respect 
for sovereigns qua sovereigns, which tends to suggest two sovereigns on an equal 
583 1998 Am. J. Int'/ L 711. 
584 Ibid 
585 See fn 597. 
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footing and not one higher than the other. In addition to this it shows that comity does 
not always mandate deference for the sake of an easy way out. Rather, it is 
recognition that courts across the world are entitled to their fair share of disputes as 
co-equals in the global task of jUdging. 586 So understanding the heart of comity sheds 
more light on the concept than theorising around the idea. 
Lien587 accepts comity as the informal and voluntary recognition that the courts of one 
nation accord to the judicial decisions of another. This definition best expresses what 
can be termed judicial comity. Judicial comity is seen as the deference of one court to 
another foreign court qua court for a myriad of reasons, one of which is the 
recognition of "a kind of legal globalisation" both influencing and influenced by 
economic globalisation. Slaughter588 describes this as a global community of law, 
established not by the world court, but by national courts working together around the 
world. This definition shows what is more clearly the idea of comity as judicial 
courtesy. Such courtesy is not of a legal nature and is therefore unenforceable. It rests 
solely on the goodwill of the parties involved. 
In considering these various defmitions it is clear that there is no agreement on the 
exact content and boundaries of the comity doctrine. While the baseline understanding 
is the same, the concept is so fluid that it allows much room for a personal 
interpretation. The fact that authors appear to extend the concept without boundary is 
evidence of this. The idea of comity can at best be understood as a value. None of the 
defmitions considered above give the doctrine any form of legal force, excluding that 
of Ezer and Bendor, which in itself does not appear to make sense. It is obvious that 
whilst values may inform the laws, the law is not equal to the values. Decisions are 
made not on the basis of values, but laws. It is this fluid understanding of comity that 
has given rise to much critique of the doctrine.589 There are even different applications 
586 Slaughter 1998 Am. J. Int'/ L. 709. 
587 Lien 2000-2001 Cathoic. U. L. Rev 593. 
588 1999-2000 Va. J. Int'l L 111,9-. 
589 Indeed this doctrine is so flexible that Lien points out that the use of word 'doctrine' is inapposite 
since it connotes something fixed or grounded. Thus she suggests that comity can more accurately be 
referred to as a value (Lien 2000-2001 Cathoic. U. L. Rev 599). 
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of comity; such as legislative comity,590 but this work is confined to the boundaries of 
judicial comity. At the end of the discussion, we are not much better off than the 
beginning. The merits of comity can be appreciated, but without the requisite 
boundaries, what began as a good value may well turn into something undesirable. So 
while it is clear that comity can lubricate relations between the IC] and national 
courts, it is not clear where the boundaries of the doctrine lie. Such boundaries are 
essential to the maintenance of the rule of law; the idea being that judges should act 
within the boundaries of the law. The problem with comity is that there exists a 
danger that judicial intuition or gut feel (albeit with good intentions) will replace 
sound judgments based on existing and recognised legal principles. Without an 
understanding of the boundaries of comity, we cannot distinguish between an abuse of 
the concept and its legitimate use. Can this concept nonetheless be the grounds upon 
which US courts should consider IC] decisions binding? This question is dealt with in 
the next section. 
6.3.2 The Case for Comity 
The comity doctrine has often been discussed in the context of the horizontal 
relationship between courts interacting across borders. Lien591 suggests two models of 
comity that promote judicial co-operation; co-operative comity and integrative 
comity. Both models are designed to shape responses to international law conflict. 
The co-operative judicial model applies on a horizontal level when domestic courts 
face conflicts with foreign courts or tribunals. The integrative model, however, 
applies between courts on a hierarchical level; that is, national courts and international 
or supranational courts and tribunals. 
This model is enlightening, because it makes a distinction between judicial relations 
between foreign courts (which often occurs in the context of private international 
level and therefore involves very little political repercussion) and judicial relations 
between the national courts and international or supranational courts (which often has 
590 See the case of Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993), where legislative or 
'prescriptive' comity was described as the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the 
reach of their laws. 
591 2000-2001 Cathoic. U. L. Rev 594. 
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gross political implications). It is easier to see how comity can work on a horizontal 
level; that is, as between two foreign courts. This is the classic case of the private 
litigant who wins a case in a foreign court, then returns to have the order enforced or 
recognised in the court of another state. It is also where two foreign courts 
simultaneously have jurisdiction over a matter arising out of the same cause of action. 
Comity is required in such situations because there are no legal rules dictating that the 
matter should be heard in anyone court. Were the second court to recognise the 
judgment of the first, this would be purely as a matter of courtesy and not as a matter 
oflaw per se. 
Comity on the hierarchical level, however, is a lot more difficult to envisage. A 
hierarchical system by definition suggests that there is an inbuilt system of authority 
that binds the lower court to the decision of the higher. This description is an 
acceptable description of the relationship between national courts and supranational 
adjudicative bodies. Thus the relationship between a state court and the inter-
American Court of Human rights, or the court in a member state of the European 
Union and its relationship between the European Court of Justice are such examples. 
But a closer look at the relationship between the ICJ and domestic courts shows 
otherwise. To assert that the ICJ is an authoritative body over domestic courts would 
not be entirely accurate. This research is premised on international law and national 
law being supreme within their own jurisdictions. Thus the ICJ is an authoritative 
body in its own sphere. This means it has authority over international law related 
matters and further it only has authority on the basis of consent. But even then, it 
cannot dictate domestic law matters to its member states. It is here that judicial comity 
plays its role. Using the Breard scenario as an example; it was argued that the courts 
did not have an absolute legal obligation to adhere to the ICJ provisional measures 
order since it was not established that such orders were binding.592 It is argued that 
even in the absence of an express rule showing the binding nature of provisional 
measures, the United States courts should have obeyed the ICJ order as a matter of 
comity or respect. 593 The case was thus a perfect demonstration of the need for comity 
592 This is the effect of Slaughter's argument in her commentary on Breard (1998 Am. J. In! '/ L. 711). 
593 Ibid 
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in judicial relations. After the ICJ's fmal order indicating the binding nature of 
provisional measures orders, the issue was no longer one of courtesy, but one oflaw. 
So it would seem that comity is not just useful, but necessary, to enable the smooth 
flow of judicial interactions across the globe. One of the effects of globalisation is to 
increase interaction of individuals across the world and with this. conflict of laws is 
bound to increase in importance. It is thus essential that courts have some system to 
detennine which courts will have jurisdiction. In respect of public international law 
matters, even in this sphere there must be room for comity. The problem of 
provisional measures orders as revealed in Breard and LaGrand provides a good 
example of why this is important. 
6.3.3 The Case against Comity 
Comity has been criticised as a value because its malleable character has often led 
people to resolve that courts resort to this value as a tactic to avoid explaining their 
reasoning in court decisions. It is for this reason that Ramsey advocates the 
abandonment of this doctrine,594 stating that its vagueness often results in obscure 
legal analysis. Standing alongside him is Joel Pau1595 who believes comity to be an 
"unworkable standard that is neither mandated by international law nor justified on 
the basis of reciprocity, utility, courtesy or morality". 596 The former view seems more 
readily acceptable than the latter. It is undeniable that the formal content of the comity 
doctrine is very vague and there is no one fixed understanding of it. This does indeed 
make its application very anomalous, since it is subject to abuse by judges who may 
seek to use it as an escape hatch. The utility and courtesy of the doctrine, on the other 
hand, seems very clear. It is this very factor that underpins the doctrine: the idea that 
courts can respect each other qua courts. In this sense, the preferred position would be 
that of Slaughter, who supports judicial comity on the basis that it is the respect owed 
to the laws and acts of other nations by virtue of common membership in the 
594 Ramsey 1997-1998 Iowa L. Fev. 
595 Paul 1992 Harv. Int'/ L. J. 
596 See generally Paul (ibid). 
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international system - a presumption of recognition that IS something more than 
courtesy, but less than obligation.597 
The utility of comity is thus accepted, but there are instances when its use should be 
limited. In the types of cases mentioned above, where there is dual jurisdiction or no 
legally binding rule upon which a decision can be enforced (like the provisional 
measures order pre-LaGrand), comity is not just useful but a necessity. However, 
such instances can be distinguished from the current problem facing the US Courts 
post-Avena. In many of the works in which the implementation of the IC] decision in 
LaGrand and Avena is discussed, many authors begin by setting out the legal grounds 
upon which they believe US Courts should implement the decision. Invariably, the 
idea of comity emerges, although the word 'comity' is not explicitly used.598 Thus 
arguments are put forward whose content is embodied in the doctrine of comity. In 
essence, comity is being advocated as one ground upon which US domestic courts 
should implement the IC] decision. The problem is that the nature of this case is 
distinctly different from the cases described above. 
As a starting point, it has been shown that comity is usually applied where there is 
concurrent jurisdiction and one court must defer to the other as a matter of courtesy to 
avoid litigating twice on the same issue. This is not uncommon in cases involving two 
foreign courts. It is, however, rare in cases involving domestic courts and 
1 
international or supranational courts. This is for the simple reason that the issues } 
before the IC] are usually very different from the issues raised in domestic courts, 
even if they arise out of the same facts. Thus the context is different, which renders 
the application of the comity doctrine different. According to Bradley, another 
problem raised by comity being applied to the situation post-LaGrand is that it often 
597 Slaughter "A Global Community of courts" (2003) 44 Harv. Int'l L.J. 205. 
598 See for instance Quigley 2002 Yale. J. Int'! L. 440 who suggests that the U.S. courts implement the 
IC] decision based on reciprocity, and Schiffman "Breard and Beyond: The Status Of Consular 
Notification And Access Under The Vienna Convention" (2000) 8 Cardozo J. Int'! & Camp. L. 27 at 
58, who suggests that U.S. cotrr!s should afford international tribunals 'respectful consideration' in the 
name ofharrnony, and White "A New Remedy Stresses The Need For International Education: The 
Impact of The LaGrand Case On Domestic Courts Violation Of Foreign National's Consular Relations 
Rights Under The Vienna Convention" (2003) 2 Wash. U Global Stud. L. Rev. 295 at 310, where 
reciprocity weighs heavily in his argument for implementation ofthe IC] decision. 
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works in civil; not in criminal, cases.599 He states that a French contract decision may 
be enforced in a New York court, but generally comity is not given to penal or 
criminal decisions of other states.600 
Apart from the fact that the circumstances post-Avena do not suit an application of 
comity, there is the problem of the undefined nature of the concept. It has already 
been shown that there are various definitions of comity. Although case law has set out 
the basic concept, this basic defmition has been built upon. The main problem with 
this is that it defies the element of certainty and predictability that the law should 
have. It cannot be accepted that US courts should defer to the IC] on the basis of such 
a vague concept. Such a move would set a dangerous precedent that would replace 
rulings based on well established legal principles with rulings based on intuition. 
A further problem with the doctrine of comity is that it simply does not have enough 
force as law. A legal principle is one for which there is a sanction for failure to 
observe the rule. A value, on the other hand, is sanctioned by the omission of the good 
thing that could have been gained. In this way, comity seems to be a value because 
there is no sanction for failure to consider comity, apart from the fact that one may 
miss out on the privileges of comity, such as good international relations. Thus, 
comity appears to be more of a value than a law. Domestic courts cannot be bound to 
implement IC] decisions on the basis of morals. No doubt morals and values inform 
most of our law, but these values are only considered by courts insofar as they are 
given legal expression. Bearing this in mind, comity cannot be accepted as a good 
medium through which individual rights can be vindicated. 
Finally, and probably the most convincing reason why domestic courts cannot be 
obliged to enforce the decision in Avena and LaGrand: there simply is not enough 
legal authority on the subject. Whilst the law must be developed, it cannot be 
developed in a vacuum. It must be set up against the backdrop of existing laws. In this 
area, there is not enough case law to corroborate a case for comity. This point is raised 
599 Bradley, Fisler-Damrosch, &'Flaherty "Medellin v Dretke: Federalism and International Law" 
(2004-2005) 43 Colum. J. Transnat L. 667 at 683. 
600 Ibid 
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by Weisburd in his criticism of Slaughter's argument for comity.601 He points out that 
Slaughter makes reference to only three cases in her argument for comity, which 
according to Weisburd are distinguishable from the facts in Breard or LaGrand and 
Avena. 602 
6.3.4 Final Remarks on Comity 
Comity is thus not a straightforward issue, but is nonetheless important because it 
would seem that the world is moving from a place of independence and sovereignty to 
a place of interdependence and comity. This move has implications for the attitudes of 
local judges and courts towards the international court. In an age where commerce 
and technology have connected the world, it is not surprising the there is increased 
adjudication across the borders and it can be expected that in the future there will be 
more conflict between domestic law and international law. Consequently, there is 
great merit in the argument of those like Slaughter, since there must be some 
recognition given to the wider judicial fraternity. Yet, while recognising the 
importance and the place of comity in a globalised society, one does not want to 
throw caution to the wind. Courts are places for the interpretation and application of 
law, and not merely values. Thus decisions must be made on the basis of existing 
legal laws and not intuition or gut-feeling. There is too little authority on the subject 
of comity to mandate an application of the doctrine. Without such authority to guide ~ 
and limit the scope of the doctrine there is danger of abuse. In view of the above, ~ 
comity is too vague a concept to be the only basis upon which domestic courts should 
implement IC] decisions. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the European Union has achieved relative success in 
integrating the community using the vehicle of the national courts as the enforcers of 
the EC] decisions. The chapter has also looked at the possibility of advancing this to 
601 Weisburd 1999-2000 Mich. j Int'/ L. 924-925. 
602 Weisburd (ibid) suggests that the three cases quoted by Slaughter involved a court's determination 
that the interest of the parries could be protected substantially as well in a foreign as in a local court; 
whereas in the Breard, the case involved public and not private interests. 
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other courts in the world, through the doctrine of judicial comity. It has been said that 
such advancement, although desirable, is hampered in practice by problems of 
politics, such as separation of powers and national interests. The EU legal system has 
circumvented these problems to an extent, by incorporating the role of national courts 
in their community legislation and creating binding obligations to implement 
decisions of the Eel. No such structure exists between domestic courts and the Iel. 
Further, it is not likely that the Iel Statute will be amended to allow such powers. 
In the absence of a binding legal basis upon which domestic courts could implement 
Iel decisions, the chapter considered the possibility of comity as grounds for active 
enforcement by domestic courts. It was argued that although the utility of the doctrine 
is undeniable, its application is precarious because of its undefined content and 
imprecision. However, a balance was advocated in terms of comity being used in 
appropriate cases, even where public law interests are at stake, such as was the case in 
the provisional measures order pre-LaGrand or in cases of concurrent jurisdiction. 
There is enough legal authority to warrant such a position. However, to extend the 
application of the doctrine to situations such as the current situation that US courts 
find themselves in would be complex. There is simply not enough legal evidence to 
back up such a position. 
In conclusion, the EU system has succeeded because of deliberate measures placed in ~ 
\ 
its founding documents that enable judicial co-operation: integration has not come by ~ 
mere courtesy. Needless to say, judicial co-operation in the rest of the world will not 
come by courtesy alone. The application or enforcement of a foreign or international 
judgment reflects a country's willingness to cede its sovereignty in favour of judicial 
courtesy. It is unlikely that comity will ever become widely accepted. In practice, 
national interest occupies a major part in the decision making of governments, of 
which the jUdiciary is but one arm. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The heart of this thesis is about changing worldviews in modern international law. 
These changes have been both the impetus and the result of globalisation. On the one 
hand, basic principles of international law are being revised in response to 
globalisation,603 whilst at the same time, the world is becoming more globalised as 
international law moves from a place of independence to interdependence. The impact 
of globalisation on international law is too vast a topic to be tackled in one thesis, so 
the research was narrowed down to the issue of enforcement of international decisions 
by national courts, more specifically, enforcement ofIC] decisions by national courts. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis thus showed changing perceptions of foundational theories 
such as sovereignty, nationalism, monism and dualism. The chapter showed that 
overall, there is a move from independence and sovereignty to inter-dependence and 
accountability. This is clearly exemplified by the intolerance in contemporary 
academia of principles or decisions that are aimed at isolating the state from 
international influence in the name of sovereignty.604 Even the idea of sovereignty 
603 See Chapter 2 for examples. 
604 See discussion on sovereignty in Chapter 2. 
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itself has metamorphosised from its original Westphalian sense into a more liberal 
notion. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the thesis show how this transformation process has begun 
in the international court. The chapters show how the Court is empowered and acts in 
terms of very strict terms, yet in spite of this it took a bold decision in LaGrancf°5 and 
ruled in a matter that implicated domestic legal proceedings; a highly controversial 
and unusual move. Underpinning the court's decision was a recognition of the need 
for accountability in treaty relations and the fact that even national courts are subjects 
of international law. 
Chapters 5 and 6 then continued in the same vein by considering the possibility of 
national courts being active enforcers of IC] decisions. The Brearcf°6, LaGrancf°7 
and Avena608 cases were again used to give the research some practical import. 
Chapter 5 thus analysed the response of the US courts to the IC] decisions. It emerged 
from this analysis that there are certain democratic structures that act as barriers to the 
enforcement of IC] decisions by national courts. It was said that these hurdles should 
in some instances be seen as challenges at best, because they are not insurmountable. 
Chapter 6 then looked at the EU model as a model for enforcement and the concept of 
judicial comity as a ground upon which it can be argued that national courts should 
enforce international decisions. It was said that although the EU model is similar to 
l 
the relationship between the IC] and national courts, the few differences that do exist ~ 
are crucial. Enforcement through the agency of national courts is therefore unlikely to 
occur with the same pattern of certainty, since such enforcement is not entrenched in 
the founding provisions of the IC] statute. Neither is it likely that change can be 
605 [1999] IeJ Reports 9 (3 March). Accessed at http://www.icj-
ciLorglicjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
606 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States) 
(judgment of 10 November 1998). Accessed at http://www.icj-
cij.orglicjwww/idocketlipaus/ipausframe.htm on 29 January 2006. 
607 Supra. 
608 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) judgment of 31 March 
2004). Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketlimus/imusframe.htm on 27 January 2006. 
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initiated through the concept of judicial comity, which is too vague a term to rely on 
at this stage of international law development. 
In this closing chapter, I will extract the main threads of argument from the previous 
chapters as a build-up to the essential questions: why are national courts the answer to 
improved implementation of international decisions, and how can this be achieved? In 
answering this question I will consider how U.S. domestic courts can resolve the 
tensions that they are faced with post-Avena. 
7.2 CONCLUSIONS ON THE POSITION OF U.S. LAW AFTER 
LA GRAND AND AVENA 
The IC] decisions in LaGrand and Avena are binding on the U.S. firstly because the 
U.S. has consented to the jurisdiction of the IC] by being a signatory to the Optional 
Protocol. 609 Secondly, it has an obligation to enforce the obligations under the VCCR 
as a signatory to the treaty. 
The act of submitting to the IC] jurisdiction in itself holds certain foreseeable 
consequences. Firstly, there is the risk of leaving the nation's future in the hands of 
foreign judges and secondly, the risk of facing an adverse order. In spite of all these 
risks, the U.S. consented to the Court's jurisdiction. In essence they were committing 
to be bound by whatever decision the court would make in the matter. The U.S. 
placed no limitations or qualifications to its consent to judgment. The obligations 
referred to above are not obligations incurred under compulsion, but voluntarily. The 
VCCR is a treaty that was adopted under article 11 of the United Sates Constitution, 
by Congress itself.61o Furthermore, such adoption was a unanimous decision of 
Congress.611 The question is, what did the United States consent to? It can be 
generally accepted that the U.S. consented to observe all the terms of the Treaty and 
609 See LaGrandjudgment of27 June 2001 at para 15. 
610 Tiefenbrun "The Role of the, World Court in Settling International Disputes: A Recent Assessment" 
(1997-1998) 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Camp. L.J25. 
611 Bradley & Damrosch "Discussion: Medellin v Dretke:Federalism and International law" (2004-
2005) 43 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 667 at 675. 
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ensure that all obligations as contained in the Treaty would be observed. No state can 
possibly envisage every consequence that would arise from assenting to a particular 
treaty. It is understandable that the ICl's fmding that Article 36(1) of the VCCR had 
the character of an individual right might have been a surprise to the u.s. The 
preamble to the VCCR provides that the state parties to the Convention realise that the 
purpose of the convention is not to benefit individuals, but to ensure efficient 
performance of functions by consular postS.612 This tends to suggest that the VCCR 
does not in fact confer individual rights. Despite this, the IC]' s interpretation of the 
Treaty is binding on the United States. This is a risk inherent in adjudication as a 
mechanism for dispute resolution. 
Whether one accepts the decisions of the IC] as correct or not, it this clear that they 
are binding on the U.S. The only question open to the U.S. is one how to implement 
them. 
7.2.1 The ICJ decisions in LaGrand and Avena should be implemented by U.S. 
Courts 
In addition to the IC] rulings being binding on the United Sates generally, it was 
shown that its implementation is best left to the U.S. courts for reasons already 
enumerated in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The main point is to reiterate that this finding 
is in no way unconstitutional or contrary to any U.S. state law. 
As a starting point, the nature of the VCCR is such that it is self-executing, this being 
a decision of the U.S. itself and not any external international body. Consequently, 
there is no need for empowering legislation before the Treaty becomes directly 
enforceable by national courts. National courts can thus apply the Treaty without any 
prior consent from Congress. Several objections are raised in this respect. Firstly, 
Bradley613 draws a distinction between the international decision and its 
implementation. He says just because the IC] ruled that the U.S. has to review and 
612 Accessed at http://untreaty.uTI.orglilc/texts/instrumentslenglishlconventions/9 2 1963.pdf on 6 
November 2006. 
613Bradley & Damrosch 2004-2005 Colum. J. Transnat'/ L. 677. 
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reconsider sentences and convictions, this does not indicate which body should deal 
with it.614 In other words, there was no specific direction to the courts themselves. 
This is quite correct. The court did not directly address the U.S. national courts in 
LaGrand, but in Avena, it clearly stated that it national courts were best suited to deal 
with the case. 615 Implicit in this was an effort to clarify which branch of the US 
government should have been tasked with the duty in LaGrand. 
Bradley616 also argues that while it is accepted that the Treaty creates binding 
obligations on the United States, this does not mean in the circumstances that the IC] 
decision is binding on the U.S. courts. He argues that if one were to assert that the 
U.S. courts are bound to apply the IC] decision, it is on the basis of the Treaty and not 
the court's decision.617 The problem with this point is that it is redundant. No 
distinction can be drawn in this instance between the Treaty and its interpretation.618 
Thus Darnrosch619 argues that the IC] decision partakes of the same legal character as 
the Treaty itself because it is the authoritative interpretation of the Treaty. 
The next problem is the constitutionality of national courts enforcing the IC] decision. 
Quite simply, it would not be unconstitutional. Courts would not be meddling in 
matters in the realm of the executive, because although the case has political 
implications, it is really a legal issue in every sense. It has been said that to suggest 
that national courts are bound to follow, the IC] decision is leaving the fate of the 9 
\ 
criminal justice system in the hands of foreign judges. Although there is some merit to ~ 
this concern, in the circumstances it is inflated.62o While it is agreed that it is not the 
place of the IC] to dictate domestic criminal policy, it must be pointed out that the IC] 
614 Bradley & Damrosch (2004-2005) Colurn. J Transnat'l L. 678. 
615 Avenajudgment of at para 141. 
616 Bradley & Damrosch (2004-2005) Colurn. J Transnat'l L. 681. 
617 Ibid 
618 Bradley & Damrosch (2004-?005) Colurn. J Transnat'l L. 686 
619 Ibid 
620 Bradley & Damrosch (2004-2005) Colurn. J Transnat'/ L. 623. 
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was cognizant of this fact. 621 It is for this reason that the means of implementation 
was left to the U.S. As a result, the matter and the fate of the justice system is left to 
U.S. officials and not foreign judges. 
In sum, the U.S. failed to apply a standard set internally. At the heart of LaGrand was 
an appeal to take account of Consular Relations Convention violations in cases where 
detainees were sentenced to severe penalties.622 There are technical issues that are 
very difficult to take into account when considering the place of international law in 
domestic law. As a result it is quite acceptable that before a nation will implement an 
international decision, it must first be authorised by municipal legislation. It must 
equally be acceptable that where a treaty is deemed self-executing, the intention is to 
create an exception to this general rule. 
Final remarks 
As international law developed and the effects of globalisation became more 
widespread, it became apparent that international legal principles could no longer be 
shelved by states. As a result, many states now make provision for international law in 
their constitutions in order to contextualise the international rights in the domestic 
law.623 The supremacy clause624 in the U.S. Constitution is similar in this respect in 
that it sets out the place of treaty law and the parameters of its application within the 
federation. Thus if ever there is a dispute as to the effect of a treaty within domestic 
law, the supremacy clause shows how much attention must be paid to that Treaty. ~ 
Article 6 was clearly interpreted in the case of Ware v Hilton.625 This measure is not 
621 LaGrandjudgment of27 June 2001 at para 125. 
622 Aceves "International Decisions: LaGrand Case" (2002 ) 96 Am. J Int '[ L at 218. 
623 South Africa is a prime example of this in that it clearly defmes the role and place of international 
law within the Republic. Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides 
that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal, or forum must consider international law. 
624 Article 6, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 
625 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 199 (1796) ~t 236-237. "A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is, of all 
the United Sates if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its way ... 1t is the declared will of the 
people of the United Sates, that every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be 
superior to the Constitution and Laws of any individual state, and that their will alone is to decide." 
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one that came into the United States as a result of external pressure; it is a standard set 
by Congress itself and not some international body. 
I thus conclude that the decision ofthe IC] in Avena is binding on the U.S. and further 
it must be implemented not by Congress or the Executive, but by the judiciary at a 
federal level, since they are empowered in terms of US domestic law to do so. It has 
already been said that although there is no express international law that mandates 
that national courts should enforce IC] decisions, the scenario presented for the U.S. 
by the facts in LaGrand and Avena show that there may be room for this role 
nonetheless, without the need to revise the IC] statute or the UN Charter. 
7.3 NATIONAL COURTS AS DIRECT ENFORCERS OF ICJ DECISIONS 
Traditionally, national courts have been the vehicle through which international 
treaties and customary international law which have not been independently 
incorporated into domestic statutes enter the domestic system.626 International judicial 
decisions have often been used as evidence of the content of customary international 
law and at times even - used as authoritative interpretations of international 
agreements.627 Very rarely in such cases is the authority of the international decision 
questioned.628 Thus international decisions hold great power and the influence of 
these international judicial bodies have infiltrated the domestic legal systems without 
complete control by the executive. This has been the state of affairs for at least 200 
years.629 
However, there has been a shift in the international milieu. More individuals are 
coming before domestic courts seeking to assert their internationally recognised 
626 Slaughter 'Judicial Globalisation' (1999-2000) 40 Va. J.Int'/ L 1103. 
627 Paust ('Domestic Influence ofInternational Court of Justice Decisions' (1997-1998) 26 Denv. J.Int'{ 
L. & Pol y. 792) shows that since the creation of the International Court, 42 cases in federal courts in 
the United States have applied 15 ICJ decisions or advisory opinions as evidence of international 
normative content. 
628 Paust 1997-1998 Denv. J.Int'/ L. & Poly 798. 
629 Ibid 
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rights. Even more so, some individuals are asserting rights on the basis of 
international decisions, as was the case in the trilogy of cases that are the subject of 
this paper. Thus it is no longer correct to say that private plaintiffs have no 
relationship to Ie] cases. With the increase of judicial bodies and tribunals in 
international law, there should be greater room for reciprocation between courts, more 
specifically domestic courts and supranational courts, but also between domestic 
courts and international courts. 
7.3.1 Why national courts? 
After the Nicaragua630 case III 1986, it became apparent that the enforcement 
procedures available to the Ie] are weak in comparison to those available at a 
municipal level. LaGrand has brought this issue into the limelight once again, after 
the U.S. failed to comply with the Ie] provisional measures order. National courts as 
enforcers of Ie] decisions is thus a topical issue because it is clear that there is a gap 
in this respect, and it is clear that this gap may be narrowed by the use of national 
courts as enforcers. 
National courts would be a useful mechanism for improving the enforcement of Ie] 
decisions for a number of reasons. Firstly, an effective system of international 
adjudication ultimately depends on the degree of co-operation shown by organs with a 
more immediate control over assets of the parties.631 In this respect national courts are 
evidently in a better position than the Ie] itself. The Ie] does not have a mechanism 
to seize the assets of a noncompliant state, or the authority to direct that it hand its 
assets over to a judgment creditor.632 Domestic courts, however, have this authority 
and power. 
630 In this case, the United States openly refused to respect the judgment of the ICJ. See judgment of 27 
June 1986 (accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inusfi"ame.htm on 15 September 
2006). For further discussion of the case see C Schulte Compliance with Decisions of the International 
Court of Justice (2004) 184. 
63 
1 Shreuer "The implementation of International Judicial decision by Domestic Courts" (1975) 24 1. 
C.L.Q 153 at 159. 
632 O'Connell "The Prospects of Enforcing Monetary judgments of the International Court of Justice: A 
study of Nicaragua's judgment against the United States (1989-1990)" 30 Va. J. Int'l.L. 901-902. 
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Secondly, national courts in conjunction with litigants can assume a role of policing 
national political branches if allowed to implement international decisions.633 
Kumm634 shows that in liberal constitutional democracies, government institutions 
and bureaucracies generally tend to conform their behaviour to legal requirements as 
interpreted by national courts. He concludes that in the same way, enforcement of 
international law by national courts is likely to increase the probability of state 
compliance with internationallaw.635 
Finally, it is essential that national courts be considered as enforcers of international 
decisions because of the current legal context. The process of globalisation has 
brought about significant changes in international relations. International law 
problems now have their roots in the domestic arena and if international law is to 
make any impact, it must tackle these problems at this level. International law 
pervades areas traditionally reserved to domestic jurisdiction of states such as human 
rights, criminal law, trade, the abuse of natural resources, management and 
conservation of the environment and even cultural heritage. 636 As a result, 
adjudication in these areas will require a complex blend of international and national 
legal norms.637 This naturally mandates the involvement of international and national 
legal institutions. 
In short, the most compelling reason for using national courts to enforce IC] decisions 
is that they will be most effective. Their legitimacy and authority at a municipal law ~ 
level means they are better suited to enforce decisions than the Security Council, the 
IC], or other international institutions. 
633 Kumm "International Law in National Courts: The international rule of Law and the Limits of the 
Internationalist Model" (2003-2004) 44 Va. J Int'! L. 19 at 22. 
634 Ibid 
635 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 2nd ed (1979) at 47, points out that as a general rule nations 
comply with international law, but the problem of non-compliance is widespread enough to grant a 
significant role to national courts. 
636 Francioni "International La~ as a Common Language for National Courts" (2001) 36 Tex. Int'l L. J 
587 at 588. 
637 Ibid 
168 
7.3.2 The potential role for national courts to be direct enforcers ofICJ 
decisions. 
There can be little doubt that national courts would be useful mechanisms to enforce 
IC] decisions. The potential for this role is great, but the likelihood of this role being 
officially recognised is uncertain. This research has made it clear that there is no 
absolute obligation on national courts to enforce IC] decisions and where national 
courts do so, there are real challenges that must be faced. Whether a court will defer 
to the IC] or not depends on the status of international law in domestic law. 
7.3.2.1 The status of international law in domestic law 
Chapter 1 discussed the theories of international law that attempt to describe the 
relationship between international law and national law. It was showed that a dualist 
state is unlikely to accept the direct enforcement of international decision by its 
courts, whereas a monist state would. Slyz638 points out that these theories no longer 
exist in their pure forms, which means that most nations fall somewhere in between 
monist and dualist. However, even where a state is traditionally described as dualist, 
there might still be room for development. For instance, even in a dualist nation like 
the United States there is room for international principles to influence domestic law 
without first passing through the Legislature. A self-executing treaty might be directly 
enforced by a national court without having to first be approved by the Legislature. 
This once again supports the point that a strictly academic perspective of the theories 
of international law is not as fruitful an endeavour as the study of the relationship 
between international law and domestic law through state practice. Consequently, 
treaty law is the obvious area through which national courts can play an active role in 
enforcing IC] decisions. LaGrand was a demonstration of the outworking of this 
potential role. 
638 Slyz "Note, Intemationallaw in national courts" (1995-1996) 28 NY. u.J. In! '/ L. & Pol. 65. 
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7.3.2.2 Practical Aspects 
Reilley and Ordonez639 describe three scenarios to demonstrate the possible role for 
national courts in IC] jurisprudence. Firstly, national courts may playa role where a 
successful litigant to an IC] decision seeks to enforce that decision against the 
judgment debtor before a national court.640 Secondly, a national court may be 
approached by only one of the original parties to the IC] decision.641 Finally, a 
national court may be involved where a decision of the IC] is used as evidence of law 
or fact in a matter before a national court. 642 
Judgment creditor and judgment debtor before a national court 
This first scenario would arise as follows: suppose the IC] in LaGrand had requested 
a monetary award as compensation for the breach by the United States, and Germany 
were to enforce this decision in a domestic court. Before a domestic judge could make 
ruling there are two conditions that he has to satisfY himself with. Firstly, he or she 
would have to accept the decision of the IC] as authoritative and dispositive.643 If not, 
the United States could raise the issue of res judicata and argue that Germany cannot 
re-litigate on the basis of the same facts. 644 Additionally, to hear the facts anew would 
be in contravention of Article 60 of the UN Charter that provides that IC] decisions 
are final and without appeal.645 Yet a domestic judge may be hesitant to enforce the 
IC] decision without hearing argument for fear that he would be acting outside his 1 
authority. No party has attempted to enforce an IC] decision in this way; 
consequently, the outcome is certain. However, this remains an option, albeit an 
unlikely one. 
639 Reilley & Ordonez "Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on national 
courts" (1995-1996) 28 NY.UJ.Int'l L. & Pol. 435. 
640 Reilley & Ordonnez 1995-199628 NY. UJ. Int'/ L. & Pol. 452. 
641 Reilley & Ordonnez 1995-199628 NY.UJ.Int'l L. & Pol. 455. 
642 Reilley & Ordonnez 1995-1996 28 NY. UJ. Int'l L. & Pol. 468. 
643 Reilley & Ordonnez 1995-1~96 28 NY. UJ.Int'l L. & Pol. 452. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Reilley & Ordonnez 1995-1996 28 NY. UJ. Int 'I L. & Pol. 455. 
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One party to the ICJ decision before a national court 
This can happen in two instances; where a third party is suing the judgment debtor 
and relies on the IC] decision as the basis of its claim, or the judgment creditor is 
suing a third party on the basis of the IC] decision.646 If only one of the parties to the 
IC] decision is the subject of litigation before the national court, the problem of res 
judicata does not strictly arise because the parties are not the same. An example of 
this can be seen in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case.647 The case concerned the legitimacy 
of Iran's decision to nationalise oil. Although the matter was never dealt with on the 
merits for lack of jurisdiction, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British company, 
then brought an action against a Swiss company that had purchased a quantity of the 
nationalised oil at a national level. 648 The IC] did not deal with the case on the merits, 
but certain comments made by the court were later used as foundations for actions by 
the United Kingdom. In the case of Socobel v Greece649 a Belgian corporation sought 
to execute a judgment obtained 12 years earlier in the PCIJ, before a Belgian court. 
Whilst the action was not successful on the basis of jurisdiction, it demonstrates the 
potential that national courts have to actively enforce decisions of the IC]. The 
problem here is that section says that Ie] decisions are binding only on the parties to 
the case. 
ICJ decision used as evidence of law or fact in a domestic court 
The final scenario is where domestic courts cite IC] decisions as evidence of law or 
fact. In such cases the IC] decision is often afforded persuasive authority. This occurs 
predominantly in the area of maritime law and treaty interpretation.65o In the case 
concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr v 
646 Ibid 
647 u.K. v Iran, 1952 I.C.J 93 (July 22). Available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iukisummary520722.htm. 
648 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co v JafJrate et al (Supreme Court ofthe Colony of Aden, 1953). Can be found 
in (1953) 47 Am. J. Int'/ L. 325" 
649 18 lL.R 3 (Belg, Trib. Civ. de Bruxelles 1951). 
650 Reilley & Ordonnez 1995-199628 N. Y. u.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 469. 
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us.,) a Moroccan Appeal court overturned a decision by the lower court which had 
been based on an earlier IC] decision as its primary authority. 
The Medellin v Dretke651 -type situation is a unique example that could fall into either 
of the second or third categories. Medellin was relying on the IC], s interpretation of 
the VCCR, while relying on the IC]'s finding in Avena that the detainees should be 
allowed. 
7.3.3 Concluding remarks on national courts as active enforcers of ICJ 
decisions 
At the time that the UN Charter was drafted it was not envisaged that international 
law would have domestic legal effect. However, it clearly does. The rights of 
individuals in the same position as Medellin cannot be disregarded. The law must be 
expanded to accommodate this situation. It therefore follows that only national courts 
would be able to adjudicate in such cases, since private individuals have no standing 
in the IC]. 
The above examples are an attempt to show three ways in which national courts could 
be active enforcers of IC] decisions. 
Political scientists have said that the EC] was cautious in its approach, to avoid ? 
overstepping the bounds of political consensus of the community.652 The court thus 
used an incremental style by wooing national courts to accept the expansion of its 
jurisdiction and enforce its judgments. Interestingly enough, the founding fathers of 
the Treaty of Rome never intended the EC] to play such a prominent role in the 
European Community. 653 
651 (125 S. Ct 686 (2004). 
652 Stein 'Lawyers, Judges, and the Making ofa Transnational Constitution' (1981) 75 Am. J.lnt'l L. 1. 
653 See Rasmussen On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (1986) 249-250. 
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7.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Globalisation and the human rights movement has resulted in significant changes in 
the international milieu. International law has not remained untouched by these 
changes. Due to the increased connectivity in the world, the domain of international 
law and domestic law can no longer be seen as separate. Decisions made at an 
international court level are now having more direct impact on domestic law. This 
thesis has used the cases of LaGrand and Avena to demonstrate this phenomenon. The 
increased influence of international law in the domestic arena means the IC] has 
greater opportunity to shape the development and reception of international legal 
principles and standards within the borders of sovereign states. The issue therefore 
requires a twofold approach: On the one hand, the IC] must make bolder decisions 
than in the past. "The image of the International Court of Justice as a sort of lemonade 
stand dispensing occasional decisions to sovereign passers-by is no longer apt.,,654 On 
the other hand, the implementation methods of the court have to be strengthened. 
There has been a relatively high record of compliance with the judicial decisions of 
the ICJ, but the lack of power to secure such compliance is a huge problem for 
international adjudication.655 The thesis has thus considered the possibility of using 
national courts as active enforcers ofIC] decisions. 
It has been said that "the objectives of international law and the stability of the 
international system itself depend critically on domestic choices previously left to the ~ 
determination of national political processes".656 The EU system has proved the 
success of this method. It is unlikely that the UN Charter and the IC] Statute will 
change; it has been shown that there is great room for the IC] to use national courts as 
enforcers, especially in the area of treaty law. The example of the U.S. was used to 
show that this can be done in a way that would be in keeping with the domestic laws 
and constitutional principles of the nation state. The challenge that remains is not 
654 Nafziger "Political Dispute Resolution by the World Court, with reference to United States Courts 
(1997-1998)" 26 Denv. J. Int'/ L. & Poly 775 at 785. 
655 • Shreuder 1975Int & Camp. L.Q. 159. 
656 Slaughter & White "The Future ofIntemational Law is Domestic (or The European Way of Law)" 
200647 Harv. Int'! L.J. 327 at 328. 
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structural but ideological, especially in the present international milieu. Francioni657 
puts it as follows: 
"At a time when the traditional straitjacket notion of national sovereignty is 
being eroded by transnational economic forces, global communication and the 
increasingly vocal role of non-governmental organizations, it becomes 
essential that national courts adjust to this reality by re-defining the boundary 
of their judicial function." 
This thesis is thus a contribution to the field, in that it shows that there is room for 
national court involvement in the enforcement of international decisions, at least 
through treaty law. National judges now need to embrace the fact that they too have a 
role to play in the development of internationallaw.658 The idea of law is to establish 
a set of rules and principles that guide human or state behaviour. These rules must be 
both standard and stable. The success of these laws, however, lies not in their mere 
existence, but in their implementation. Consequently, the success of international law 
is not determined by how elegantly it is framed, but how well it is implemented by the 
member states for which it exists. 
657 2001 Tex. Int'/ L. J. 587 at 598. 
658 Reilley & Ordonez "Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on National 
Courts" (1995-1996) 28 NY.U. J.Int'/ L. & Pol. 435 at 483. 
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